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IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA ) 
BELSTLER, husband and wife ) 
) 
Petitioner/Plaintiff ) 
) 
vs ) 
) 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and ) 
HOW ARD CONINE, husband and wife ) 
) 
Respondents/Defendants ) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
37893-2010 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, in and 
for the County of Kootenai. 
HONORABLE LANSING L. HAYNES 
District Judge 
Arthur B. Macomber 
408 E Sherman Ave., Ste 215 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Charles M. Dodson 
1424 Sherman Ave., Ste 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Attorneys for Respondents 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA ) 
BELSTLER, husband and wife ) 
) 
Petitioner/Plaintiff ) 
) 
~ ) 
) 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and ) 
HOW ARD CONINE, husband and wife ) 
Attorney for Appellant 
Arthur B. Macomber 
408 E Sherman Ave., Ste 215 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
37893-2010 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Charles M. Dodson 
1424 Sherman Ave., Ste 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Kootenai, Idaho this LI'* day of \JrJC J , 2010 
\ DANIEL 1. ENGLISH 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: j)ebr2 D. Lell 
Deputy Clerk 
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F cia I District Court - Kootenai Co 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0002523 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Chris Belstler, etal. vs. Karen Sheler, etal. 
User: LEU 
Chris Belstler, Dana Bel stier vs. Karen Sheler, Howard Conine 
Date 
4/9/2007 
5/30/2007 
7/17/2007 
7/19/2007 
7/23/2007 
8/312007 
8/8/2007 
12113/2007 
1117/2008 
Code 
NCOC 
COMP 
SUMI 
HRSC 
NOAP 
ACKS 
MOTN 
AFFD 
CONT 
HRSC 
HRVC 
STIP 
MISC 
ANSW 
HRSC 
HRVC 
User 
LEPIRE 
LEPIRE 
CRAMER 
CRAMER 
TAYLOR 
PARKER 
PARKER 
PARKER 
PARKER 
PARKER 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
MCCOY 
HUFFMAN 
PARKER 
PARKER 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
Judge 
New Case Filed - Other Claims Lansing L. Haynes 
Filing: A 1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No Lansing L. Haynes 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Layman, Layman, & 
Robinson Receipt number: 0739631 Dated: 
4/9/2007 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: [NONE] 
Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
Summons Issued Lansing L. Haynes 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/17/200703:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Motion to Enlarge Time 
Dodson 
Filing: 11A - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than Lansing L. Haynes 
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Charles M 
Dodson Receipt number: 0746495 Dated: 
5/30/2007 Amount $58.00 (Check) For: [NONE] 
Notice Of AppearancelCharles M Dodson 
Acknowledgement Of Service 
Motion for Enlargement of Time and Notice of 
Hearing 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Enlargement of Lansing L. Haynes 
Time 
Hearing result for Motion held on 07/17/2007 Lansing L. Haynes 
03:30 PM: Continued Motion to Enlarge Time 
Dodson 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/19/2007 03:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Motion to Enlarge Time 
Dodson 
Amended Notice of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
Hearing result for Motion held on 07/19/2007 Lansing L. Haynes 
03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion to Enlarge 
Time 
Dodson 
Stipulation to Extend Time For Defendants to Lansing L. Haynes 
Answer Complaint 
Proof of Service Lansing L. Haynes 
Filing: J8B - Special Motions Counterclaim With Lansing L. Haynes 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Charles M Doson 
Receipt number: 0756710 Dated: 8/8/2007 
Amount: $14.00 (Check) For: [NONE] 
Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim Lansing L. Haynes 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 02/20/200803:30 PM) Bistline 
1 hr 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
held on 02/20/2008 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Bistline 
1 hr 
Date: 10/29/2010 Fi al District Court - Kootenai Coun User: LEU 
Time: 12:03 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of? Case: CV-2007-0002523 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Chris Belstler, etal. vs. Karen Sheler, etal. 
Chris Belstler, Dana Belstler vs. Karen Sheler, Howard Conine 
Date Code User Judge 
1/17/2008 HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 03/06/200803:30 PM) 1 hr, Bistline 
2/2812008 HRVC TAYLOR Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
held on 03/06/2008 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
1 hr, Bistline 
HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 04/15/2008 03:30 PM) Bistline, 1 hr 
3/3112008 HRVC TAYLOR Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
held on 04/15/200803:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Bistline, 1 hr 
HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 05/28/200803:30 PM) Bistline, 1 hr 
4/1012008 NOTC PARKER Notice of Address Change Lansing L. Haynes 
4/29/2008 HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Lansing L. Haynes 
05/19/200803:30 PM) 
TAYLOR Notice of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
4/3012008 AFFD VICTORIN Affidavit of Chris and Dana Belstler Lansing L. Haynes 
MEMO VICTORIN Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 
MNSJ VICTORIN Motion For Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
NOHG VICTORIN Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
AFFD BAXLEY Affidavit of Atrhur Bistline In Support of Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 
5/5/2008 RSCN MCCOY Response to Status Conference Notice-Bistline Lansing L. Haynes 
5/19/2008 HRHD TAYLOR Hearing result for Status Conference held on Lansing L. Haynes 
05/19/200803:30 PM: Hearing Held 
5/2112008 HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
01/20/200909:00 AM) 4 days 
TAYLOR Notice of Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
FILE MCCORD New File Created Lansing L. Haynes 
******************FILE 2****************************** 
5/23/2008 HRVC TAYLOR Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
held on 05/28/2008 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Bistline, 1 hr 
HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 07/08/200803:30 PM) Bistline 
Dodson, 1 hr 
6/2312008 AFFD CANTU Affidavit of Charles M. Dodson in Oppostion to Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFD MCCORD Affidavit of Howard Conine in Opposition to pet's Lansing L. Haynes 
motion for summary judgement 
AFFD MCCORD Affidavit of Karen Sheler (Conine) in Opposition Lansing L. Haynes 
to pet's motion for summary judgment 
MEMO MCCORD Memorandum in opposition to pet's motion for Lansing L. Haynes 
summary judgment 
Date: 10/29/201 0 
Time: 12:03 PM 
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Fi cia I District Court· Kootenai Co User: LEU 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0002523 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Chris Belstler, eta!. vs. Karen Sheler, eta!. 
Chris Belstler, Dana Belstler vs. Karen Sheler, Howard Conine 
Date Code User Judge 
6/23/2008 MOTN MCCORD Motion for a view of the premises Lansing L. Haynes 
6/30/2008 NOTH MCCORD Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
FILE SHEDLOCK New File Created *****File #3***** Lansing L. Haynes 
718/2008 HRVC TAYLOR Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
held on 07/08/2008 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Bistline 
Dodson, 1 hr 
7/3012008 MISC CANTU Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosure Lansing L. Haynes 
9/21/2008 FILE SHEDLOCK New File Created *****File #4***** Lansing L. Haynes 
*****Expando - DF and PF Exhibits***** 
1018/2008 STIP HUFFMAN Stipulation for Relief from Pretrial Order Lansing L. Haynes 
Concerning Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosure 
10/15/2008 STIP MCCORD Stipulation to Continue Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
ORDR HAMILTON Order on Stipulation for Relief from PreTrial Lansing L. Haynes 
Order Concerning Plaintiffs Expert Witness 
Disclosure 
10/20/2008 REPT CRUMPACKER Report of Mediation Lansing L. Haynes 
10/22/2008 STIP TAYLOR Stipulation to Continue Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
10/31/2008 ORDR TAYLOR Order Continuing Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
HRVC TAYLOR Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on Lansing L. Haynes 
01/20/200909:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4 days 
HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
04/20/200909:00 AM) 4 days 
TAYLOR AMENDED Notice of Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
11/412008 SUBC PARKER Substitution Of CounsellArthur A Macomber Lansing L. Haynes 
11/6/2008 STIP CRUMPACKER Stipulation to Continue Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
11/13/2008 ORDR TAYLOR Order Continuing Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
HRVC TAYLOR Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on Lansing L. Haynes 
04/20/200909:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4 days 
HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
05/18/2009 09:00 AM) 4 days 
TAYLOR Notice of Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
1/3012009 STIP LEU Stipulation For Plaintiffs To File An Amended Lansing L. Haynes 
Complaint And To Request The Court To Vacate 
Trial Date And Reset Trial Schedule 
2/312009 COMP TAYLOR Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on Lansing L. Haynes 
Deeds, and Request for Quiet Title to Upper and 
Lower Roads 
ORDR TAYLOR Proposed Judgment Approving Stipulation for Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs to File Amended Complaint, Vacating 
Trial Date and Rescheduling a New Trial Date 
HRVC TAYLOR Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on Lansing L. Haynes 
05/18/2009 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4 days 
Date: 10/29/2010 F cial District Court - Kootenai Cou User: LEU 
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Chris Belstler, etal. vs. Karen Sheler, etal. 
Chris Belstler, Dana Belstler vs. Karen Sheler, Howard Conine 
Date Code User Judge 
2/3/2009 HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
09/21/200909:00 AM) 4 day 
TAYLOR AMENDED Notice of Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
2/1712009 MISC HUFFMAN Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, & Lansing L. Haynes 
Counterclaim 
3/18/2009 ANSW PARKER Counter Defendants Delstlers' Answer to Lansing L. Haynes 
Counterclaim 
3/25/2009 WITP CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs Disclosure of Expert Witnesses Lansing L. Haynes 
6/26/2009 WITD BAXLEY Defendants' Disclosure Of Potential expert Lansing L. Haynes 
Witness 
NTSV BAXLEY Notice Of Service Lansing L. Haynes 
7/612009 NTSV CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs Responses to Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendants Request for Production of 
Documents 
7/20/2009 NTSV COCHRAN Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs' Request for Lansing L. Haynes 
Answers to Interrogatories, Set One 
7/21/2009 NTSV CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs Request for Lansing L. Haynes 
Answers to Interrogatories Set One Corrected 
7/28/2009 NOTD BAXLEY Notice Of Intent To Take Oral Deposition Of Lansing L. Haynes 
karen Sheler on 08/20109 at 9:00 AM 
8/2412009 NTSV COCHRAN Notice Of Service Lansing L. Haynes 
9/8/2009 RECT COCHRAN Receipt Of Transcript Lansing L. Haynes 
PLWL COCHRAN Plaintiffs Witness List Lansing L. Haynes 
NOTC COCHRAN Notice of Filing Plaintiffs List of Exhibits Lansing L. Haynes 
9/11/2009 STIP JOKELA Stipulated Waiver Jury Trial and Stipulation for Lansing L. Haynes 
View of the Premises by Presiding Judge 
9/14/2009 HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
09/21/200909:00 AM) 
HRVC TAYLOR Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on Lansing L. Haynes 
09/21/2009 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4 day 
LETR HARPER LetterlPlease return the signed Orginial Lansing L. Haynes 
Cetrificate Of Witness and change Sheet to M & 
M Court Reporting Service, INC. 
WITD HARPER Witness List - Defendant's Lansing L. Haynes 
NOTC HARPER Notice of Defendnats List of Exhibits Lansing L. Haynes 
STIP HARPER Stipulated Waivere of Jury Trial, and Stipulation Lansing L. Haynes 
for view of the Premises by Presiding judge 
9/15/2009 TAYLOR AMENDED Notice of Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
9/16/2009 MISC HARPER Plaintiffs Trial Brief Reconveyance of Easement Lansing L. Haynes 
Ineffective Pursuant To Idaho Law 
9/17/2009 MISC HARPER Defendants Proposed Findings Of Fact And Lansing L. Haynes 
Conclusions Of Law 
MISC HARPER Defendants Pretrial Memorandum Lansing L. Haynes 
Date: 10/29/2010 
Time: 12:03 PM 
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Fi I District Court - Kootenai User: LEU 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0002523 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Chris Belstler, etal. vs. Karen Sheler, etal. 
Chris 8elstler, Dana Belstler vs. Karen Sheler, Howard Conine 
Date Code User Judge 
9/18/2009 WITP HARPER Plaintiffs Revised Witness List Lansing L. Haynes 
NOTC VICTORIN Notice of Filing of Plaintiffs' Revised List of Lansing L. Haynes 
Exhibits with Revised List 
MISC SREED Defendants' Amended Witness List Lansing L. Haynes 
NOTC SREED Corrected Notice of Defendants' List of Exhibits Lansing L. Haynes 
9/21/2009 NOTC HARPER Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and James R. Michaud 
Conclusions of Law 
DCHH TAYLOR District Court Hearing Held COURT TRIAL-DAY James R. Michaud 
ONE 
Court Reporter: JOANNE SCHALLER 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
CTST CARLSON Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled held on James R. Michaud 
09/21/200909:00 AM: Court Trial Started 
DCHH CARLSON District Court Hearing Held James R. Michaud 
Court Reporter: Joann Schaller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 100 
9/2212009 DCHH TAYLOR District Court Hearing Held COURT TRIAL-DAY James R. Michaud 
TWO 
Court Reporter: JOANNE SCHALLER 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
DCHH CARLSON District Court Hearing Held James R. Michaud 
Court Reporter: Joann Schaller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 100 
FILE SHEDLOCK New File Created *****File #5***** Lansing L. Haynes 
9/23/2009 DCHH CARLSON District Court Hearing Held James R. Michaud 
Court Reporter: Joann Schaller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 230 
9/24/2009 DCHH CARLSON District Court Hearing Held James R. Michaud 
Court Reporter: Joann Schaller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 139 
9/28/2009 ESTI VICTORIN Estimate Of Transcript Costs/JoAnn Schaller Lansing L. Haynes 
10/29/2009 MISC COCHRAN Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Legal Arguments Lansing L. Haynes 
10/30/2009 MISC HUFFMAN Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs' Post Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
Memorandum 
11/23/2009 PBRF CRUMPACKER Defendants Conines Response to Plaintiffs Post Lansing L. Haynes 
Trial Brief 
MEMO CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs reply to Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs Lansing L. Haynes 
Post-Trial Memorandum 
12/23/2009 MEMO HUFFMAN Memorandum Decision And Order For Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
Date: 10/29/2010 
Time: 12:03 PM 
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Fi cia I District Court - Kootenai Cou User: LEU 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0002523 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Chris Belstler, etal. vs. Karen Sheler, etal. 
Chris Belstier, Dana Belstier vs. Karen Sheler, Howard Conine 
Date Code User Judge 
12/23/2009 FILE HARWOOD ***************FILE #6 Lansing L. Haynes 
CREATED********************** 
12/30/2009 ORDR RICKARD Order To Withdraw And Substitute Memorandum Lansing L. Haynes 
Decision And Order For Judgment 
MEMO RICKARD Memorandum Decision And Order For Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
1/4/2010 NOTR CRUMPACKER Notice Of Transcript Delivery Robert Lynn Lansing L. Haynes 
Stratton 
1/6/2010 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider Lansing L. Haynes 
02/12/201010:00 AM) MacComber 
NOTC CRUMPACKER Notice of Motion & Motion for Reconsideration & LanSing L. Haynes 
Amendment of Memorandum Decision 
1/13/2010 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider Lansing L. Haynes 
03/16/201003:30 PM) MacComber 
HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on Lansing L. Haynes 
02/12/201010:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
MacComber 
1/14/2010 ... NOTC BAXLEY AMENDED Notice Of Motion For Lansing L. Haynes 
Reconsideration and Amendment Of 
Memorandum Decision on 03/16/10 at 3:30 PM 
3/2/2010 BRIE HARWOOD Brief In Support Of Motion For Reconsideration Lansing L. Haynes 
And Amendment Of Memorandum Decision 
3/10/2010 BRIE SREED Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Motion for Lansing L. Haynes 
Reconsideration and Amendment of 
Memorandum Decision 
3/12/2010 MISC HUFFMAN Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Brief in Opposition Lansing L. Haynes 
to Motion for Reconsideration & Amendment of 
Memoradum Decision-3/16/2010 3:30 PM 
3/16/2010 DCHH SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on LanSing L. Haynes 
03/16/201003:30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT 
Court Reporter: LAURIE JOHNSON 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: MacComber 
4/21/2010 MEMO SVERDSTEN Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiffs' Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion to Reconsider 
4/29/2010 AFFD BAXLEY Affidavit Of Costs (Defendants) Lansing L. Haynes 
6/4/2010 CVDI VICTORIN Civil Disposition entered for: Conine, Howard, LanSing L. Haynes 
Defendant; Sheler, Karen, Defendant; Belstier, 
Chris, Plaintiff; Belstier, Dana, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 6/4/2010 
FJDE VICTORIN Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
STAT VICTORIN Case status changed: Closed LanSing L. Haynes 
7/14/2010 CVDI LEU Civil Disposition entered for: Conine, Howard, Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant; Sheler, Karen, Defendant; Belstier, 
Chris, Plaintiff; Belstier, Dana, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 7/14/2010 
FJDE LEU Amended Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
Date: 10/29/2010 
Time: 12:03 PM 
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cial District Court - Kootenai 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0002523 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Chris Belstler, eta!. vs. Karen Sheler, eta!. 
Chris Belstler, Dana Belstler vs. Karen Sheler, Howard Conine 
Date Code User 
7/16/2010 LEU Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Macomber, Arthur B 
(attorney for Belstler, Chris) Receipt number: 
0031007 Dated: 7/16/2010 Amount: $101.00 
(Check) For: Belstler, Chris (plaintiff) and 
Belstler, Dana (plaintiff) 
APSC LEU Appealed To The Supreme Court 
APDC LEU Appeal Filed In District Court 
STAT LEU Case status changed: closed 
BNDC VICTORIN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 31031 Dated 
7/16/2010 for 100.00) 
STAT VICTORIN Case status changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
7/19/2010 MISC LEU Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal 
7/30/2010 BNDC LEU Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 33401 Dated 
7/30/2010 for 2164.50) 
8/6/2010 RICKARD Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Dodson, Charles M. 
(attorney for Sheler, Karen) Receipt number: 
0034428 Dated: 8/6/2010 Amount: $101.00 
(Check) For: Conine, Howard (defendant) and 
Sheler, Karen (defendant) 
1016/2010 BNDV RICKARD Bond Converted (Transaction number 2315 
dated 1016/2010 amount 2,138.50) 
10/8/2010 BNDC RICKARD Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 44070 Dated 
10/8/2010 for 107.25) 
10/19/2010 BNDV RICKARD Bond Converted (Transaction number 2405 
dated 10/19/2010 amount 107.25) 
BNDV RICKARD Bond Converted (Transaction number 2406 
dated 10/19/2010 amount 26.00) 
User: LEU 
Judge 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
STAlE OF IDAHO }SS 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
CUUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
FILED: 7'5 76f/ 
LAYMAN, LAYMAN & ROBINSON, PLLP 
110 Wallace Avenue 2001 APR -9 PM 4: 24 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 ~lC~~ (208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
ISB: 5216 
SUMMONS ISSUE UTY CU 
APR 09 2007 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, Husband and Wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Case No. 07- ";lId:? 
--'-----
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
KAREN SHELER and HOWARD 
CONINE, Husband and wife, and the 
marital community composed thereof, 
Defendants. 
For a cause of action, Plaintiffs, allege as follows: 
1) Plaintiffs DANA BELSTLER and CHRIS BELSTLER, at all times material 
hereto, were and are husband and wife, and reside in Kootenai County, idaho, 
at 7316, W. Chandler Lane. 
2) Defendants KAREN SHELER and HOWARD CONINE mayor may not be 
husband and wife, but upon information and belief, at all times material 
hereto, said defendants did reside in the State of Washington, and were and 
are the owners of the real property located at 7200 W. Chandler Lane, in 
Kootenai County, Idaho. 
3) Defendants presently utilize a portion of Plaintiffs' property to access their 
property. 
4) Plaintiffs are entitled to an order allowing them to relocate the Defendants' 
access to their property in such a manner as to not unreasonably interfere with 
Defendants' use and enjoyment of their property. 
-1- RIGfNAL 
5) Defendants presently have a gate located on Plaintiffs' property and Plaintiffs 
are entitled to an order directing that Defendants' remove the gate. 
6) Plaintiffs have made demand on Defendants for the above and Defendants 
have unreasonably refused to acquiesce to the same. Plaintiffs are entitled to 
an order that Defendants reimburse them for their reasonable attorneys fees 
and costs incurred in prosecuting this action, with a reasonable sum being 
$1,500 in the event this matter proceeds by way of default for failure to 
answer the complaint and $100,000 being a reasonable sum in the event of 
default for any other reason, subject to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. 
Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray that this Court enter an Order: 
1) Allowing Plaintiffs to relocate Defendants' access; 
2) Enjoining permanently Defendants from using the present access; 
3) Allowing Plaintiffs to remove Defendants' gate and place it on Defendants' 
property; 
4) Awarding Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in this 
action; and 
5) Providing to Plaintiffs such other and further relief as the Court may deem fair 
and equitable. 
A Jury Trial on all issues subject to trial by jury is requested. 
DATED this 27th, day of March, 2007. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
~----""-------
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
VERIFICATION 
DANA BELSTLER being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says: 
-2-
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.- Y" 
I am one of the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action and named in the foregoing 
instrument, and have read the contents thereof, and believe the same to be accurate and 
complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
Dated this 2ih Day of March 2007. 
~~.c=-
Dana Be1stler 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 27th, 2007. 
~---------------
Notary Public For Idaho 
Residing at 110 LkI~ft? 
Commission Expires .jI; 
-3-
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... 
CHARLES M. DODSON 
Attorney at Law 
1424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814 
(208) 664-1577 
Facsimile (208) 666-9211 
ISB #2134 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
CASE NUMBER: CV-07-2523 
VS. 
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, 
AND COUNTERCLAIM 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
DEFENDANTS. 
KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
COUNTER PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
COUNTER DEFENDANTS. 
~n . nz 
FEE CATEGORY: J 8b 
FEE: $14.00 
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COMES NOW, the above named Defendants, CONINE, by and through their Attorney of 
Record, CHARLES M. DODSON, and by way of Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, 
answer, admit, deny, affIrmatively allege and counterclaim as follows: 
ANSWER 
I. 
These Answering Defendants, except as specifically admitted herein, deny each and every 
allegation contained within the Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
II. 
These Answering Defendants are without sufficient knowledge to address the allegations 
contained within Paragraph 1. of Plaintiffs' Complaint, that the same appears to be true, and 
therefore admit the same. 
III. 
In response to Paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs ' Complaint, these Answering Defendants admit that 
they are husband and wife, reside in the State of Washington, and are the owners or real property 
located at 7200 W. Chandler Lane in Kootenai County, Idaho. 
IV. 
In response to Paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Answering Defendants admit the 
same, and affIrmative allege that these Answering Defendants are either entitled to (by document of 
record) the easement across the Plaintiffs' property, or have established the use of said easement by 
prescriptive use pursuant to Idaho Code Title 5, Chapter 2. 
V. 
In responding to Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs ' Complaint, these Answering Defendants deny the 
same. 
VI. 
In response to Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Answering Defendants admit the 
existence of a gate, dispute whether or not the same is on the Plaintiffs' property, and deny that 
Plaintiffs are entitled to any Order directing the removal of the gate. Defendants further 
affIrmati vely allege that the location of a gate upon the easement ofthe Defendants upon the property 
of the Plaintiffs is authorized as a matter oflaw. 
ii Z 
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VII. 
In responding to Paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, these Answering Defendants 
acknowledge the receipt of a demand, and deny each and every other allegation set forth therein. 
AFFIRMA TIVE DEFENSES 
VIII. 
These Answering Defendants raise the following Affirmative Defenses in response to 
Plaintiffs' Complaint: 
A. Latches 
B. Statute of Limitations 
C. Easement by implication 
D. Prescriptive Easement 
E. Easement of Record 
IX. 
These Answering Defendant have been required to obtain the services of counsel for the 
defense of said matter, and, upon prevailing, are entitled to their reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
in an amount to be proven at the time of trial herein. 
WHEREFORE, these Answering Defendants pray Judgment as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed; 
2. That Defendants be awarded their attorneys fees and costs for the defense thereof. 
3. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable in the premises. 
COUNTER CLAIM 
COMES NOW the Defendants, and by way ofCounterc1aim, complaint and allege as against 
the Plaintiffs as follows: 
I. 
That the Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE (hereinafter referred to as CONINE), are residents of the State of Washington, and the 
owners of certain real property described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and hereafter incorporated 
by reference as if fully set forth herein. 
-
-. 53 7if if 
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II. 
That Plaintiff/Counter Defendants, DANA BELSTLER and DANA BELSTLER (hereafter 
referred to as BELSTLER) are believed to be husband and wife, residents ofthe County of Kootenai, 
and owners of adjacent property as the same lies immediately west of the property owned by 
CONINE described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
III. 
That the court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Idaho Code 5-401 et seq. 
IV. 
That CONINES have an easement located upon and across the northerly portion running east 
and west, of the property owned by BELSTLER commonly referred to as 7316 W. Chandler Lane, 
Kootenai County, Idaho. 
V. 
That CaNINES and their predecessors in interest have used said road hereinabove referenced 
continuously, openly, notoriously, and without interruption for at least twenty (20) years for access 
to their property. 
VI. 
That in the alternative to the foregoing paragraph, CaNINES have an Easement of Record, 
or by implication as the case may be, upon and across the property of BELSTLER. 
VII. 
That CONINE currently uses the road hereinabove referenced across the BELSTLER land 
for ingress and egress to the CONINE property. 
VIII. 
That BELSTLER seeks to unlawfully and unreasonably restrict CONINIE' S use of the road 
hereinabove described for access to the CONINE property, and as such CONINE'S have been 
damaged in an amount to be determined at the time of trial on the merits. 
REi "F - -- . -w JTIii'iif mtG V7T -"iiiiSW j _ WET 
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IX. 
That CONINES have been required to obtain the services of counsel for the prosecution of 
this matter and are entitled to their reasonable attorneys fees and costs in an amount to be proven at 
the time of trial herein. 
WHEREFORE, CONINES PRAY JUDGMENT on this Counterclaim as follows: 
1. For a determination of the rights of the CONINES in the currently existing roadway 
located upon and across the property of BELSTLER, either as an Easement by prescription, an 
Implied Easement, or Express Easement created by recorded document; 
2. For an award of CONINE'S attorney's fees and costs for the prosecution of this action; 
3. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this ~ \iay of_~~.......J:!--r-_~,,::,:,,~ 
. DODSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
I hereby ertif)j that on the t' day of 
--~~~.w--' 2007, a true and correct copy 
of the fore . ng was: 
transmitted, via facsimile: 
to: 
ARTHUR BISTLINE 
A TTORNEY AT LAW 
ILE 208-665-7290 
RLES M. DODSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
- -
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ORDER NO. 34479 
EXHIBIT "All 
That :pJrtion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 17, 
Township 48 North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho, 
described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter of said Section; thence 
East along the North side of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter, a 
distance of 510 feet; thence 
South on a line parallel with the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter to the Northerly l::oundary of TERRACE ADDITION to Rockford Bay 
Sumrer Hares; thence 
In a Westerly direction along the Northerly l::oundary line of said TERRACE 
ADDITION to the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 17; thence 
North along said West line to the Northwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of 
the Northeast Quarter to the :pJint of beginning. 
EXCEPT any portion thereof lying within road right of way. 
- -
"r,: q 
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
LAYMAN, LAYMAN & ROBINSON, PLLP 
5431 N Government Way, Ste. lOlA 
Coeurd'A!enc, Idaho 83815 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 676-8680 (fax) 
ISB: 5216 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
STATE OF IDAHO } SS COUNTY OF KOOTENAI . 
FILED: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAB.O, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, Husband and Wife., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KAREN SHELER and HOWARD 
CONINE, Husband and wife, and the 
marital community composed thereof, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 5S. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV-07-2S23 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIS AND DANA 
BELSTLER 
We, Chris Belstler and Dana Belstler having been first duly sworn, upon oath 
depose and state that: 
1. We are over the age of eighteen (18) and residents of Kootenai County, State 
of Idaho. 
2. W c arc familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this matter and 
are competent to testify as to the matters herein contained. 
Al~FIDAVIT OF emus AND DANA BELSTIJER -1- ~iO 
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3. We are the owners of rea! property overlooking Rockford Bay, Lake Coeur 
d'Alene. We acquired our parcel from the Henry's and the Henry's from V.A. 
Sanders. 
4. Defendants Howard Conine and Karen Sheler own the property immediately 
to the cast of us. 
5. Our property is crossed by three (3) difl'-"1"cnt roads which the Conines have 
used to provide access to their property; the commllllity road, Chandler Lane; 
a private drive, which diverges from Chandler Lane at approximately our 
property line; and the "lower road" located at tl1e north end of our property. 
All three roads traverse the entire width of our property. These roads are 
drawn on Exhibit A to this Affidavit. Exhibit A is the merger of two (2) maps 
which is why some of the lines do not match up. 
6. When we looked at the property, before we purchased it, we saw the private 
drive but did not think it went anywhere and that any use was made ofiliat 
drive as it was narrow and not manicured. We did not see anyone use the 
private drive until a couple of months after we moved in. As tht: winter 
moved into spring and summer we met the Conines and noticed that when 
they wcrc in town they used the private drive to access their property. We also 
noticed in the summer of 2006 that someone was driving trailers across the 
lower road and parking them on the Conine property. 
7. In the summer of 2006 we approached the Conines and asked them to cease 
using the lower road and private drive. We offered to grant them an easement 
on the east side of our property that was sufficient to allow for an acceptable 
- AFFTDA VTT OF CHRIS AND DANA BELSTLER -2- 211 
grade into the Conine property off of Chandler Lane. We also offered to 
perform the work needed. The Conines ceased use of the lower road but 
never responded to our offer and stopped talking to us. The offer was 
conveyed again in November 2006 by our attorney and not responded to. 
That let1er is attached as Exhibit B. 
8. TIle only recorded documents pertaining to any easement across our property 
is Instrument Number 1119009, a true and correct copy ofwhlch is attached 
as Exhibit C. This instrument did show up on our title report, but was listed as 
an easement for the benclit of our parcel. 
9. The Conines' use of the private drive impacts our properly in the foHowing 
ways: 
a. People driving across our drive can see into our home, again creating 
a very uncomfortable feeling for us. We cannot leave our large garage 
door open us we feel people are checking the contents out when they 
drive by. Simply put, the private drive causes traffic to come closer to 
our horne than makes us feel comfortable. 
b. We are unable to make improvements on our property. An example is 
that we want to asphalt our drive and put up a retaining wall coming 
into our property. 
c. The road the Conines are using has a fairly decent sized seasonal 
creek. This is causing a problem fbr us as their usage and the 
overgrowth of brush is causing the creek to change its path. It now 
floods the road and is moving down towaxdsthe gate the Conines have 
Q w-- Fize = 
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The creek flows from the road down the side of our yard. TIle 
Canines driving on this road has caused it to erode. There has been 
zero up-keep. They and their friends drive trucks and traile;:fs with 
boats across this road to store their boats in the pole bam. It is not a 
properly constructed road and has soft soil. 
d. OUf well is only fifteen (15) feetlTom the drive, which is only ten (10) 
feet wide. Our well is placed too close road for the traffic it would get 
once the Conines move up here permanently. They come up 
infrequently now and only have_ two (2) pole barns, so tile well 
placement, although a concern, is not yet an issue. 
e. As of now the Conines pole barn and pole barn conversion arc being 
used as a party place and side boat storage business. Wc have 
unknown people coming across our drive and too close to our home. 
Wc have experienced a lot of trash being thrown on our property and 
havc had people walking across our drive at night lor no reason. 
1: Chandler Lane is properly constructed and is further from our house, 
giving u.s much more privacy. Chandler Lane (on our property) has 
gravel and is very wide. It has a proper culvert and drainage. It is a 
well built road. We have kept it up as far as landscaping. Due to the 
trees and bushes along the lane, people can not see into Ollr home and 
garage with ease, as they do now. 
Vii 
Al:l~1DA VIT OF emus AND DANA BEl~STI~ER -4-
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10. The existence o~ the lower road prevents us from making use of the onI yother 
... ' 
.; .. 
flat part of our property. The property can be subdivided, but no residence 
can be constructed because bfthc location of the road. 
Dated this 12 day of April, 2008. 
~~ 
DANA BELSTLER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ...."UL day of April, 2008. 
-
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for Idaho 
Residing at:S"I't ->. (:J.J:! ~.gNICC 
Commission Expires: IO-J'-( ( 
I hereby certify that on the ~y of April, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Charles M. Dodson 
1424 Shenmm Ave., Ste. 300 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 666-9211 
AFFIDAVIT OF Cl'nuS AND DANA BELSTLER -S-
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LAW CI'l'lCllS 
LAYMAN, lAYMAN & ROBlNSON, Pill) 
. 316 Occidental AVI2IUC S. 
Suirc500 . 
Scnlllc, WASlil04 
(206) 340-\314 
Fax (206) 292-1790 
JOHNaLAYMAN+ 
IOHNR. IAYMAN-
RICHARD Co ltODlNSOlll+ 
PATllJO FOSl'Ell'" 
ASHLEY AJUCHARDS* 
ANDREW A SCBn.LINGER+ 
ARllIUR.M. BISllJNE" 
AMlEl.~ 
MkDNM.NACCARAlOt 
Howani and Karen Conine 
20426 Damson Road 
Lynnwood. WA 98036 
601 SOuIhDi~SIl1:Xt 
Spokane; WA992Cl2-1335 
(S09)455-!lH83 
FlU (509) 624-;!902 or 
(509) 444-8290 
November 6, 2006 
llOWnIlaceAwnw:: 
CooA-d'.AJcnc, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
Fux.(208) 66,5·7290 
OFOOUNSEL. 
"'BRrAN Co BALOi 
+.Admitlcd in WlIIlhingIun 
• Admilh::d in Wnsbingum NJd Idaho 
• Admiual in liluba 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL-RRR 
7004 2510 0001 68306946 
Re: Be1stlcr. Chris & Dana I Easement / Howard and Karen Conine 
Our File: 27361 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Conine: 
I represent Chris and Dana Belstlcrregarding various issues on their property. 
The Bc1stlcrs approached you on August 5, 2006, with a request that you cease using an access 
to your property. going through their private driveway and begin using the actual easement on the 
upper: rond, which you have declined to do. 
My injtial impression is that the access you are presently using is not recited in any recorded 
document As such, to continue your lISe oftbat driveway you will be required to expend thollSands of 
doI1ars an attorneys' fi:es with DO certainly oftbe outcome, or you can reconsider the Bclstlcrs' very 
reasonable offer to excavate a driveway and provide an easement on their property to allow for a proper 
grade for that driveway. They, like you, would rather spend money on matters that add value, rather 
than attomeys' fees, and I can see no reason that tbeirproposal will devalue your property. In addition, 
Mr. and Mrs. Belstler also recently had a property line survey done, to confum encroachment of your . 
gate, leading into your property. The gate you installed is approximately 2 feet onto the Bclstlers' 
property. They are requesting that you move the gate onto your property, where it belongs. There is a 
legal marker, which is now a :record ·of survey, showing the property line; your gate should be just 
behind the mm:ker. If you 'agree to the Belstlers' proposal to build you a new driveway, the gate will not 
be nccessru:y. If you do not, they will address it in the same suit as 1he driveway. 
\\lJmItJl'h!Utw'dtlCWIJall!l\BcIstlcr, Chri3\Z736\\55854.doc ~ EXHIBIT - 0'" 6 A 
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Howard and Karen Conine 
Page2of2 
November 6, 2006 
You have fifteen (15) ~ys from receipt to respond to this letter. If I receive no response, I will 
schedule a court hearing on behalf of the BeIstlcrs with regards to these two issues and the above offer 
will be rescinded. I have made equally clear to the Belstlern the potential costs to force the issue of the 
access, and they are committed to going forward if some resolution cannot be reached. 
Our hope is to amicably resolve this situation privately. Mr. and Mrs. Bclstler arc open to 
- dialog regarding this issue and hope to bear :from you. If you are not interested in any sort of resolution 
of this malter, Mr. and Mrs. Belstler request that you attend mediation as soon as all schedules permit. 
Please contactrne if you have any questions or comments. 
Very truly yours, 
LAYMAN, LAYMAN & ROBINSON, Pll.P 
c---__ 
ARTHUR M BISTLlNE 
AMB/sld 
cc: Chris and Dana Bclstler 
.. H7__ tV tr 
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HUT}!AL "aRI1lr;H~N'1" POIt £I\S£HBH!I' POR INGRESS MID gCOllE:!!! 
N1TNKSBE'l'llr 
WIlERtAl!. V. ". SANDERS and CiEftAt.D:IHE C:. SAMDE:RS. hU!IIban'd and 
wife. are tbe o"ne:1I 01 t:ha EaBt 660.4 ft. 01' the NWl,r ly.1ng. Ilo~t'h 
of Roclttor4 Day Road 166C in Section 17. Township " ·8 Nor!:b. Hange 
••• 8.H., in Xoo~.noi County, Idaho, and are 8e111n9 the ~o11G~g 
deacrritoad property to XJl:Nl':.I!:'l'1I L. IIICNlty, a sin91. JUn I 
All that por~ion ot Cov. Lo~ 1. S.~tion 17. 'l'o~n.hip 48 
N •• NAnga 4 ~.».~., dasorlba4 a8 follo ... r 
8eginninq at tho Wor~h8.st corner of Gov. Lot 11 then~a 
Nort.h 89°36' Woat along ~he North line of .a1d Gov. ~dt 
1. 3JO.2 ft., tha~Ce South D0 24' W.st to a point on the 
Marth I1na of Rockford Bay R.oadl thence ~.IIt..r1y a1,on9 
aaia Rorth L1ne of Rocktor4 aay Road to a pain'!: wb·.1.ch • 
b~.ra South 0°24' Wast fro~ the Point of h.~1nnln9; ~hewc. 
North OO:Z~. Itc.at ~o the Point of &Qginnin~. 
the lCef.ltcrly J30.::z' gf Ciov. toe 1 of approxilllat.ely 20 fl:. in • .t:.d:\:;h 
Nor~h And South and 330.2' East and W.st, 
in an Area aajaClIlnt 1:0 Rockford Hay noad and in fron1:. ot t.h. t;.1..I:·o-
~tatlon lOCAted thereon. 
KENNETH to. Ul!:NR~ grAnt.s an .aoelllel\!: cont.1ouin", the ,u:1.ss:.1.ng 
rood In ~b8 Soutperly pDrt of ~hB property tn.t h$ ia p~rcha.in9 
from v. A. SA~Dr.RS ~nd GChALD1NE C. SANDER9 and the Northerly part 
of the propert.y that h- i. purcbasing frolll V. A. SANDtk~ and 
QCR~DINE C. SANDERS to LIND~ MERWIN, who owne tbe property in tbe 
Idaho. BaiQ aaa.ment~ are t~e cont1.nu~t1on of tbe a~ist.1nq 109Q1n9 
roa~ runnin9 parallel to Rockford say aoed on the South and the 
tha North. 
V. A. SANDERS 
~AiM;(?~(~ 
G KALDXH~ C. SARDXas 
~&.~ KENNE~H ~. UENRy1F 
('"\ -, 
_. t 8 II EXHIBIT m I 
tm p riST 
,\ 111,,,,f LoU t.) U I U U UU U 
S~nTC or WASHINGTON) 
lB •• 
County of Spokano ) 
On clti. day p8&'aon&111 .appo.~od 'bofCl%e .0 V. A. s:l1nnUn; 
and G~RALD~"B c. SANDBas to ao known eo be Cho 1ndLv1d~.~8 ~.­
",cribQIt in and who exar:uted tbe vitJtin an4 1!orc;.oI'2I9 l1Uf'.f!',r~~it"'I1. 
and ac!cn:;J"leclvecl that they signed ttl. ' .l11li8 as their t:r:oe: .. nod 
. voluntary Bot and deed. f021: tb. VB •• IUld p'tlrpo •• , ~herei..n 1118'at;:: .... .. 
ci gnod. " rqJ Ii 
CIVXN under my hand and 0::iol.a1 8.al th18 ~ 
1'88. 
S~A~K or WA5H%HC~ON) 
1.8. 
Coun~y ot Spokano ) 
. . -: .,. ' 
: ,;,.: 
't9r(; ~ .... 
On ~biB day personally app.ared hetore _0 XEN~E~~ L- ~~~ 
to ~e known to bo tho individuAl deacribed tn and vh~ .~.~~~~~;: 
the within Gnd fore9cing instrument, Gnd Ack~ov~edv.od chat '~h'" 
e19nll4 the .alle lUI his !reo and Volunt;ary IIC~ alld dee-d . fer 1\:11'11 
UIOS and purpos •• ~h.rein .en~ionea. 
CIVZN ynder ay he"d 
June. 1.9U8. 
" . 
r . U I U 
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COUNTY OF KOOTEWJ SS 
::ILED: . ~ 
CHARLES M. DODSON 
Attomey at Law 
J 424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814 
(208) 664-1577 
FacsimHe (208) 666-9211 
ISB #2134 
2008 JUN 23 PH 3! 50 
'- . ,GL~ . ~",-IC ____ _ .~ 
I 
TN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIlE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELS1LER and DANA 
... BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
vs. 
KAREN SHBLER (CONINE) and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
DEFENDANTS. 
KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE, husbarui and wife, 
COUNTER PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife~ 
COUNTER DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NUMBER; CV-07-2523 
AFFIOA vrr OF KAREN SHELER 
CONINE IN oPPosmON TO 
PLAINTlFFS' MOnON FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
J-AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN SHELER CONINE TN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ' 
220 
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STATE OF 
County of 
) 
)ss. 
) 
KAREN SHELER CONINE being first auJy swom on oath deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant makes thi~ Affid.avit on the bDBis of her own persona.l informatiol'l/ belief and 
knowledge, and facUi to which s:he c6uld testify if called to do so ill a cowt oflaw. 
2. Affian~ together with her husband, HOWARD CONWE, purchased property situate in 
the County of Kootenai, State ofIdaho, more particularly described on Exhibit f<A" a.t.ta.ohed hereto, 
which property was purchased on or about thl! 25th day of June, 1998 from GARY H. SOLOMON 
and JUDITH A. SOLOMON. 
3. At the time of purchase there WiL~ a roadway extending from Sanders Lane aoros, the 
property of the Plaintiffs for access to th(: property jd~ntified on Exhibit "A"~ whjch was the only 
. physical means of access to the buildings located on the property descTibed as Exhibit "A·', I 
commonly refer to that as Oltt private driveway, and it has been the only access to the property since 
it was subd.ivided by Mr. Sanders well over twenty yeBl'S ago. That private driveway is the only 
physical access to our property, the upper portion of Sand.ers Lane being steep, and well elevated 
above the building site Which we currently occupy on tbe property described as Exhibit ttA". 
4. There is no other aocess off' of Sand r::rs Lane, which is also known as Chandler Lane, onto 
our property other than the private driveway which traverses Belstlers property and to reconstruct 
a road from the extension of Chandler Lane/Sander Lane would be literally physically impossible 
based upon my observations, the elevati.ons EIl1.d the djstance~. 
5. At the time of purchase of our property we were advised that the road referred to as the 
lower road by the Belstlers in their Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents that 
runs next to the Worley Fire Department, was an easern.ent toad ~ the lower half of our 8.9 acres. 
The Bclstlers blocked the use of that road on occasion, although we have continued to use that road. 
6. Until the BelstIers raised the issue of the use of our priva.te drive to our buildings on our 
property, no one ever questioned our use of the private driveway, and apparently, according to the 
deposition of Jerry Ronald Evans, which I hav~ reviewed, that private drive bas been in existence 
well over twenty years. 
2 "AFFIDA VIT OF KAREN SHELER CONINE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
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7. Over the past ten years of ownership, my husband and I have maintained the road (private 
drive) which crosses the Belst1ers property, almost every year by having it re-graveled We have 
avoided doing so for the last two years to avoid unnecessary CQ.ofrontations with the Belstlers. We 
are fuUy aware that wh.en th.e BeIstlers were examining the property for purchase, they could see 
clea.rly the private drive was newly graveled and well maintained. 
8. We do not have any other physical access from Chandler Lane to our .property, and to cut 
off the private drive would Jeave our property inaccessible for. the purposes of accessing the 
buildings constructed upon our property. SUb:sequent to our purchase we aiso added a 36 X 110 pole 
building to our property, using the private drive for access for the con.~etjon matcr.ials and 
workmen. That building is not being used for any commercial purposes, and is used primarily by 
HOWARD CONINE for his boat and car eollection. As ofthe date of making this Affidavit, stored 
within the bnilding are a travel trailer, EI. Cadillac Aliante. a 1971 Mustang, a 1978 Lincoln, a 1972 
Ford 4X4 pickup, a 1980 Bayliner Boat, a 1988 Welcraft Boat, a 1977 Eliminator Boat, a 1977 
Tahiti Boat, a 1994 Jeep Cherokee, a 1985 Winebago Motor Home and a friend's travel trailer. 
Additionally, our neighbor stored two jet skis, without cost~ over the vvintel' i:o. that building. 
9. During the coursc of our ownership we used the lower access road and offered jt to the 
neighboring resort to use to store empty boat trailers on the lower portion of our property which is 
out of sight of both our buHdings, which we use when on site, and also out of sight of the Belstler 
house. 
10. We have not at anytime:: \Ised our property for commercial putposes. 
11. We did remove the storage of boat trailers Wler the Be16tlers demanded they be removed. 
12. The BeJstlel's' private home sits at least forty yards away from private drive we use to 
access OUt structures ao.d property. The back of the Belstler house faces the private drive and only 
·recently. a.fter the Bclstlers remodeled, did they install a floor to ceiling window and large glass 
wood door which allows them. to 5ee any vehicle travel o~1. our private drive across the rear ofthe1r 
property. 
13. Shortly after the Belstlers purchased their property they were invited to our residence for 
a barbequc. had the oppo1'tun.ity to walk down our private drlve, and they raised 110 objection. It was 
3-AFFIDA VIT OF KAREN SHELER CONINE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIPFS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
m 
06/23/2008 09:46 FAX 206 72 
, as/19/20aa lE'.! 03 
NORTHWEST ADMINISTRATO 
DClDSDN-RAEClN. 
@011/013 
PAGE lEI 
quite some time later, many monthB. the Belsders raised the:: issue that they did not want my husband 
and 1 ot out guests using the private drive. 
14. After it became olear The Belstlers did not desire us to use our private drive~ the Belstlers 
cleared and improved, what we now understand to be that portion of Chandler Lane/Sandler Lane 
which is raised significantly in elevation above our buildings and struotures, Wld had never been used 
by us, and as we understand it, had not been used by the SOLOMONS, Mr. Kluss or Linda Merwin 
(our predecessors in interest). To our knowledge, that upper road (~xtension of Chandler 
Lane/Sander$ Lane) has not been maintained or used for over twenty years. Further, it has been 
blocked at its end by a gate and fence at the Black Rock Golf Course. 
15. To eliminate the private drive and force us to use the extension of Chandler 
Lan~Sanders Lane that has now beel1 improved on our property by the Bclstlers would be literally 
impossible in the wintertime due to incline, assumb')g arguendo a road could actually be "cut" to the 
buildings on our property. 
16. Over the course of ownership we have visited our Idaho property described on Exhibit 
.tN' literally every other weekend, incl uding the winter time, with one exception when the snow on 
Snoqua]ttde P~5 was treacherous to gct through ('we Jive iT.! Western Washington Coast), 
17. The Belstlers, in their Affidavit, which I have read, are stating that my husband and I usc 
the Idaho property as a party place. Mr. Conine is 61 years old and I am 56 years old. We elo have 
barbeques with friends occasionally in the summer but we do not «party". 
18. Rarly in our neighborly relationship with the Belstlefs shortly after they purchased their 
1'1'operty, M.r.s. Belstler speoifically a.dvised me "we didn't even known when you were here", 
meaning they had not even noticed when we drove across the private driVE:. 
19. The BelstIers in their Affidavit indicate the Road is close to their wel1. The private drive 
is also close to our well. and does not cause problems for either well to our knowJedgC!. 
20. As to the Belstlers proposal to relocate OUT road depending upon the proposed relocation, 
such a road would be a terribly steep incline, and in all likelihood run directly acro!s our well 
location. 
4-AFFTDA VIT OF KAREN SHELER CONWE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTTFFS' MOTION 
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21. At the time of our purchase an~ taking of possession of our propc:rt)', there was a boat 
stored in the building on OUI property, ~d we were required to contact the SOLOMONS, our 
predecessors in interest, through our realtEO have that boat removed. That boat is evidence the 
property was used by the SOLOMONS or X),e oftheit guests or invitees. 
22. I have, through my attomey, 0 • ed copies of documents that relate to OUI land. One 
of those documents is a Mutual Agreentnt for Easement for Ingress and Egress recorded as 
Instrument No. 1119009, a copy of which ts attached as Exhibit 4tB". I understand that document 
to be au Agreement which allows for the ± of our lower road next to the fire station. 
23. I also obtained,. through my atto I ey, a document which was signed by Linda L. Merwin 
and V.A. Sanders, a copy of which is attaChf:' as Exhibit "C". It is my understanding tbat document 
wasmemorialization ofa verbal agreemen between Linda L. Merwin and V.A. Sanders allowing 
for the aeo~ss through the property owned b V. A. Sanders (which is Dowthe Belstlcrs property and 
others). That document clearly ShOW5 LindJ Merwin W4$ aware of the status of the private drive and 
I 
I 
the benefits of aocess. , 
24. Atthe time of closing of our I'ut'~hase we obtained a Title Report, a troe and correct copy 
of which is attached as Exhibit "D". ReferJCed in tha.t Title Report is a Joint Use and Maintenance 
Agreement, signed by our predecessor ill i~terest, Mr. Kluss. That provAdes for a Joint Usc and 
Maintenance Agreement ~lpon the road. bt eximod in 1991, and based upon our phr.;ical 
exarninati.on of the premisos in 1998 the orily road that could refer to is the private drive. A eopy 
I 
of that JOtot Use md Maintenance Agredent is attached as Exhibit "E". 
25. In Paragraph 9, Subsection c O~llleir Affidavits, the Belst1e:rs claim there is a l'fairly 
descent sized seasonal creek" adjacent to oJr private drive. They also claim it is causing problems 
by causing the creek to change its path~O our knowledge, based Upon our exam.ination and 
presence at thf;' property. that creek does no flood the road nor has our driving of the priVate drive 
caused it to erode. Notwithstanding the co. ents by the Belstlers, we have always provided upkeep 
to our private drive, with the exception o~ the last year or so in order not to be involved in a 
confrontation with the Bel!'tJers. 
, 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAI1lI NOT. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me tbis 1 ~day of ~ ) VU---< 
sc:;:v __ --. 
~013/013 
F'AGE 12 
,2008. 
NO UBLle FOR: r~ d 
RE TOING AT: LYJ1{17wlJ(J::/ /l27~ tJlflc.e 
MYCOMMISSIONEXPIRES: ,02 'IS-I/ 
\A 
I here certifY that on the ...:2l day of 
__ ~~¢.._. 2007, a true and correct ;oP,Y ( 
of the 0 going was: i1~~ ~1.Jfu...J 
-tr:mlsmitred, via f.auiA.i101h r _. - Ij 
to: 
ARTHUR BISTLINE 
ATTO ~ATLAW 
C 8M. DODSON 
AITORNEY AT LAW 
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ORDER NO. 34479 
EXHIBIT "A" 
That ];X)rtion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 17, 
Township 48 North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho, 
described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter of said Section; thence 
East along the North side of the Northwest Quarter of the :Northeast Quarter, a 
distance of 510 feet; thence 
South on a line parallel with the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter to the Northerly J:ounda:ry of TERRACE ADDITION" to Rockford Bay 
S1...ll1l1'"I2r Hares; thence 
In a Westerly direction along the Northerly roundary line of said TERRACE 
ADDITICN to the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 17; thence 
North along said West line to the Northwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of 
the Northeast Quarter to the ];X)int of beginning. 
EXCEPT any ];X)rtion thereof lying within road right of way. 
J;~HIBIT 
At 
/ 11 
1119009 
MUTUAL AGREEMENT FOR EASEMENT FOR INGRESS AtW EG·RESS 
WITNESSETH, 
WIIEREAS, V. A. SANDERS and GERALDINE C. SANDERS, h"1Jband a,"~ 
",ife, are the owners of the East 660.4 ft. of the NWIr lyi.ng. North 
of Rockford Bay Road '66e in Section 17, Township 48 North, Ran-ge 
4 W. 8.M., in Kootenai County, Idahol and are selling the foll:c)\d'n:g 
described proper.ty to KENNETH L. HENRY, a single lIIan' 
All that portion of Gov. Lot 1, Section 17, Township 48 
N., Range 4 W.B.H., desoribed as follows: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Gov. Lot 11 tben~e 
North 89°36' West along the North line of said Gov. Lot 
1, 330.2 ft.; thence South 0 0 24' West to a point on th~ 
North line of Rockford Bay Road; thence Easterly alang 
said North line of Rockford Bay Road to a point wn·icb . 
bears South 0 0 24' West from the Point of beginning: thenc~ 
North 0°24' East to the Point of Beginning. 
"._ '1: 
'ra 
::~ 
c~ t~ ,.1~ 
~ ~ 
,j 
, i!ii 
WHEREAS, it is necessary to execute a joint easem.ent for LJf-g~:;t~[~. fI 
··/l:.;1 
and egress; NOW THEREFORE, V.A. SANDERS and GERALDINE C. SANDE'RS '-; :'f.i;? 
,"""t "" ...... "t to "'.NET. L. B'NnY ov.r . th. SOU'h.rlY port'~' "" f' ~ 
the Westerly 330.:2' of Gov. Lot 1 of approximately 20 ft. in w£dth fI 
North and South and 330.2' East and West, '~ 
in an area adjace'nt to Rockford Bay Road and in front of the fl.r·e 
station located thereon. 
KENNETH L. HENRY grants an easement continuing the existin9 
road in the Sout~erlY part of the property that he is purchasing 
from V. A. SANDRRS and GERALDINE C. SANDERS and the Northerly part ~ 
of the property that he is purchasing from V. A. SANDERS and 
GERALDINE C. SANDERS to LINDA MERWIN, who owns the p~operty in the 
NE~ of Section 17. TOWnship 49 N . • Range 4 W.B . M., Kootenai County. 
Idaho. Said easements are the continuation of the existing 10ggin9 
roa~ runnin9 parallel to Rockford Bay Road on the South and the 
the North. fn:isting road frolll the community road on 
DATED this ~ day of June, 19~8. 
'l~;/~~-£-
V. A. SANDERS 
~~ rz:.44t~~V 
'"' ~, '7 
) .. / 
EXHIBIT 
.~. 
1\ 
.... 
-09 1.1.1.90 . 
STATE OF ~ASHINGTON) 
) ss. 
county of Spokane ) 
On this day personally appEia~ed before -me V. A. S~llD'.sR;S 
and GERALDINE C. SANDERS to lIle knQwn tQ be the in<3ivi.ciu:4;l;s ~:I!'_ 
scribed in and who e'lecuted the within an-~ fo-reg.ohl9 lms£"ru!l)~n'lf. .~ 
and acknowledged that they signed the s.a'lile as their fz::(1;B an:-(i ... df:j:':" 
voluntary act: and deed, for the uses and purposes tha:r:ein lIiel1;"::.:' 'v :.f, __ 
tioned. . .:~4?t ~J!' 
. .~;;;",: ~ ... 
GIVEN under lilY hand and official seal this L dIIIY.- .0£;1:1;:' 
.June, 19 SS. _;,.: 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
Iss. 
County of Spokane ) 
On this day personally appeared before me KENNEllm·- L. lHBI~R~ 
to Ine known to be the individual. described in and ·who ex~:c;#;~f.di" 
the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowle-dg:ed th:a,t-~tt~" 
signed the same as his free and voluntary act and dee"l, £01:" erre 
uses and purposes therein mentioned. 
GIVEN under my hand and official 
June, 1988, 
COUIfIY Ot KOOTENAI SS 
STATE Of IIWIO } 
ATlJl~I?~ 
= ALt) Umllllltea JaSt./LLo'cIoc¢:u Shitl!:rlleltl 
"~~F. 
fee~ 4;rlJ 
Relullllo p.t). SfL.::r~ 
~,tuL. 9'7.J..4)' 
.... ,,'Co< .• ~., 
According to a verbal agreem~nt between the undersianed parties, an 
easement on the northwest corner of the property ow~ed by Linda L. 
Merwin was granted in exchange for access from the county road 
thorough property owned by V. A. Sanders. Further, any additional 
access thorough the Merwin oroperty had to be mutually agreed to by both undersigned parties. 
This verbal agreement 
authority to complete 
other property. This 
parties. 
was made to provide Mr. Sanders with 
the present road and provide him access to 
agreement was clearly beneficial to 
EXHIBIT 
III ..l 
the 
his 
both 

POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE 
JSSUED BY 
First American Title Insurance Company 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS FROM COVERAGE CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE 
B AND THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS, FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California 
corporation, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, 
not exceeding the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A, sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of: 
1. Tme to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested other than as stated therein; 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on the title; 
3. Unmarketability of the title; 
4. Lack of a right of access to and from the land. 
The Company will also pay the costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in defense of the title, as insured, but 
only to the extent provided in the Conditions and Stipulations. . 
First American Title Insurance Company 
BY rf/4x!. ~ PRESIDENT 
ArrEST /J1 ruI tl.-~ SECRETARI 
e~rate or Imeresl. I ms POliCY snail not continue 10 
. favor of any purchaser from the insured of either (i) an 
or interest in ~he land, or (ii) an indebtedness secured 
, purchase money mortgage given to the insured. 
3. NOTICE OF CLAIM TO BE GIVEN BY 
INSURED CLAIMANT. 
The insured shall notify the Company prompUy in 
writing (i) in case of any litigation as set forth in Section 4(a) 
below, (ii) in case knowledge shall come to an insured 
hereunder of any claim of title or interest which is adverse to 
the title to the estate or interest, as insured, and Wl1ich might 
cause loss or damage for which the Company may be liable 
by virtue of this policy, or (iii) if title to the estate or interest, 
as insured, is rejected as unmarketable. If prompt notice shall 
not be given to the Company, then as to the insured all liability 
of the Company shall terminate with regard to the matter or 
matters for which prompt notice is required; provided, 
however, that failure to notify the Company shall in no case 
prejudice the rights of any insured under this policy unless 
the Company shall be prejudiced by the failure and then only 
to the extent of the prejudice. 
4. DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION OF ACTIONS; 
DUTY OF INSURED CLAIMANT TO COOPERATE. 
(a) Upon written request by the insured and subject to 
the options contained in Section 6 of these Conditions and 
Stipulations, the Company, at its own cost and without 
unreasonable delay, shall provide for the defense of an 
insured in litigation in which any third party asserts a claim 
adverse to the title or interest as insured, but only as to those 
stated causes of action alleging a defect, lien or en-
cumbrance or other matter insured against by this policy. The 
Company shall have the right to select counsel of its choice 
(subject to the right of the insured to object for reasonable 
cause) to represent the insured as to those stated causes of 
action and shall not be liable for and will not pay the fees of 
any other counsel. The Company will not pay any fees, costs 
or expenses incurred by the insured in the defense of those 
causes of action which allege matters not insured against by 
this policy. 
(b) The Company shall have the right, at its own cost, 
to institute and prosec ute any action or proceeding or to do 
any other act which in its opiniQn may be necessary or 
desirable to establish the title to the estate or interest, as 
insured, or to prevent or reduce loss or damage to the 
insured. The Company may take any appropriate action under 
the terms of this policy, whether or not it shall be liable 
hereunder, and shall not thereby concede liability or waive 
any provision of this policy. If the Company shall exercise its 
rights under this paragraph, it shall do so diligently. 
(c) Whenever the Company shall have brought an 
action or interposed a defense as required or permitted by the 
provisions of this policy, the Company may pursue any 
litigation to fmal determination by a court of competent 
jurisdiction and expressly reserves the right, in its sole 
discretion, to appeal from any adverse judgment or order. . 
(d) In all cases where this policy permits or requires 
the Company to prosecute or provide for the defense of any 
action or proceeding, the insured shall secure to the 
Company the right to so prosecute or provide defense in the 
action or proceeding, and all appeals therein, and permit the 
Company to use, at its option, the name of the insured forthis 
purpose. Whenever requested by the Company, the insured, 
at the Company's expense, shall give the Company all 
reasonable aid (i) in any action or proceeding. securing 
evidence, obtaining witnesses, prosecuting or defending the 
action or proceeding, or effecting settlement, alld (ii) in any 
other lawful act which in the opinion of the Company may be 
necessary or desirable to establish the title to the estate or 
interest as insured. lithe Company is prejudiced by the failure 
of the insured to furnish the required cooperation, the 
Company's obligations to the insured under the policy shall 
terminate, including any liability or obligation to defend, 
prosecute, or continue any litigation, with regard to the matter 
or matters requiring such cooperation. 
5. PROOF OF LOSS OR DAMAGE. 
\ 0) 10 t'ay or umerwlse bettie With Parlies Uther 
the Insured or With the Insured Claimant. 
(i) to pay o,r otherwise settle with other 
or in the name of an insured claimant any claim insur{;, 
against under this policy, together with any costs, attorneys' 
fees and expenses incurred by the insured claimant which 
were authorized by the Company up to the time of payment 
and which the Company is obligated to pay; or 
(ii) to payor otherwise settle with the insured 
claimant the loss or damage provided for under this policy, 
together with any costs, attorneys' fees and expenses 
incurred by the insured claimant which were authorized by the 
Company up to the time of payment and which the Company 
is obligated to pay. 
Upon the exercise by the Company of eitiler of the 
options provided for in paragraphs (b)(i) or (ii), the Com-
pany's obligations to the insured under this policy for the 
claimed loss or damage, other than the payments required to 
be made, shall terminate, including any liability or obligation 
to defend, prosecute or continue any litigation. 
7. DETERMINATION, EXTENl" OF LIABILITY 
AND COINSURANCE. 
This policy is a contract of indemnity against actual 
monetary loss or damage sustained or incurred by the 
insured claimant who has suffered loss or damage by reason 
of matters insured against by this policy and only to the extent 
herein described. 
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall 
not exceed the least of: 
(i) the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A; 
or 
(ii) the difference between the value of the insured 
estate or interest as insured and the value of the insured estate 
or interest subject to the defect, lien or encumbrance insured 
against by this policy. 
(b) In the event the Amount of Insurance stated in 
Schedule A at the Date of Policy is iess than 80 percent of 
the value ot the insured estate or interest or the iuli 
consideration paid for the land, whichever is less, or if 
subsequent to the Date of Policy an improvement is erected 
on the land which increases the value of tile insured estate 
or interest by at least 20 percent over the Amount of 
Insurance siated in Schedule A, then this Policy is subject to 
the following: 
(i) where no subsequent improvement has been 
made, as to any partial loss, the Company shall only pay the 
loss pro rata in the proportion that the Amount of Insurance 
at Date of Policy bears to the total value of the insured estate 
or interest at Date of Policy; or (ii) where a subsequent 
improvement has been made, as to any partial loss, the 
Company shall only pay the loss pro rata in the proportion that 
120 percent of the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule 
A bears to the sum of the Amount of Insurance stated in 
Schedule A and the amount expended for the improvement. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to 
costs, attorneys' fees and ey,penses for which the Company 
is liable under this policy, and shall only apply to that portion 
of any loss which exceeds, in the aggregate, 10 percent of 
the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A. 
(c) The Company will pay only those costs, attorneys' 
fees and expenses incurred in accordance with Section 4 of 
these Conditions and Stipulations. 
8. APPORTIONMENT. 
lithe land described in Schedule (A)(C) consists of two 
or more parcels which are not used as a single Site, and a loss 
is established affecting one or more of the parcels but not all, 
the loss shall be computed and settled on a pro rata basis as 
if the Amount of Insurance under this policy was divided pro 
rata as to the value on Date of Policy of each separate parcel 
to the whole, exclusive of any improvements made sub-
sequent to Date of Policy, unless a liability or value has 
otherwise been agreed upon as to each parcel by the 
Company and the insured at the time of the issuance of this 
policy and shown by an express statement or by an 
endorsement attached to this policy. 
9. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. 
the insured ciaimant sl1all transfer to the Company aii'r! 
and remedies against any person or property necessal 
order to perfect this right of subrogation. The ins 
claimant shall permit the Company to sue, compromis 
settle in the name of the insured claimant and to use the n 
of the insured claimant in any transaction or litig. 
involving these rights or remedies. 
If a payment on account of a claim does not fully CI 
the loss of the insured claimant, the Company shall 
subrogated to these rights and remedies in the propor 
which the Company's pa~fment bears to the whole am( 
of the loss. 
If loss should result from any act of the inst 
claimant, as stated above, that act shall not void this po 
but the Company, in that event, shall be required to pay ( 
that part of any losses insured against by this policy wI 
shall exceed the amount, if any, lost to the Company 
reason of the impairment by the insured claimant of 
Company's right of subrogation. 
(b) The Company's Rights Against non-insu 
Obligors. 
The Company's right of subrogation against nl 
insured obligors shall exist and shall include, with 
limitation, the rights of the insured to indemnities, guaranti 
other policies of insurance or bonds, notwithstanding , 
terms or conditions contained in those instruments wh 
provide for subrogation rights by reason of this policy. 
14. ARBITRATION. 
Unless prohibited by applicable law, either the Co 
pany or the insured may demand arbitration pursuant to I 
Title Insurance Arbitration Rules of tile American Arbitrati 
Association. Arbitrable matters may include, but are I 
limited to, any controversy or claim between the Compa 
and the insured arising out of or relating to this policy, a 
service of the Company in connection with its issuance 
the breach of a policy provision or other obligation. 
arbitrable matters when the Amount of Insurance 
$1,000,000 or less shall be arbitrated at the option of eitt 
the Company or the insured. All arbitrable matters when t 
Amount of Insurance is in excess of $1,000,000 shall 
arbitrated only when agreed to by both the Company and t 
insured. Arbitration pursuant to this policy and under t 
Rules in effect on the date the demand for arbitration is mal 
or, at the option of the insured, the Rules in effect at Date 
Policy shall be binding upon the parties. The award In 
include attorneys' fees only if the laws of the state in w/li( 
the land is located permit a court to award attorneys' fees 
a prevailing party. Judgment upon the award rendered by II 
Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdictic 
thereof. 
The law of the situs of the land shall apply to , 
arbitration under the Title Insurance Arbitration Rules. 
A copy of the Rules may be obtained from It 
Company upon request. 
15. LIABILITY LIMITED TO THIS POLICY; 
POLICY ENTIRE CONTRACT. 
(a) This policy together with all endorsements, if an: 
attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy an 
contract between the insured and the Company. In interprel 
ing any provision of this policy, this policy shall be construe 
as a whole. 
(b) Any claim of loss or damage, whether or ne 
based on negligence, and which arises out of the status c 
the title to the estate or interest c overed hereby or by an 
action asserting such claim, shall be restricted to this polic} 
(c) No amendment of or endorsement to this polic: 
can be made except by a writing endorsed hereon or attachel 
hereto signed by either the President, a Vice President, thl 
Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validating officer 0 
authorized signatory of the Company. 
16. SEVERABILITY. 
In the event any provision of the policy is held invalh 
or unenforceable under applicable law, the polic~/ shall bl 
deemed not to include that provision and all other provision: 
shall remain in full force and effect. 
17. NOTICES, WHERE SENT. 
All notices required to be given the Company and anI 
statement in writing required to be furnished the Companl 
shall include the number of this policy and shall be addressee 
to thp. r.nmn~nv ::It 11 LI. ~::I cot I:iffh ('trnni 0 ....... .f. .... 1\........ ("> .... ,.;"'" ~ .... :~ 
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 
The following matters are expressly excluded from joverage of this policy and the Company will not pay IL_ or damage, costs, attorneys' fees or expenses whicl 
arise by reason of: 
1. (a) Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning laws, ordinances, or regulations) restricting, regulating, prohibitin! 
or relating to (i) the occupancy, use, or enjoyment of the land; (ii) the character, dimensions or location of any improvement now or hereafter erected on thl 
land; (iii) a separation in ownership or a change in the dimensions or area of the land or any parcel of which the land is or was a part; or (iv) environmenta 
protection, or the effect of any violation of these laws, ordinances or governmental regulations, except to the extent that a notice of the enforcement thereo 
or a notice of a defect, lien or encumbrance resulting from a violation or alleged violation affecting the land has been recorded in the public records at DatE 
of Policy. 
(b) Any governmental police power not excluded by (a) above, except to the extent that a notice of the exercise thereof or a notice of a defect, lien or encumbrancE 
resutting from a violation or alleged violation affecting the land has been recorded in the public records at Date of Policy. 
2. Rights of eminent domain unless notice of the exercise thereof has been recorded in the public records at Date of Policy, but not excluding from coverage any 
taking which has occurred prior to Date of Policy which would be binding on the rights of a purchaser for value without knowledge. 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters: 
(a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant; 
(b) not known to the Company, not recorded in the public records at Date of Policy, but known to the insured claimant and not disclosed in writing to the Company 
by the insured claimant prior to the date the insured claimant became an insured under this policy; 
(c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant; 
(d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy; or 
(e) resulting in loss or damage which would not have been sustained if the insured claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured by this policy. 
4. Any claim, which arises out of the transaction vesting in the Insured the estate or interest insured by this policy, by reason of the operation of federal bankruptcy, 
state insolvency, or similar creditors' rights laws, that is based on: . 
(i) the transaction creating the estate or interest insured by this policy being deemed a fraudulent conveyance or fraudulent transfer; or 
(ii) the transaction creating the estate or interest insured by this policy being deemed a preferential transfer except where the preferential transfer results from the 
failure: 
(a) to timely record the instrument of transfer; or 
(b) of such recordation to impart notice to a purchaser for value or a judgment or lien creditor. 
1. DEFINITION OF TERMS. 
The following terms when used in this policy mean: 
(a) "insured": the insured named in Schedule A. and, 
subject to any rights or defenses the Company would have 
had against the named insured, those who succeed to the 
interest of the named insured by operation of law as 
distinguished from purchase including, but not limited to, 
heirs, distributees, devisees, survivors, personal representa-
tives, next of kin, or corporate or fiduciary successors. 
(b) "insured claimant": an insured claiming loss or 
damage. 
(c) "knowledge" or "known": actual knowledge, not 
constructive knowledge or notice which may be imputed to 
an insured by reason of the public records as defined in this 
policy or any other records Which impart constructive notice 
of matters affecting the land. 
(d) "land": the land described or referred to in 
Schedule (A), and improvements affixed thereto which by law 
constitute real property. The term "land" does not include any 
property beyond the lines of the area described or referred 
to in Schetfule(A), nor any right, title, interest, estate or 
easement in abutting streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, 
ways or waterways, but nothing herein shall modify or limit 
the extent to which a right of access to and from the land is 
insured by this policy. 
(e) "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, 
or other security instrument. 
(I) "public records": records established under state 
statutes at Date of Policy for the purpose of imparting 
constructive notice of matters relating to real property to . 
purchasers for value and without knowledge. With respect to 
Section 1 (a)(iv) of the Exclusions From Coverage, "public 
records" shall also incl/de environmental protection liens filed 
in the records of the clerk of the United States district court 
for the distri.ct in which the land is located. 
(g) "unmarketabiJity of the title": an alleged or 
apparent matter affecting the title to the land, not excluded or 
excepted from coverage, wh'lch would entitle a purchaser of 
the estate or interest described in Schedule A to be released 
from the obligation to purchase by virtue of a contractual 
condition requiring the delivery of marketable title. 
2. CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE AFTER 
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as 
of Date of Policy in favor of an insured only so long as the 
insured retains an estate or interest in the land, or holds an 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
by this policy which constitutes the basis of loss or damage 
and shall state, to the extent pOSSible, the basis of calculating 
the amount of the loss or damage. If the Company is 
prejudiced by the failure of the insured claimant to provide the 
required proof of loss or damage, the Company's obligations 
to the insured under the policy shall terminate, including any 
liability or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any 
litigation, with regard to the matter or matters requiring such 
proof of loss or damage. 
In addition, the insured claimant may reasonably be 
required to submit to examination under oath by any 
authorized representative of the Company and shall produce 
for examination, inspection and copying, at such reasonable 
times and places as may be designated by any authorized 
representative of the Company, all records, books, ledgers, 
checks, correspondence and memoranda, whether bearing a 
date before or after Date of Policy, which reasonably pertain 
to the loss or damage. Further, if requested by any authorized 
representative of the Company, the insured claimant shall 
grant its permission. in writing, for any authorized rep-
resentative of the Company to examine, inspect and copy all 
records, books, ledgers, checks, correspondence and mem-
oranda in the custody or control of a third party, which 
reasonably pertain to the loss or damage. All informaJion 
designated as confidential by the insured claimant provided 
to the Cornpany pursuant to this Section shall not be 
disclosed to others unless, in the reasonable judgment of the 
Company, it is necessary in the administration of the claim. 
Failure of the insured claimant to submit for examination 
under oath, produce other reasonably requested information 
or grant permission to secure reasonably necessary informa-
tion from third parties as required in this paragraph, unless 
prohibited by law or governmental regulation, shall terminate 
any liability of the Company under this policy as to that claim. 
6. OPTIONS TO PAY OR OTHERWISE SmLE CLAIMS; 
TERMINATION OF LIABILITY. 
In case of a claim under this policy, the Company shall 
have the following additional options: 
(a) To Payor Tender Payment of the Amount of 
Insurance. 
To payor tender payment of the amount of insurance 
under this policy together with any costs, ilttorneys' fees and 
expenses incurred by the insured claimant, which were 
authorized b the C . 
en er 0 paymen an w IC 
pay. 
Upon the exercise by the Company of this option, all 
liability and obligations to the insured under this policy, other 
+I ........... .j. .... _ .. 1._ .It ... _ _ __ ___ _. ••••• • • - • 
for any loss or damage caused thereby. 
(b) In the event of any litigation, including litigation t 
the Company or with the Company's consent, the Compar 
shall have no liability for loss or damage until there has bee 
a final determination tiy a court of competent jurisdictiol 
and dispOSition of all appeals therefrom, adverse to the titl 
as insured. 
(c) The Company shall not be liable for loss { 
damage to any insured for liability voluntarily assumed by th 
insured in settling any claim or suit without the prior writte 
consent of the Company. 
10. REDUCTION OF INSURANCE; REDUCTION OR 
TERMINATION OF LIABILITY. 
All payments under this policy, except payments mad 
for costs, attorneys' tees and expenses, shall reduce th, 
amount of the insurance pro tanto. 
11. LIABILITY NONCUMULATIVE. 
It is expressly understood that the Amount of In 
surance under this policy shall be reduced by any amount thl 
Company may pay under any policy insuring a mortgage t( 
which exception is taken in Schedule B or to which thE 
insu red has agreed, assumed, or taken subject, or Which i~ 
hereafter executed by an insured and which is a charge 01 
lien on the estate or interest described or referred to if 
Schedule A, and the amount so paid shall be deemed c 
payment under this policy to the insured owner. 
12. PAYMENT OF LOSS. 
(a) No payment shall be made without producing this 
policy for endorsement of the payment unless the policy has 
been lost or destroyed, in which case proof of loss 01 
destruction shall be furnished to the satisfaction of the 
Company. 
(b) When liability and the extent of loss or damage has 
been definitely fixed in accordance with these Conditions and 
Stipulations, the loss or damage shall be payable within 30 
days thereafter. 
13. SUBROGATION UPON PAYMENT 
OR SETTLEMENT. 
(a) The Company's Right of Subrogation. 
Whenever the Company shall have settled and paid a 
claim under this policy, all right of subrogation shall vest in 
tho f"nmn'lI"HI IIM ... .ffn ..... + ... ~ h.., .......... "" .... '- _& -I.l..._ : __ •• __ ..J. _l_~ __ --"-
SCHEDULE A 
Order No. 34479-Mvl 
Amount of Insurance $75,000.00 
Date of Policy: July 2, 1998 AT 2:44 P.M. 
1 . Narre of Insured: 
KAREN" 8HELER CDNINE I A lVlARR.IED WavJAN 
ALTA Owner's Policy 
Form No. 1402.92 
(10-17-92) 
Policy No. J 980326 
Premium $467.50 
2 . TIle estate or interest in the land which is covered by this p:::>licy is: 
FEE SIMPLE 
3. Title to the estate or interest in the land is vested in: 
KAREN" 8HELER CDNINE I A lVlARR.IED WavJAN 
4 . TIle land referred to in this p:::>licy is described as follows: 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A" 
.. 
ORDER NO. 34479 
EXHIBIT "A" 
That p:lrtion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 17, 
Township 48 North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho, 
described as follows: 
BIDINNING at the Northwest comer of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter of said Section; thence 
East along the North side of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter, a 
distance of 510 feet; thence 
South on a line parallel with the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter to the Northerly b:Jundary of 'TERRACE ADDITION to Rockford Bay 
SlH1TT'er HOll'Es; thence 
In a Westerly direction along the Northerly b:Jundary line of said TERRACE 
ADDITION to the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 17; thence 
North along said West line to the Northwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of 
the Northeast Quarter to the p:lint of beginning. 
EXCEPT any p:lrtion thereof lying within road right of way. 
,r"I, 7"" 
, , ""\ 
Order No. 34479 
SCHEDULE B 
ALTA ONner' s Policy 
Form No. 1402.92 
(10-17-92) 
Schedule B 
Policy No. J 980326 
EXCEPTIONS FRCM COVERAGE 
This policy does not insure against loss or danage (and. the Corrpany will not pay 
costs, attorneys' fees or expenses) which arise by reason of: 
PART I 
SECI'ION 1 
1 . Taxes or assessrrents which are not shown as existing liens by the records of 
any taxing authority that levies taxes or assessrrents on real property or by the 
public records. 
2 . Arr:! facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public 
records but which could be ascertained by an inspection of said land or by rraking 
inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
3 . Easerrents, claims or easement or encurrbrances which are not shown by the 
public records. 
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachrrents, 
or any other facts which a correct survey would disclose, and. which are not shown 
by public records. 
5. (a) Unpatented mining claims i (b) reservations or exceptions in patents or 
in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; (c) water rights, claims or title to 
water whether or not the rmtters excepted under (a), (b), or (c) are shown by the 
public records. 
6. Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, lal::Dr or rraterial theretofore or 
hereafter furnished, irrposed by law and not shown by the public records. 
SECI'ION 2 
1. General taxes for the year 1998, a lien in the process of assessrrent not yet 
due or payable. 
2 . Reservations 
From: 
To: 
Dated: 
Recorded: 
Instrurrent No. : 
contained in Deed: 
Kathryn L. Anstadt 
Richard R. Anstadt 
April 9, 1974 
April 10, 1974 
646091 
v .jV 
..JO. J 980326 
ORDBKNO. 34479 
EXCEPTIONS FRCM COVERAGE CClNTJNUED 
3. An easerrent containing certain terms I conditions and provisions affecting a 
}?Ortion of said premises and for the purposes stated herein: 
For: An electric transmission and/or distribution line or 
In Favor of: 
Recorded: 
Instrurrent No. : 
Affects: 
system 
KOotenai Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
April 3, 1991 
1213469 
W. 510' of NW NE ex. Pl. ptn., 17-48-4 
4. Joint Use 
Dated: 
and Maintenance Agreerrent: 
Recorded: 
Instrurrent No. : 
July 12, 1991 
July 12, 1991 
1224548 
5 . Any law, ordinance or regulation of an Indian tribe or nation including but 
not limited to building and zoning ordinances, restricting or regulating or 
prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyrrent of the land, or regulating the 
character, dirrensions or location of any irrprovement now or hereafter erected on 
the land, or prohibiting a separation in ownership or a reduction in the 
dirrensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation of any such law, 
ordinance or regulation. 
Rights of eminent darain or rights of police power exercised by an Indian tribe 
or nation unless notice of the exercise of such rights appears in the public 
records at Date of Policy. 
The policy excepts from coverage any matter relating to any easements, rights of 
way, encumbrances or defects in title which may be found in any records other 
than those rratters which directly appear within the official records of KOotenai 
County, Idaho. 
6. Deed of T:rust to secure an indebtedness in the principal sum of $35,000.00, 
and any other amounts and/or obligations secured thereby: 
Dated: June 25, 1998 
Recorded : July 2, 1998 
Instrurrent No. : 1544699 
Grantor: Karen Sheler Conine, a rrarried worran 
Trustee: First American Title Company of Kootenai County, Inc., 
an Idaho Corporation -
Beneficiary: Gary H. Solorron and Judith A. Solorron, husband and wife 
END OF SCHEDULE liB" EXCEPTIONS 
EH 
- -
= 
JOINT USE AND HAINTENANCE AGREENENT 
This agreement is entered into by and between the various owners of the tracts 
of land described as: 
i!l1-~ LAND DESCRiPTION !Jell L/{/J-110l) ... $.°J:.(;0J./2;P /v'ItJ-!lIE EX PL PT 
LftJN 0'/1//-/7-1'150 LLLE(];J .. ~.#51 EL!?L.P/i £¥ ttJ'7!13.:1. j('-1Ut..fJA, J, 1~ _ 
It is necessary for the parties hereto to enter into an agreement for maintenance 
and repair of the following descri~ed ~oadwa y: 
And the parties hereto agree aR f01lows: 
1. That each party hereto sh~11 contrlbutp equally, ~c[~rJing to edch lot owned , 
to the maintenance and repair of above d~~r:ih~ t! l'o ad~ay; 
2 . That above described I-oadway will lJc consl~uct~d ~o b~ {)~ss2blc year-rQun~ 
and that no party hereto is alltllorized to 0:" sllall e;~PQrt ~!iy ntllcr party 
to contribute to improvement by placing gr~, ·,.-el 0[" Hspli.:!lt !in lhe rc~.qci' .. Jay 
without prior written .ngrccliicnt .) f .!ll o(ilr,J p.1rties; 
3_ The parties l,erelo agree t() llS~ s~id t·~~ d~3y f()T ~lOtm~! iTlgr0ss a t! J egress 
and utilities purposes r(~1.tl(ing t o lilr· P~( · : .'I: rt.· .. ~IH' :" o\.'n ~; djiJ('ent. :\ny 
party m.aking use of r.h~ ro.~d\.: ~y in ~;1Il"1! .1 m;lHIlC'f or !';\lch equipment. rh .1\: do (.": s 
~~.gnificant damage shall b~ r espol\sible .L: I" rr;p.dri ;·I;; ~\l("h d.1m.:li;.f: <1t Lheir 
expense; 
4. The parti~s hereto ?gree to Sh.:l!·C (·'-!!Jall·: t·: t !n ... ~ .... :-:~.~: !~.:;~ t<, thf! ci c ;linage 
ditches, conduits, titles or Cttlverls rl;"quln: d j;-: j.:'rl~('r t"~1 i15Si,i r. If ~ J; .:ife. 
passable condition of roau\,'a ',' fer i"di~.Hed I"t,; 
5. It is stated, however, th0t ')1\1 Y th,:, .Jct: j.: 1 user:":; (ir ~~H~ ::uil\.'e dc:; (' ("ibr.d 
road\rr.'ay shall contriuut!! to it:'; fil;lil··tclla~l(e nnd "'2'p-: ... 
6 . This agreement shall be blndinK on :he h~irs, 
r~rtics hereto. 
(",or'!) 
1 
Dated this 
STATE OF \(ASIIINCTOH 
County of )#dr?"y,,(,) 
Robert P. KluDli 
On thla J.7IIv day oC 6~'(r:: , 19.2.. Robert P. Kluu, Kenneth L . 
Henry and Georgia D. Henry apPi'ared before me known to be the individuals des-
er~~ed 1n and who executed the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged 
tllat ··they signed the ""IBe as their Cree and voluntary Act and deed, for the UI S 
~p~·~U~po.e8 therein .entioned. 
.... l\ • I, 
,< t1'vt lt~Qd';r ' JII), hand and ofHetst sea! thia 
'. i .::,= : .,-:r '. / :', ">,'''' () // / r,lll day of 
" : ~ / £.t~ ... (. 
Expiration date J.1!~t~V~4~·~) ______ __ 
-) 
'/, . / 
of (<-""'1';";-/1' 
Arthur B. Macomber, Attorney at Law 
408 E. Sherman Avenue, Suite 215 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: 208-664-4700 
Facsimile: 208-664-9933 
State Bar No. 7370 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2009 FEB -3 pM ~. 47 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife; 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
KAREN SHELERand HOWARD ) 
CONINE, husband and wife, and the ) 
marital community composed thereof; ) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No: CV-07-2523 
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON 
DEEDS, AND REQUEST FOR 
QUIET TITLE TO UPPER AND 
LOWER ROADS 
INTRODUCTION 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA BELSTLER, husband 
and wife (hereinafter "BELSTLER"); by and through their attorney of record, Arthur B. 
Macomber, pursuant to the Idaho Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act at Idaho Code 
section 10-1201 et. seq., with an Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on 
Deeds and to Quiet Title to certain Upper and Lower Roads against Defendants, KAREN 
SHELER and HOWARD CONINE, husband and wife (hereinafter "CONINE"), 
regarding interpretation and validity of certain recorded documents, and for quiet title to 
Belstlers' lands. 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment on deeds and Quiet title to upper and lower roads-Belstler v. Conine 
JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs BELSTER are title owners of Kootenai County real property. 
Defendants CONINE are title owners of Kootenai County real property, which parcel 
abuts the BELSTLER land. The alleged easements at issue are located on the Kootenai 
County real property of Plaintiffs BELSTLER whereupon they reside. This action 
concerns real property located in Kootenai County, Idaho; therefore, this Court has 
jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-401. 
JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs voluntarily and knowingly waive their rights to jury trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. V.A. Sanders and Geraldine Sanders owned Government Lot 1 of Section 
17, Township 48 North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho and split 
the property into parcels. 
2. On October 7, 1983, V.A. Sanders granted a 60-foot easement to Rockford 
Bay, Inc. recorded in Kootenai County as Instrument No. 953685 and which easement is 
now known as Chandler Lane. (Exhibit "A.") 
3. On June 6,1988, Sanders sold the Northeast 1/4 of the Northwest 114 of 
Section 17 to Kenneth Henry. Conditioned on fulfillment of that installment purchase 
contract recorded in Kootenai County as Instrument Number: 1119008. (Exhibit "B"). 
Henry granted certain easements in gross to a Linda Merwin, the former owner of 
Defendants' property recorded in Kootenai County as Instrument Number: 1119009. 
(Exhibit "C.") 
4. On October 14,2005, Plaintiffs BELSTLER purchased the real property 
from Kenneth Henry. 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment on deeds and Quiet title to upper and lower roads-Bel stier v. Conine 2 
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5. Plaintiffs BELSTLER are the title owners of that parcel of real property, 
which is located in the Northeast 114 of the Northwest 1/4 of Section 17, Township 48 
North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho. 
6. Roy T. Smythe and Thelma Smythe owned the Northwest 114 of the 
Northeast 1/4 of Govemment Lots 3 and 4 of Section 17, Township 48 North, Range 4 
West of the Boise Meridian and later split the property into parcels. 
7. On October 21, 1961, Thelma Smythe sold the Northwest Quarter of the 
real property to Richard and Kathryn Andstadt. 
8. On September 10, 1974, Richard Andstadt sold the real property to Linda 
Merwin. 
9. On September 11, 1990, Linda Merwin sold the real property to Robert 
Peter Kluss. 
10. On July 12, 1991, Robert Peter Kluss entered into a Road Maintenance 
Agreement with Kenneth Henry, see Exhibit "D," recorded in Kootenai County as 
Instrument No. 1224548. This agreement was later corrected to add specificity and was 
re-recorded in Kootenai County as Instrument No. 1224896, see Exhibit "E." This 
agreement confirmed that access to Defendants' property was to be by Sanders Lane, 
which is now Chandler Lane. 
11. On November 26, 1993 Robert Peter Kluss sold the real property to Gary 
and Judith Solomon. 
12. On July 2, 1998, Gary and Judith Solomon sold the real property to 
Defendants CONINE. 
13. Defendants CONINE are the title owners of that parcel of real property, 
which is located in the Northeast 114 of the Northwest 114 of Section 17, Township 48 
North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho. 
14. Plaintiffs BELSTLER and Defendants CONINE both use Chandler Lane 
to access their properties from Rockford Bay Road. Defendants CONINE claim the right 
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to use a driveway which diverges from Chandler Lane in a southerly direction at 
approximately Plaintiffs' property line, based on CONINES' claims about the meaning of 
language in Exhibit "C." The driveway (Upper Road) traverses the entire width of 
Plaintiffs' property. 
15. Defendants also claim the right to access their property by way of a road 
which traverses the south end of Plaintiffs property, (Lower Road), based on language in 
Exhibit "c." 
16. Defendants have installed a gate on Plaintiffs' property at the end of the 
driveway on the Upper road just before the driveway enters Defendants' property. 
17. Plaintiffs are entitled to quiet title of the areas Upper and Lower roads, and 
a declaration Defendants are without any right to use the driveway (Upper Road) or the 
road at the south end (Lower Road) of Plaintiffs' property due to said easements being 
created in gross for Linda Merwin only. 
18. In the alternative, Plaintiff's believe the Kluss-Henry Joint Use and 
Maintenance Agreement found in Instrument Number 1124896, see Exhibit "E", 
supersedes the alleged Henry-Merwin grant in Instrument Number 1119009, see Exhibit 
"C." 
19. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment requiring Defendants to remove the 
gate on Plaintiffs' property. 
20. Plaintiffs have expended attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be 
determined, which are attributable to Defendants' unlawful use of Plaintiffs' property. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, pray for judgment as follows: 
1. That the Court declare a judgment interpreting various recorded 
documents attached as Exhibits hereto; 
2. Plaintiffs are entitled to Quiet Title to Upper and Lower roads. 
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3. Defendants are without any right to use the Upper and Lower roads. If 
Defendants are found to have a right to use the Upper or Lower roads, the roads shall be 
surveyed and located on the ground prior to inclusion any final judgment. 
4. A mandatory injunction against Defendants CONINE from using the 
Upper or Lower roads on Plaintiffs' property. 
5. Attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined at a later date. 
6. Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this 2 Cf-r-h day of 0t:UUJd.¥,2009. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney at Law 
VERIFICATION 
I, DANA BELSTLER, being sworn, having read the foregoing, say the facts set 
forth herein are accurate and complete to the best O@;;l~ 
DANA BELSTLER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this 27th day of JW1=r2009. 
(SEAL) ~a~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: Oldtown 
My Commission Expires: 08/23/2014 
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MUTUAL AGR.EEMENT FOR ElASEMENT FO! INGRESS AND EGRESS 
WITNESSETH. 
WHEREAS, V. A. SANDERS and GERALDINE C. SI'.NDERS, h-usband and 
wife, are the owners of the East 660.4 ft. of the NW~ lyinq No~th 
of Rockford Bay Road 'fi6C in Section 17, Township 48 Nort;h, Range 
4 W.B.M., in Kootenai County, Idahol and are selling the followi.ng 
described prope~ty to KENNETH L. HENRY, a single man: 
All that portion of Gov. Lot 1, Section 17, Township 4a 
N., Range 4 W.B.H., described as follows: 
Beginning at the Northeaat corner of Gov. Lot I; thence 
North 89°36' West along the North line of said Gov. Lot 
l., 330.2 ft.; the.,ce South 0 0 24' West to a point on t :he ",:,-
North line of Rockford Bay Road; thence Easterly al-ong . - -~:_i 
said North line of Rockford Bay Road to a poin-t wh-ich f.r 
bears South 0°24' West from the Point of beginning; th.en-_ce Xi 
:::::.:~':: ::':.::.::::::n:.::.::':n::::: ...... nt for i~ ..... ,1 
and egress; NOW THEREFO:RE, V. A. SANDERS and GERALDINE C. SAND_E"'RS 'E";" 
::: n:.::.::: .::: ~2 ~o 0 :.:::~. L:: :'::Y .::::.::: t:~~:r~~."":~~:~f i 
North and South and 330.2' East and West, ~ 
in an area adjace-nt to Rockford Bay Road and in front of the f:ire-
~ta~~on located thereon. 
KENNETH L. HENR~ grants an easement continuing the existing 
road in the Sout~erly part of the property that he is purchasing 
from V. A. SAND~RS and_ GERALDINE C. SANDERS and the Northerly part 
of the property that h~ is purchasing from V. A. SANDERS and 
GERALDINE C. SANDERS to LINDA MERWIN, who owns the property in the 
NE~ of Section 17. TOWnship 48 N .• Range 4 W.B.M .• Kootenai County. 
-Idaho. Said easements are t-hp. continuation of the existinr:J._l_~ClClinCl 
--- --. - -----------
CHlst1ng road from the community road on the North. 
DATE. this ~ day of J.n., 19$ •. 
'l~;/~~~-
V. A. SANDERS 
~t2!UU~AA 06'Ld,a.L.,!Y:LJ 
G RALDINE C. SANDERS 
r~J·~ 
KENNETH L. HENRY~ 
;..: ,-'.: 
1.1.1.9009 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
)ss. 
County of Spokane ) 
On thh day personally appeared before lIIe V. A.SA'RDE::RS 
and GERALDINE C. SANDERS to l1Ie known to be the individlUl',l;sd.-_ 
Rcribed in and who exeouted the within a,nd foreqoin'9 Jm"U:'ru~'!!:"'t, {. 
and aoknowledged that they sign .. a the s,ame as their fr-:ee ,1I'n;d ",;,~~ 1';," 
VOluntary aot and deed, for the uses an,d purp-oSGII tllereLn liI~nIS:,' "''if' ",' 
tioned. ;' 11/.";',' il,~' 
GIVEN ':oi~~\':": June, 1988. ~' 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
las. 
County of Spokane ) 
On this day personally appeared before me KENNE!I'H L.B'J!N''RY 
to lIIe known to be the individual described in and who exec~~a; 
the wi thin and foregoing instrument, and acknowled,ged th:at;h:e 
Signed the same as his Iree and voluntary act and deed. for th~ 
uses and purposes therein mentioned. 
GIVEN under my hand and official June, 1988. 
-
JOINT USE AND MAINTENANCE AGitEEMEllT 
This agreement is entered into by and between the various owners of the tracts 
of land described ~S, 
OilNERS NAME LAND DESCRIPTION 
.J£t.~ lJE!i.:/iIlJ10g;JS ftls/o~f Mli-AiE EX PL Pr 
~:.J. 1*?J 
It is necessary for the parti.es hereto to enter into an agreement [or maintenance 
and repair of the following described roadway: 
And the parties her~to agree a~ fellows: 
1. That each party hereto shall contribute equally, accordin& to each lot owned, 
to the maintenance and ,epair of abo~e described roadway; 
Z. That abov~ described roadway will be constructed to be passable year - round 
and that no party hereto is authorized to or shall expect any other party 
to contribute to improvement by placing gravel or asphalt on the roadway 
without prior written agreement of all other parties; 
3. The parties \lel'eto agree to use said road"'ay for normal ing.ress and egress 
and utilities purpose .~ relating to the paoperty they own adjacent . Any 
party making use of the road .. 'ay in such i! manner or such equipment that does 
Significant damage shall ue responsible for repairing such damage at tneir 
expense; 
4. The parties hereto agree to share equall~ to the expense to the drainage 
ditches, condui~s, titles or culverts required in order to assume safe, 
passable condition of roadway for indicated lots; 
5. l. t is stated, however , that only th~ actual users of the above described 
roadway shall contribu t e tD its maintena~ce and repair, 
6. This iJgreement shall be binding on the hei.rs, successors and assigns of the 
parti .... hereto. 
(mure) 
, . 
, " 
.: . \ . " 
122454:8 
, 
Dated thi!l 1991. 
R1Jb:eT.t P.U~~.;:~T 
-,:~, J~F~' 
STATE OF WASUINGTON 
County of ~~~) 
On this .../..:.J-I1v day of ,A..f~ • 19 4(, Robert P. Klus:s. ,K~n~~,.~., 
Henry an~ Georgia D. Hen¥y ap e~red before me known to be the 1~d~~dtt~t~ ~e.~ 
crl,b.ed in and who executed the within and foregoing inst,r.ument .• .ana;'.ac~o~ 
tK'a\:··tbey signed the same as their free and volun.t,ary act and deed~ fot:' :f}ie: 
'. ~lld·,'~u'tp?ses therein mentioned • 
. .••• ,.. ~ • f.~ 1'~1 {:~~~'VJ;~~/~;f~.(.y~t8nd and official seal this /~,fl1 day of ~~~j""P:::;.;d::::"tl7.~""b'--_' !fM. 
o = 
. '. t~ ". I .. ..... 
'. N~,lln:. J.I'"ubll.?and f~./ 
resichng' at,,' ~;?--V • 
./. ... : ....... , .... ~. .' 
Expiration date ..l.;'~V.~y+q~2~ ______ _ 
-; 
:~~~ k 
: ~';~'::;:-:' 
1224548 
JOINT USE AND MAINTENANCE AGREEMENT 
This agreement is entered into by and between the various owners of the tracts 
of land described as! 
LAND DESCRIPTION 
LJf5H'II/J-Ll-08J...~ 1tI.~/O~C ;1@-,11£ EX PL fIr 
'1flNJ}ljllJ-O-29SQ LT! EX' ~.dSI EX~7iEXtlJJtt;J1.p./j 
1 I I , I I 
It is necessary for the parties hereto to enter into an agreement for maintenance 
and repair of the following described roadway: 
1. That each party hereto shall contrihute equally, according to each lot ownec:!, 
to the maintenance and repair of above described roadway; 
2. That above described roadway wi, II be constructed to be passable year - round 
and that no party hereto is authorized to or shall expect any other party 
to contribute to improvement by placing gravel or asphalt on the roadway 
without prior written agreement of all other parties; 
3. The parties hereto aeree to llse said roadl.·av for normal ingress " .d egress 
and utilities purposes relating to the paoperty they own adjac~nt. Any 
party making use ,.) f the ,-o3d ... . 'ly in slIch d manner or such (:c"ipment that does 
significant damage shall be responsible [Of repairing SU(~ damage at their 
txpense; 
4. The parties hereto agr<!(? to share eq.wl I, .. to the e}:pense to the drainage 
ditches, conduits, titles or clllv<!rts required i,n order to assltme safe, 
passahle condition of road\Jay for ir.dic.:ltt'd lot!;; 
5. It is stated, hO""Qvcr, thaI. onlv the actll?l IJsers of th e a', ,'ve described 
roadway shall contrihute to its m:lint.cni!.:'c<? and rcp.:li,'. 
P 'll- tjl~s hereIn. 
i~TjJJYiALf: 
(mo,-.:!) 
JUL I tl !llis III'S I 
.~ c: Ii 
1224548 
i 
Dated this 
STATE OF WASHINGTON 
County of ;4dc~ 
u ' .",' . " 
, 'Jflv 
On this /~ day of , 19 til, Robert: ,p;~ ,"';J;~;!J.;.!!!,,;: ;"E!nt\t~·th.}jl}i;': . 
Henry and Georgia D. Henry ap , eared before mek.lloWIl' tol;).e ih~ "j ;ri'd~1;~~i:'4u:a:t.:i 
cribed in and who executed the wi thin and fo,r,eg:oing itrs,t:irtimeft.~t. ; . 
tlf~t· · they signed the same as their free and volun'ta:ry ac\t: .and*deed,~ " ';'4 ~;.;.,. •. '."; f1,'j;i',;;': 
: ,' ind."purposes therein mentioned. 
;" ~~'i~~N ' ~~~:d'e'r- my hand and official seal this / " ffl day of ---"f)i;;;' :I.::.( L-::.;) • .::;' .':r.;:r-" >---
.' . 
Expi ra t ion da te ..l./i:":;~f-V.;.<9:....2,--___ _ 
.,~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day oh.laIll1D~ ,2009, at or about 
}:S%"" p_.m., I caused to be served a true and correct copy ofthoregoing: 
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON DEEDS, 
AND REQUEST FOR QUIET TITLE TO UPPER AND LOWER ROADS 
CHARLES M DODSON 
1424 Sherman Ave., Ste. 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: 208-664-1577 
Facsimile: 208-666-9211 
DATED thisj)\h day Of~~ ,2009. 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
[ ] 
~~ 
[ ] 
u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile: 666-9211 
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CHARLES M. DODSON 
Attorney at Law 
1424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814 
(208) 664-1577 
Facsimile (208) 666-9211 
ISB #2134 
STATE Or IDAHO > S5 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI1 
FILED: 
2009 FEB 17 AM II: 03 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
~1w~ &If- ~ OEP TY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
DEFENDANTS. 
KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
COUNTER PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
COUNTER DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NUMBER: CV-07-2523 
AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSES, AND COUNTERCLAIM 
t tttt 
I-AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND COUNTERCLAIM 
= 
COMES NOW, the above named Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs, CONINE, by and through 
their Attorney of Record, CHARLES M. DODSON, and by way of Amended Answer, Affirmative 
Defenses, and Counterclaim, answer, admit, deny, affirmatively allege and counterclaim as follows: 
ANSWER 
I. 
These Answering Defendants, except as specifically admitted herein, deny each and every 
allegation contained within the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. 
II. 
These Answering Defendants admit Paragraphs 1,2,4,6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16, of 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. 
III. 
In response to Paragraph 3 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Defendants admit that easements 
were granted and deny that they were in gross and affirmatively allege that the easements granted 
were appurtenant to the land of the Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs. 
IV. 
In response to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, these Answering Defendants 
admit the same, and affirmative allege that the easements passed with the property. 
V. 
In response to Paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs ' Amended Complaint, these Answering Defendants 
admit the existence of Exhibit "D", later to corrected to Exhibit "E" and that the same is of record 
with Kootenai County, and deny that the Agreement (Exhibit "D" and Exhibit "E") confirmed access 
to the Defendant/Counter Plaintiffs property was by Sanders Lane which is now Chandler Lane. 
Defendant/Counter Plaintiffs further affirmatively allege that the easement for driveway claimed by 
these Answering Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs as set forth in the Amended Counterclaim herein 
attached is an easement appurtenant as set forth in the last full paragraph of page 1 of Exhibit "c" 
attached to Plaintiff s Complaint. 
VI. 
In responding to Paragraph 14 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, these Answering Defendants 
.. 
2-AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND COUNTERCLAIM 
admit the same and affirmatively allege that in the alternative the Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs have 
a prescriptive right on the "driveway easement". 
VII. 
In response to Paragraph 17, 18, 19, and 20 of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, these 
Answering Defendants deny the same. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
VIII. 
These Answering Defendants raise the following Affirmative Defenses in response to 
Plaintiffs' Complaint: 
A. Latches 
B. Statute of Limitations 
C. Easement by implication 
D. Prescriptive Easement 
E. Easement of Record 
IX. 
These Answering Defendants have been required to obtain the services of counsel for the 
defense of said matter, and, upon prevailing, are entitled to their reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
in an amount to be proven at the time of trial herein. 
WHEREFORE, these Answering Defendants pray Judgment as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed; 
2. That Defendants be awarded their attorneys fees and costs for the defense thereof. 
3. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable in the premises. 
COUNTER CLAIM 
COMES NOW the Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs, and by way of Counterclaim, complaint 
and allege as against the Plaintiffs as follows: 
I. 
That the Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE (hereinafter referred to as CONINE), are residents of the State of Washington, and the 
3-AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND COUNTERCLAIM 
owners of certain real property described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and hereafter incorporated 
by reference as if fully set forth herein. 
II. 
That Plaintiff/Counter Defendants, DANA BELSTLER and DANA BELSTLER (hereafter 
referred to as BELSTLER) are husband and wife, residents of the County of Kootenai, and owners 
of adj acent property as the same lies immediately west of the property owned by CONINE described 
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
III. 
That the court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Idaho Code 5-401 et seq. 
IV. 
That CONINES have two easements located upon and across the southerly and northerly 
portion running east and west, of the property owned by BELSTLER commonly referred to as 7316 
W. Chandler Lane, Kootenai County, Idaho, as granted to CONINES predecessor in interest LINDA 
MERWIN as set forth on Exhibit "C" of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. 
V. 
That CONINES and their predecessors in interest have used said easement where Chandler 
Lane ends at the Belstler property and crosses the Belstler property as a driveway continuously, 
openly, notoriously, and without interruption for at least twenty (20) years for access to their 
property. 
VI. 
That in the alternative to the foregoing paragraph, CONINES have an Easement of Record, 
or by implication as the case may be, upon and across the property ofBELSTLER for the easements 
referenced in Paragraph IV of this Amended Counterclaim. 
VII. 
That CONINE currently uses the northerly easement hereinabove referenced across the 
BELSTLER land for ingress and egress to the CONINE property. 
VIII. 
That BELSTLER seeks to unlawfully and unreasonably restrict CONINE'S use of the 
easements hereinabove described for access upon and across to the BELSTLER property, and as such 
4-AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND COUNTERCLAIM n"n 
, :, I 
CONINE'S have been damaged in an amount to be determined at the time of trial on the merits. 
IX. 
That CONINES have been required to obtain the services of counsel for the prosecution of 
this matter and are entitled to their reasonable attorneys fees and costs in an amount to be proven at 
the time of trial herein. 
WHEREFORE, CONINES PRA Y JUDGMENT on this Counterclaim as follows: 
1. For a determination of the rights of the CONINES in the easement referenced in Paragraph 
IV. above currently existing roadway located upon and across the property ofBELSTLER, either as 
an Easement by prescription, an Implied Easement, or Express Easement created by recorded 
document; 
2. For an award of CONINE'S attorney's fees and costs for the prosecution of this action; 
3. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable in the premises. 
DA TED this q't\ day of hl ,~S::'-;'20D9. 
7 !)~<,--, --~,' .. I -, . \;HARfiiM\)~D-j51@:::s= 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
I hereb~rtify that on the ~day of 
t: t:.Jk , 2007, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was: 
transmitted, via facsimile: 
to: 
ARTHURB. MACOMBER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
7FACSIMILE 664-9933 ( _/~== ... -=> 
~--,->. ::0;::;.:= 
CHARLES M. DODSON-' 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
5-AMENDED ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND COUNTERCLAIM 
ORDER NO. 34479 
EXHIBIT "A" 
That portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 17, 
Township 48 North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, Ko:::>tenai County, Idaho, 
described as follows: 
B83INNING at the Northwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter of said Section; thence 
East along the North side of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter I a 
distance of 510 feet; thence 
South on a line parallel with the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter to the Northerly J::oundary of TERRACE ADDITION to Rockford Bay 
Sumrer Hares j thence 
In a Westerly direction along the Northerly J::oundary line of said TERRACE 
ADDITION" to the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 17; thence 
North along said West line to the Northwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of 
"'the Northeast Quarter to the point of beginning. 
EXCEPT any portion thereof lying wi thin road right of way. 
-
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Arthur B. Macomber~ Attorney at Law 
408 E. Sherman Avenue, Suite 215 
Coeur d'A1ene, ID 83814 
Telephone: 208-664-4700 
Facsimile: 208-664-9933 
State Bar No. 7370 
Attorney for Plaint~ff.t; & 
Counter Defendants BELSTLERS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs; 
v. 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and 
HOWARD CONINE, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and 
HOWARD CONINE, husband and 
wife, 
Counter Plaintiffs; 
v. 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLE~ husband and wife, 
Counter Defendants. 
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Case No: CV 2007-2523 
COUNTER DEFENDANTS 
BEJ .. STLERS' ANSWER TO 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
COME NOW Counter Defendants CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA BELSTLER 
(hereinafter BELSTLERS), appearing by and through their coun.sel, Arthur B. 
-p 
answer to counterclaims.doc 
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Macomber, and answering the Counterclaim of Counter Plaintiffs KAREN SI-IELER 
(CONINE) and HOWARD CONINE filed in this Court on February 17,2009, to admit, 
deny and aUege as fol1ows: 
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM 
1. Defendants BELSTLERS, except as specifically admitted herein, deny 
each and every allegation contained with Counter Plainti.ffs' CONINE'S Counterclaim. 
2. As to Paragraph I of Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS adm.it to 
the truth of it. 
3. As to Paragraph II of Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS deny 
"DANA BELSTLER and DANA BELSTLER~' are husband and wife, but admit "CHRIS 
BELSTLER and DANA BELSTLER" arc husband and wife. Further, Be]stJers are 
owners of real property abutting Conine's, and said property is not merely adjacent to 
Conine's. 
4. As to Paragraph III of Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS admit to 
the truth of it. 
5. As to Paragraph IV of Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS deny the 
truth of it. 
6. As to Paragraph V of Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS deny 
Chandler Lane ends at the Belstler property and deny that Conines or their predecessors 
bave openly, notoriousJy~ and without interruption "for at least twenty (20) years" used 
any driveway easement for access to their property. 
7. As to Para.graph VI of Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS adm.it 
Conines have an easement of record as shown at Exhibits D and E of the Amended 
Complaint, i.e., the Kluss easement, but deny easement locations exist as stated jn Conin.e 
Counterclajtn~ or that any alleged former grantee n.amed Merwin js a predecessor to 
Conines as described in Defendant/Counter Plaintiffs' Counterclaim at paragraph IV . 
.. 
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8. As to Paragraph VII of Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS deny 
the truth of it, because Conines' reference to "the northerly easement" would describe the 
KJuss easement onJy, which lies upon Chandler Lane. 
9. As to Paragraphs VllI of Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS deny 
the truth of it. 
10. As to Paragraph IX of Coul'lterclaim~ Defendants BELSTLERS have no 
knowledge as to whether Conines were required to hire lega1 couns~l, and so Belstlers 
can neither admit nor deny. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO COUNTERCLAIM 
I. AS A FIRST SEPARATE AND PISTJNCT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
to Counter Plaintiffs' CountercJaim~ Defendants BELSTLERS aUege that the' 
Counterclaim, and each cause of action therein. fails to state a cause of action. 
2. AS A SECOND SEPARATE AND DISTINCT AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE to Counter Plain.tiffs ~ Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS allege that 
Counter Plaintiffs' claims are barred by licen~e/permissive use. 
3. AS A TIDRD SEPARATE AND DISTINCT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
to Counter Plaintiffs' Counterclaim., Defendants BELSTLERS allege that Couuter 
Plaintiffs~ claim.s are barred by the doctrine of collateral limitation. 
4. AS A FOURTH SEPARATE AND DISTJNCT AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE to Counter Plaintiffs' Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS allege that 
Counter Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.. 
5. AS A FIFTH SEPARATE AND DISTINCT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
to Counter Plaintiffs' Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS allege that Counter 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel. 
6. AS A SIXTH SEPARATE AND DISTINCT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
to Counter Plaintiffs! Counterclaim, Defen.dants BELSTLERS a/l.ege that Counter 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. 
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7. AS A SEVENTH SEPARATE AND DISTINCT AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE to Counter Plaintiffs' Counterclaim, Defendants BELSTLERS allege that 
Counter Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of contractual provision. 
WHEREFORE, Counter Defendants BELSTLERS pray for ,judgment as 
hereinafter provided: 
). For Counter Defendants' costs, expenses, and attomey's fees incurred 
herein as al10wed by Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12·12 J.. in an amount to be determined; 
2. For an Order from this Court dismissing Counter Plaintiffs' claims again.st 
Defendants BELSTLERS in their entirety and with prejudice; 
3, For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 
e'-l-h 
DATED this '.I day of March 2009. 
answer to countercJaim8.doc 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney at Law 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I am famiHar with my firm's capability to hand~deliver. and deliver by facsimile 
docum.ents and its practice of placing its daily mail, with fust-class postage prepwd 
thereon, in a designated area for deposit in a U.S. m.ailbox in the City of Coeur d' Alen.e, 
Idaho, after the close of the day's busin.ess. On the date shown below, I served: 
COUNTER DEFENDANTS BELSTLERS' ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS 
Charles M. Dodson 
Attorney at J..aw 
1424 Shennan Avenue, Suite 300 
Co em d' Alene, ID 83814 
Telephon.e: 208-664·1577 
[J U.s. Mail, Postage Prepwd 
[] Hand Delivered 
[J Overnight Mail 
~ Facsimile: 208-666-9211 
I declare under penalty of peJjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed 
on the 18caay of )It ~ , 2009. , 
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Arthur B. Macomber, Attorney at Law 
Macomber Law, PLLC 
408 E. Sherman Avenue~ Suite 215 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: 208-664-4700 
Facsimile: 208·664·9933 
State Bar No. 7370 
Attorneyfor Plaintfffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife; 
Plaintiffs, 
KAREN SHELER and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, and the 
marital community composed thereof; 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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Case No: CV-07-2523 
PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF RE 
CONVEYANCE OF EASEMENT 
INEFFECTIVE PURSUANT TO 
IDAHO LAW 
COMES NOW CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA BELSTLER, by and through 
their attorney of record, Arthur B. Macomber, to provide this Court a Tria1 Brief on Idaho 
law related to the question of whether certain easements from. Henry to Merwin. 
encumber the Belstler parcel for Conine's benefit, so this Court may properly consider 
and render judgment on issues presented in. th1.scase. 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Plaintiffs Chris and Dana Belstler are the ow.ners of real property overlooking 
Rockford Bay at Lake Coeur d'Alene. Defendants Howard Conine and Karen Shelcr own 
the property immediately to the east of the Belstler's. The Belstler's acquired their parcel 
from the Henry's and the Henry's from V.A. Sanders. The Conine's acquired their 
property from the Solomon's, who purchased it fTom. Kluss who purchased it from Linda 
Merwin. 
The Belstler property is crossed by three different roads that the Conine's or their 
predecessor.s used to access their property. The three roads are at issue in this case. The 
roads include 1) Chandler Lane (formerly Sanders Lane); 2) a private drive which 
diverges from Chandler Lane at approximately the Belstler west properly line; and 3) tbe 
"lower road" located at the south end of the Belstler property near the Worley Fire 
Di~trict building. All three roads tTavcrse the entire vvl.dth of the Belstler's property. 
The BelstJer's became acquainted with the Conine's during the spri.ng and 
sutnm.er of 2006. The Belstlers noticed that when Conines visited from their western 
Washington home, they used the private drive to access their property. The Belst1er~5 
also noticed during the summer of 2006 that someone was drivi.ng ttaUers across the 
lower road and parking them on the Conine property. 
In the summer of2006, the Belstler's approached the Conines and asked them to 
cease their use of the lower road and the private drive. The Belstler's offered to grant the 
Conine's an easement on the east side of their property that was sufficient to allow for an 
acceptable grade into the Conine property off of Chandler Lane and offered to pay for 
and perfonn the work. Thereafter, the Conine's ceased their use ofllie lower road but 
n.ever responded to the Belstler's offer regarding the private drive. Instead, they stopped 
talkjng to the BeJstlers. The BelstJers renewed their offer to the Con.ines in early 
November 2006, but the Co:nines did not respond to that offer. 
The Belstler's concede the existence of an easement on Chandler Lane and filed 
suit to enjoi.n Coni.ne's use of the private drive and the lower road, and to require the 
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COlline's to access their property via Chandler Lane. The Conine's claim. an express 
easement to use the private drive and the lower road and, if not, they have easements by 
prescripti on. 
The document on which the Conine's rely, and on which much of this case 
depends, is instrument number 1119009. In that instrument num.ber, the Grantor, Ken 
Henry, executed two easement con.veyances to Linda Merwin prior to holding legal title 
to his future Belstler property he was then buying from V.A. Sanders by il'lstal1ment 
contract. The Con.ines argue that the BeJstJer property is now burdened by those 
easements. The parties differ as to how this docum.ent is to be con.strued, and Belstlers 
have procured an. expert surveyor to give testimony regarding this and other documents. 
LEGAL ELEMENTS OF VARIOUS DOCTRINES 
1) Easements 
An easement is an interest in. real property. Fqjen v, Powlus ,96 Idaho 625, 628 
(1975). A transfer of real property pa':'ses aU easements attached thereto. I.e. § 55-603. 
2) .ExpressEasements 
An express easem.ent is an interest in real property that must be in. writing. 
Cap$tar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 2007 Tdaho 32090 (2007). It is only 
necessary in an ex.press easement that the parties make clear their intention to establish 
servitude. ld., citing Benninger v. Derijleld, 142 Idaho 486,489 (2006). An express 
easement may be created by a written agreement between the owner of the dominant 
estate and the owner ofthe servient estate. ld. It may also be created by a deed. from the 
owner of the servient estate to the o-wncr of the dominant estate. Id. 
3) After-Atquired Title 
"The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent 
with, the con.stitution or la.ws ofthe United States, in all cases not provided for in these 
compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state." I.e. § 73-116. The Jdaho 
legislature has the power to abolish or modify common I.aw rights and remedies. Olson. v . 
.l.A. Freeman Co., 117 Jdaho 706 (1990). The legislature altered the common law in. its 
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compiled laws at I.e. § 55-605~ which .provides "[w]here a person purports by proper 
instrument to convey or grant real property infee simple) and subsequently acquires any 
title or c1aim of title thereto, the same passes by operation of law to the grantee or his 
successors." (em.phasis mine.) Therefore, in Idaho, the after-acquired title doctrine does 
not apply to each "stick" in a real property title owner's "bundl.e of sticks," includi.ng 
easements, but only to fee simple transfers conveyed by proper jnstmment. 
4) Delivery 
Delivery is the result ofa contract and requires both the giving of the deed by the 
gran.tor and an accepting of that deed by the grantee. The Estate of Skv01"ok v. Security 
Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16.20 (2003). There cannot be a unHateral transfer of 
interest in real estate without delivery and delivery requires the mutual assent of the 
parties. ld Delivery includes surrender and acceptance, and both are necessary to its 
com.pletion. Bowers v. Cottrell. 15 Idaho 221 (1908). Th.e grantor must be willing and 
agree to deliver, and the grantee must be willing and consent to receive. (ld) It is 
essential to the delivery ofa deed that there be a giving of the deed by grantor and a 
receiving of the deed by the grantee, witb a mutual intent to pass title from the one to the 
other. Crenshaw v, Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470. 475 (1948). 
5) Stranger to the Transaction 
The generally accepted rule is that no estate or interest is created in a stranger to a 
deed by a reservation therein.. If ill a conveyance any reservation is made in the property 
conveyed, the part reserved remains in the grantors therein, and does not inure to the 
benefit of a stranger to the i.nstrument. Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 209 (1961). 
Based on the rule that says a reservation to a stranger to the instrument is void for all 
pUT.poses, current Idaho law provides the reservation of an easement in a deed reserves 
use of the easement property for grantor's benefit only. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 
232 (2003). 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In.strument number 1119009 is an express easement that states in pertinent part: 
KENNETH L. HENRY grants an easement cOlltinuing the existing road in 
the Southerly part of the property that he is purchasing from V.A. 
SANDERS and GERALDINE C. SANDERS and the Northerly part of the 
property that he is purchasing from V.A. SANDERS and GERALDINE C. 
SANDERS to LINDA MERWIN, who owns the property in the NE 1/4 of 
Section 17, Township 48 N., Range 4 W,B.M., Kootenai County, Idaho. 
Said easements are the continua.tion of the existing logging road nmning 
parallel to Rockford Bay Road on the South and the existing road from the 
community on the North. 
This document was prepared and executed as it states for property Kenneth L. 
Henry "is purchasing" from V.A. Sanders. The parties entered into this agreement before 
Henry acquired title to the property. The actual in.stallment contract for the purchase of 
the property to be introduced at trial is instrument number 1119008. 
Linda Merwin, the grantee of the purported easements, was not a party to 
instrument number 1119008~ the Sanders-Henry installment sales contract. Neither was 
Linda Merwin a party to instrument number 1119009, the Sanders-Henry Mutual 
Agreement for Easement for Ingress and Egress. At the time of the creation. of 
in.strument numbers 1119008 and 1119009, V.A. Sanders held title to the future Henry 
property. The only parties to the two transaction documents were Sanders and Henry. 
Merwin was not a party to the transacti.on and, thus, the "granting" of the easement to her 
therein functioned as a reservation of an easement to her. However, i.n Idaho, a 
reservation of an estate of interest in. land to a stranger. is ineffective. 
Appellant's said contention poses a question as to what right, if any, did 
appelJant (being a stranger to the conveyance) acquire under or by virtue 
of the reservation referred to in said deed of April 30, 19527 The answer 
to this question is found in the generally accepted rule that no estate or 
interest is created in a stranger to a deed by a reservation therein. If in a 
2] 0 conveyance any reservation is made in the property conveyed, the part 
reserved rem.ains in the grantors therein, and does not inure to the benefit 
of a stranger to the instrument. 
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Davis v. Gowen~ 83 Idaho 204, 209-210 (1961); 28 C.J.S, Easements § 30, p. 686; 
16 Am. Jur. 609; 39 A.L.R. 126. 
The rationale for this ntle was explained by the Montana Suprem.e Court: 
Strangers to the deed are those who are not parties to it. 23 AmJr.2d 
Deeds § 8891983); Black's Law Dictionary at p. 1433 (7th Ed. 1999). 
Transactions invo.lving a stranger to the deed are disfavored for three 
reasons. First, the dominant estate~ in this case the Loomis parceJ [here, 
Merwin], does n.ot have the opportunity to negotiate with the grantor on 
issues like location, width, extent of use, and allowable use. Second, the 
easement will fail to appear in the chain of title of the appurtenant parcel, 
which leaves bonafide purchasers without notice that the land benei1.ts 
from an easement. Fina11y, the conveyance to a stranger to the deed 
allows for no acceptance by the would-be dominant estate, raising 
questions of unexpected taxes, environmental concerns, and potential 
litigation. 
Loomis v. Luraski, 306 Mont. 478, 484-485 (Mont. 2001). 
Delivery of an easement deed is essential to its completion. Delivery r.equi.res a. 
meeting of two minds and the accord of two wills. However~ Merwin was not involved 
in. the transaction between Sanders and Henry. 111erefore, she could not have accepted 
the easements or given her consent to receive them. Surrender alone is insufficient. 
Since Merwin was a stranger to the casement deed, the easements are invalid. 
I.C. § 55-605 allows a fee simnle interest in reat property conveyed prior to the 
time the grantor acquired title in the property to pass to a grantee where a person. purports 
by proper insl't'Uln.ent to con.vey the property. In this case~ because 1) the easement deed 
was not proper because grantee Merwin was not a party to it and it was thereby invalid, 
and because 2) the easement grant js not a fee simpJ.e interest, the easement also fails 
under the doctrine of after-acquired. title. 
CONCLUSION 
The express easement document upon which Conin.es rely in their claim to have 
two express easements across the Belstler's property was a transaction. solely between. 
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Sanders and Henry. Although its wording resenres an easement to Merwin, Merwin was 
not a party to the easement. In ldaho, a reservati.on of an estate of interest in land to a 
stranger is in,effective. Henry never conveyed an easement to Merwin. by a separate deed 
negotiated between the two of them after he acquired title upon fulfilling the in.stallment 
contract terms with Sanders. 
Tnstntment number 1119009 is thereby ineffective to create any ,easement for th,e 
Con.ine parcel, because there is no evidence that the grantee of the easement was a party 
to the contract that gave rise to the alleged casement. Further, the purported deed 
granting the easement is invalid because it was not delivered or accepted by Merwin and 
because the grantee Merwin was a stranger to the transaction. Finally, because the 
easement deed was not proper~ and because it was not a fee simple deed. it fails to meet 
the standards required by Idaho statute which alJow title to pass to a grantee under the 
after-acquired tide doctrine. 
DATED this 16th day of September, 2009. 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney at Law 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the l(p1'b day of ~~2009~ I caused 
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Telephone: 208-664-1577 
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[] Overnight Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife; 
Plaintiffs, 
KAREN SHELER and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, and the 
marital community composed thereof; 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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Case No: CV-07-2523 
PLAINTIFFS' POST-TRIAL 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
COME NOW Plaintiffs CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA BELSTLER, by and 
through their attorney of record, Arthur B. Macomber, and hereby submit the following 
Post-Trial Brief on Legal Arguments for submission to this Court as requested thirty-five 
(35) days from September 24,2009 for the Court's post-trial consideration toward its 
decision and judgment. 
plaintiffs' post-trial brief on legal arguments.doc 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1201, et seq., this Court has the "power to 
declare rights, status, and other legal relations" of plaintiffs and defendants, thus personal 
jurisdiction over the parties for the purposes of plaintiffs' requested declaratory judgment 
is valid, and subject matter jurisdiction is proper in this Court to quiet title to plaintiffs' 
lands pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-401. Further, pursuant to Idaho Code section 5-
401 (1), Kootenai County is the proper venue for adjudication of this action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs Belstler own certain real property located in Kootenai County, Idaho 
that is described on plaintiffs' Exhibit 22. Their immediate predecessors in interest were 
Kenneth and Georgia Henry, who purchased the property from Mr. and Mrs. V. A. 
Sanders. The eastern border of the Belstler property abuts Defendant Conines' Property. 
Defendants Conine own certain real property located in Kootenai County, Idaho 
as described on plaintiffs' Exhibit 21. The order of preceding owners in interest of the 
Conine real property is Gary and Judith Solomon, who purchased from Robert Kluss, 
who with his then wife Vicki purchased from Linda Merwin. 
Mr. and Mrs. V. A. Sanders never owned what is now the Conine real property. 
At an unknown date, but likely sometime around 1983 as argued herein, V.A. 
Sanders built a road partially on lands depicted on a survey by Webb Engineering dated 
August 20, 1979, on which survey parcel "A" shows the Belstler property. (PIs. Ex. 8.) 
The road was also build across lands to the east of the Belstler parcel, including across 
lands now owned by Conine, and through to what is now the Black Rock area, toward 
fulfillment of Mr. Sander's plan to provide access to his community development, the 
Rockford Bay Country Club. (PIs. Exs. 1-3, and 33.) 
Kenneth Henry did not know Linda Merwin, and did not meet or negotiate with 
her about the purported easement grants in instrument number 1119009. (Henry Depo. 
Tr. pp. 6-7, lines 20-25 & 1-7, respectively.) In the normal course of deposition 
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examination without pressure, Mr. Henry stated instrument number 1119009 was "some 
type of formality" and that he lacked a clear understanding of why he signed it. (ld. at p. 
8, lines 3-24.) Later, after approximately five pages of deposition questioning regarding 
which northern road Mr. Henry meant to grant an easement over with 1119009, 
defendants' counsel succeeded in gaining Henry's agreement that the disputed driveway 
was the northern easement intended in 1119009. Given Henry's conflicting deposition 
testimony under pressure, and other testimony given at trial, these facts are at issue. 
Neither Canines nor any of their predecessors were granted easement rights 
across the Chandler Lane easement from Rockford Bay Road as the centerline of said 
Chandler Lane is referenced or depicted in plaintiff's exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12, or 23 to the 
western border of the Conine parcel. Further, even if Conine's were granted easement 
rights across the southern portion of Belstler's property due to a conveyance found in 
instrument number 1119009, Conine's ability to reach that southern portion across 
Worley Fire District lands located to the west of the Belstler parcel and described and 
depicted on plaintiffs exhibits 12 and 13, respectively, were not and never have been 
granted. 
Further rendition of facts is provided below to suppOli arguments that plaintiffs 
Belstler should prevail on their quiet title action. 
QUESTIONS OF LAW BEFORE THIS COURT 
Introduction 
Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on January 30, 2009, requesting this 
Court declare a judgment interpreting various recorded documents attached as exhibits 
thereto, the core document including a purpOlied grant of two easements from Henry, a 
former owner of plaintiffs' land, to Merwin, a former owner of defendants' land. (PIs. Ex. 
15.) Plaintiffs requested this Court quiet title to the purported easement areas, and enjoin 
defendants from their use. At issue, but not addressed in this brief, is the issue of 
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plaintiffs' request for fees and costs, which shall be argued following judgment. (LR.C.P. 
54(d)(5).) 
Defendants' counterclaim requested this Court recognize and affirm the two 
alleged easements either by prescription or express recorded document, one of which 
purported easements became known at trial as the "disputed driveway." At trial, 
defendants dropped their claim of easement by implication. 
LEGAL QUESTIONS 
1. What is the legal status and effect of defendants' Exhibit 0, the alleged verbal 
agreement between Sanders and Merwin, on plaintiffs' and defendants' claims? 
2. What documents comprise the Sanders-Henry purchase agreement? 
3. Is the Sanders-Henry purchase agreement ambiguous as a matter of law? 
4. Did Sanders have the power to grant an easement to Henry on June 8, 1988? 
5. Did Henry have the power to grant an easement in Sanders' property to Merwin 
on June 7, 1988? 
6. If Henry had the power to grant an easement to Merwin on June 7, 1988, was the 
deed delivered to her? 
7. Did Idaho's after-acquired property doctrine apply to the purported Henry-
Merwin grant of easement? 
8. Did the Hemy-Merwin easement grants fail for lack of Merwin's consideration? 
9. Did the Henry-Merwin easement grants fail for lack of Sanders' consideration? 
10. Did the Sanders-Henry purchase agreement contract merge into the deed, and, if 
so, did the Henry to Merwin easements survive the contract by that deed? 
11. Did the Henry-Merwin easement grants fail, because they camlOt be located? 
12. What is the legal effect on the Henry-Merwin easements of the two Kluss-Henry 
agreements found at instrument numbers 1224548 and 1224896? 
13. Do the Conines enjoy a prescriptive easement across the lower road, or across the 
disputed driveway? 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The legal status and effect of defendants' Exhibit 0, the writing allegedly 
evidencing a verbal agreement between Sanders and Merwin, is that it is void as 
between parties in this case, unless it is only used to evince Sanders' intent. 
Defendants' Exhibit 0 appears to be in the nature of a grant deed, because it 
states, "an easement on [location] was granted in exchange for access from the County 
Road .... " Defendants' Exhibit 0 was likely meant to be a conveyance of an interest in 
real property. (I.C. § 55-813.) The Kootenai County Recorder must record deeds and 
grants. (I.C. § 31-2402(1 )(a).) However, a recorder may refuse to record a document not 
authorized by law to be recorded. (I.e. § 31-2402(2).) 
Defendants' Exhibit 0 is not authorized by law to be recorded, because neither 
the alleged grantor Sanders nor grantee Merwin acknowledged it. (I.e. §§ 55-805, 55-
709, 55-71 0.) Without acknowledgment by a proper notary or officer, there is no way to 
verify whose signatures are actually on defendants' Exhibit O. Further, the document is 
undated, so the Kootenai County Recorder would not be able to index it properly. (LC. § 
31-2404(1).) Without a date, and without proper recordation, there is no way to give 
constructive notice to third parties whether either Merwin or Sanders, or, as here, their 
successors, may claim an interest in the other party's propel1y. (LC. § 55-811; Matheson 
v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758 (1977).) 
Lacking constructive notice, neither Henry nor Belstlers through Sanders, or 
Kluss, Solomon, or Conine through Merwin could claim any right to use whatever 
easements were allegedly granted in defendants' Exhibit O. On the bases discussed 
herein, this Court could ignore that document as irrelevant due to its never providing 
constructive notice to subsequent bonafide good faith purchasers for value. (Sun Valley 
Land and Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862, 866 (1993) ("[a] bona fide purchaser is 
one who takes real property by paying valuable consideration and in good faith, i.e., 
without knowing of adverse claims.") Lacking any chain of constructive notice in 
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Kootenai County records, Plaintiffs Belstler are "subsequent bonafide good faith 
purchasers for value" and cannot be a servient estate for the two easements. 
A void deed is one that is invalid for any purpose, ineffective to convey legal title 
and unenforceable at law. (23 Am. Jur.2d Deeds § 137 (1965).) Since defendants' Exhibit 
° is unrecorded, this Court should also find it is void as against subsequent purchasers of 
the Sanders' and Merwin properties, wherever those property may be located, if those 
purchases were recorded. (I.C. § 55-812.) Thus, assuming this purported grant to 
Merwin was across Sanders' property that he eventually sold to Henry and that now 
belongs to Belstlers (which assumption cannot be made from the document's language), 
any claim by Merwin's successors, including Conines, is void, because defendants' 
Exhibit 0 is unrecorded, and Henry's deed was recorded in 1989, see plaintiffs' Exhibit 
16, and Belstlers' deed from Henry was recorded in 2005. Due to this additional 
deficiency, this Court could ignore defendants' Exhibit 0, because it is void as it relates 
to the subsequent purchasers involved in this lawsuit. 
Further, defendants' Exhibit ° is ambiguous and vague to the point of being 
nearly indecipherable. The document states, "an easement on the northwest comer of the 
property owned by Linda L. Merwin," but it does not say where on the northwest comer 
ofthat property the easement was to be located. Further, there is no way to know what 
"access from the County Road through property owned by V.A. Sanders" was to be 
granted to Merwin, specifically whether said access was to be on the south portion of the 
property now owned by Belstlers, the north portion of the property now owned by 
Belstlers, or access from Rockford Bay Road, presumably the named "County Road," 
through other property owned by V.A. Sanders to the n011h, south, or east of the Conine 
property and completely unrelated to the Belstler's land. As if this is not enough, there is 
no definition of what is referred to in the document as "the present road," or what 
constitutes Sanders' "other property." Finally, without a date, it is impossible to tell 
exactly when it was signed, which leads to an additional problem creating ambiguity, as 
to a definition of "the present road" and Sanders completion thereof. 
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Even if the assumption is allowed that the signatures were not forged, to which 
point no evidence was provided at trial, all that can be determined from the language in 
defendants' Exhibit ° is that Sanders apparently intended to complete a road yet 
unfinished during the period of Linda Merwin's ownership, and that Merwin was to gain 
access to her property from the County Road through some unlocated property owned by 
Sanders. It would be helpful to determine the date of this purported agreement, or at least 
the timeframe during which it may have been executed, because if it is not a forgery, it 
may at least provide an indication of those two parties' intent within a given time period. 
Since the document language is ambiguous, this Court may look to other 
circumstances available to try to determine the intent of the parties. (Hoffman v. United 
Silver Mines, Inc., 116 Idaho 240, 245 (CLApp.1989); "If a contract is ambiguous, its 
meaning turns on the underlying intent of the parties. Intent is a question of fact, to be 
determined by a jury in light of the language of the entire agreement, the parties' conduct, 
the course of prior negotiations, and other extrinsic information." (ld., citing Olmstead v. 
Heidelberg Inn, Inc., 105 Idaho 774 (CLApp. 1983).) 
In this case, it may be possible to isolate a general time frame within which 
defendants' Exhibit ° was executed. Linda Merwin purchased the property from 
Anstadts in 1974. (PIs. Ex. 6.) Sixteen years later, Linda Merwin sold the property to 
Robert Kluss. (PIs. Ex. 17.) Thus, if Merwin is actually a party to defendants' Exhibit 0, 
it would have been executed between 1974 and 1990 during Merwin's period of 
ownership. Evidence at trial shows we may be able to further narrow the range for the 
date of defendants' Exhibit O. 
Plaintiffs' expert at trial testified that not all surveyors include prominent features 
like roads on their surveys. The Record of Survey by Webb Engineering appearing at 
Book 1 of Surveys at Page 284 and dated August 20, 1979 shows four parcels owned by 
Sanders with no roads on them. (PIs. Ex. 8.) However, it is unlikely there were no roads 
on the Webb-surveyed parcels, as Sanders "logged everything" including "some logging 
operations in [the Conine's] northern piece," and "was a logging freak." (Evans Depo. p. 
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21 at 11. 17-19.) Mr. Evans' deposition remarks regarding Sanders, and the possibility of 
a number of roads existing during the Webb Survey, are supported by plaintiffs' Exhibits 
1-3, the 1987, 1992, and 1998 aerial photos from the USDA Farm Service Agency, 
because those photos show numerous indications of roads, as testified by plaintiffs' 
expert at trial. Plaintiffs' expert testified at trial that he identified no fewer than nine 
roadcuts extending off of Chandler Lane as he traveled from Rockford Bay Road to the 
Belstler property. 
Since the 1987 aerial photo shows Chandler Lane quite clearly extending 
completely through the then Merwin property, defendants' Exhibit 0 was likely written 
before 1987, because Mr. Sanders needed "authority to complete the present road and 
provide him access to his other property." (Defs. Ex. 0.) However, conflicting evidence 
at trial as to what road was installed where and when requires us to acknowledge it is also 
possible that the roads were not on the Webb Engineering Survey in 1979 because they 
did not then exist. This likelihood is evidenced by plaintiffs' Exhibit 9, 10, and 11. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9 is a grant deed from Sanders to Andrews Equipment Services 
of Washington, Inc. executed in March of 1983 wherein Sanders' grant by warranty deed 
a parcel of land identified by plaintiffs' expert as parcels C and D on the Webb survey. 
(PIs. Exs. 4, 8.) In that warranty deed, Sanders reserved a 60-foot easement for a road 
across that property, "said easement to be in the approximate location of the existing 
road, said location to be determined by the [Sanders]." (emphasis added.) The Sanders 
apparently determined the final location of that easement by October 7, 1983, when they 
quitclaimed an easement right to Rockford Bay, Inc., a company in which Mr. Sanders 
was a partner for the purpose of developing lands known today as Black Rock into a 
"high class ... 660-acre" community for "1200 to 1500 condominium units," including 
"fancy condominiums, tennis courts, private security police, racquetball courts, paved 
road access, riding stables, a clubhouse and restaurant, an electric tram to carry residents 
from hilltop to lakeshore and an 18-hole championship golf course." (PIs. Exs. 10 
(easement grant); and 32 (news articles re: planned Rockford Bay Country Club.) Today, 
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as then, these Rockford Bay/Black Rock properties are to the east of the then Merwin and 
now Conine parcel, and, according to plaintiff s expert testimony at trial, are located 
proximate to or in areas benefiting from the road easements granted by Sanders and 
Andrews Equipment Services of Washington, Inc. as shown in plaintiffs' Exhibits 10 and 
11. (PIs. Ex. 4.) This evidence indicates the possibility, ifnot a probability that in 1979 
when the Webb Survey was created Chandler Lane was not yet built. It may have been 
under construction in early 1983, and its location was finally determined by survey 
sometime between March and October of 1983. (PIs. Ex. 10.) 
Since plaintiffs' expert's report and plaintiffs' expert at trial verified plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 9, 10, and 11 relate to roads labeled A, B, C, and D in his report, it is very likely, 
should defendants' Exhibit 0 not be a forgery, that Sanders' intent was to "complete the 
present road and provide him access to his other [plam1ed Rockford Bay Country Club] 
property" from the easternmost point of road D in plaintiffs' expert's report, extending 
that road toward the east across "the northwest corner of the property owned by Linda L. 
Merwin." 
Finally, plaintiffs' expert's report states he "did not find a recorded easement for a 
continuation of this [easement grant] road [labeled as roads A, B, C, and D] across parcel 
number 0825," which is defendant Conine's parcel directly to the east of the Belstler 
land. (PIs. Ex. 4.) This lack of evidence, coupled with evidence discussed herein above 
potentially narrows the time frame for the unrecorded purported grants between Sanders 
and Merwin to a time period as early as 1974 (if the Webb Survey did not show existing 
roads), to 1987, a period of 13 years, when we clearly see a road on the USDA map. (PIs. 
Ex. 1.) However, if the Webb Survey showed no roads because there were no roads in 
1979, the time period during which the agreement may have been executed narrows to 
eight years, or 1979 to 1987. There is no evidence indicating when Sanders actually cut 
his road through the nOlihwest portion of Merwin's land. Also, there is no evidence as to 
whether Sanders cut the road through Merwin's land sometime after 1979 without 
Merwin's pennission. However, assuming some continuity of road construction, if the 
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road was surveyed and easements were conveyed during 1983, and Sanders needed to 
"complete the present road and provide him access to his other property" sometime 
thereafter, the date of defendants' Exhibit 0 could be a relatively short four-year time 
period between October 1983 and 1987, when plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 gives evidence of the 
road's existence across Merwin's land. 
However, Sanders' purported grant to Merwin was "for access from the County 
Road thorough [sic] property owned by V.A. Sanders." There was little evidence at trial 
related to other parcels Sanders may have owned in the area, except in plaintiffs' Exhibits 
9, 10, 11, and 32 related to his partnership in Rockford Bay Inc. for the community to be 
developed to the east, regarding parcels to the south, east, or north of Merwin's property, 
through which parcels Sanders may have intended to grant Merwin access "from the 
County Road." For example, there was no evidence offered at trial as to whether "the 
County Road" indicated in defendants' Exhibit 0 is actually Rockford Bay Road, instead 
ofLoffs Bay Road from the northeast of Merwin's land. However, since evidence at 
trial showed the lands covered by the Webb survey were owned by Sanders, and that he 
subsequently or concurrently built and surveyed a road through those properties shown in 
plaintiffs' expert's report as roads A, B, C, and D, it is possible, ifnot probable that 
Sanders' grant to Merwin was across some portion of what is now Chandler Lane. 
Unfortunately, no evidence was presented at trial related to defendants' Exhibit 0 
as to whether Sanders intended Merwin to enter Chandler Lane from Rockford Bay Road 
and immediately turn right past what is now the Worley Fire Station to cross the southern 
portion of what is now the Belstlers' property, or whether he wanted her to use an 
extension from the eastern point of road D into the northwest portion of Merwin's land, 
or whether he intended access to be granted from either the western point of road D, or 
some location off road C leading to the disputed driveway to be that access. 
Alternatively, by the naked language of defendants' Exhibit 0, it may have been 
executed long after Merwin sold the property to Kluss, because it states it involves an 
easement on property "owned by" Merwin, without stating it was owned when the 
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document was executed; that it "was granted," without saying when it was granted; in 
sentence number two that additional access "had to be" mutually agreed to, as if speaking 
about something agreed to in the past; and in the second paragraph that the agreement 
"was made," without saying when it was made. In fact, the agreement was reportedly 
made "to complete the present road," as if the road is already completed by the time the 
agreement is executed; and finally that the agreement "was clearly beneficial," apparently 
referring to some unknown time in the past when it was allegedly executed and 
beneficial. Plaintiffs request this Court find defendants' Exhibit 0 completely and 
wholly indecipherable, and that it has no force or effect on the rights of the parties to this 
lawsuit. 
Making any concrete determination regarding these matters from the evidence 
offered at trial would put the Court and the parties' interests far out on an unsustainable 
evidentiary limb. Therefore, this Court should determine that defendants' Exhibit 0 is 
completely void even if it is not forged, and is of no value whatsoever except to indicate 
that Sanders and Merwin had an intent at some unknown time to grant some undefined 
access to each other across their respective properties, Sanders' property in particular 
being unspecified by the document itself. If the Court uses this document merely as 
evidence of those parties' intent, and for nothing else, this singular evidence could be of 
assistance later in determining the meaning of the Sanders-Henry contract, and all three 
documents included therein, should the Court find those documents or portions thereof 
are ambiguous and require the court to look beyond them for their meaning. 
Therefore, plaintiffs argue that defendants' Exhibit 0 should be found by the 
court to be void, but if it is to be used may only be used to show that A) Merwin and 
Sanders intended the other to gain access to their own lands across portions of the other's 
property, and B) Sanders was unable to negotiate a recordable mutual grant of easements 
with Merwin during the ten-year period from 1979 (Webb Survey) to 1989 (Sanders' 
deed to Henry) when Merwin and Sanders owned neighboring properties. 
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Finally, plaintiffs argue this COUli should take note that the latter possibility 
above is supported by the very existence of the final difficult and ambiguous paragraph of 
plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, the now infamous instrument number 1119009, because it 
demonstrates that in June of 1988 Sanders was still unable to reach agreement with, or 
perhaps even have negotiations with Linda Merwin, and attempted to rely on Henry's 
grant to Merwin to do the job that Sanders was unable to accomplish directly with her. 
The very creation of that Mutual Agreement between Sanders and Henry implies Merwin 
may have rejected the defendants' Exhibit 0; she remained unwilling to enter into a 
recordable mutual easement with Sanders, and in fact wanted to have nothing to do with 
him - any reasons for Merwin's feelings on the issue being starkly missing at trial. 
However, due to this Court's knowledge of human behavior, the implication remains. 
Plaintiffs request this Court completely invalidate and find void any application 
whatsoever for or against the interests of either parties in this case, except to the extent it 
demonstrates Sanders' inability to contract with Merwin. 
2. Two Documents are Included in the Sanders-Henry Purchase Agreement. 
In the Olmstead case, the Idaho State Supreme Court found a contract of sale and 
a contract of employment executed concunently between two parties "were intended to 
express the two couples' overall agreement." (Olmstead v. Heidelberg Inn, Inc., 105 
Idaho 774 (1983).) Along with those two agreements, the Olmstead Court found two 
other contracts between the parties that were also meant to express the parties' overall 
agreement, because "all four of the contracts shared a common nexus ... [and] they 
defined or modified the rights of the [parties] regarding the motel operation." (Olmstead, 
105 Idaho at 778.) 
In this case, Mr. and Mrs. Sanders and Kenneth Henry entered into a land 
purchase Sale Agreement contract shown at plaintiffs Exhibit 14, which is instrument 
number 1119008, for Henry's purchase of the future Belstler property, which provided 
Henry possession only and not title. (PIs. Ex. 14 at 2.) On the date of execution of 
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instrument number 1119008, those parties also executed instrument numbers 1119009, a 
purported easement agreement, and 1151056, the Sanders to Henry Deed, found here at 
plaintiffs' Exhibits 15 and 16, respectively. The initial two documents share a common 
nexus by defining or modifYing the Sanders' and Henry's rights and obligations related to 
the conveyance of property from the Sanders to Ken Henry. However, due to the 
doctrine of merger, discussed herein below, the third document is an outcome of the 
contract, but not part of it. (Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 715 
(2007).) The three documents were not recorded in numerical order, because Ken Henry 
needed to satisfY his obligations under instrument number 1119008 related to completion 
of the purchase price payments prior to the Warranty Deed, which is instrument number 
1151056, being recorded in Kootenai County. 
Specifically, plaintiffs Exhibit 14, the Sale Agreement, named the parties, Mr. 
and Mrs. Sanders and Ken Henry, described the property to be sold, provided a purchase 
price and terms for the installment payoff, stated Henry's obligations regarding 
maintenance, taxes, and insurance, allowed Henry's possession prior to deed deliverance, 
stated terms related to attorneys fees and costs in case of a potential dispute, provided a 
method of addressing payment delinquency, gave Sanders' remedy for Henry's total 
failure to pay installments, gave standard contract Notice provisions, and the parties' 
agreement to place the deed in escrow with the third-party payee of Henry's purchase 
monies, after full payment of which said escrow company was to deliver the deed to 
Henry. In plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, the Sanders are alleged to have granted an easement to 
Henry, as consideration for Henry's creation of two easements for Linda Merwin. These 
two documents constituted the Sales Agreement, and the deed was to be provided 
following the execution and performance of the terms of thereof. 
This Court should find instrument numbers 1119008 and 1119009 are two 
documents evidencing one contractual agreement. 
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3. The Sanders-Henry Purchase Agreement is Ambiguous as a Matter of Law. 
"A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations." 
(Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 2008-ID-121O.084 at 4; citing Cristo 
Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308 (2007).) 
"Whether an agreement is ambiguous is a question oflaw." (Hoffman v. United 
Silver Mines, Inc., 116 Idaho 240, 245 (Ct.App.1989); e.g., DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 
Idaho 63 (1986).) "If the contract is not ambiguous, its interpretation is another question 
of law, to be determined by the trial judge rather than by a jury." (Jd., citing Luzar v. 
Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693 (1984). "Conversely, if a contract is ambiguous, its 
meaning turns on the underlying intent of the parties. Intent is a question of fact, to be 
determined by a jury in light of the language of the entire agreement, the parties' conduct, 
the course of prior negotiations, and other extrinsic information." (Jd., citing Olmstead v. 
Heidelberg Inn, Inc., 105 Idaho 774 (Ct.App. 1983). 
Specifically related to easement grants or deeds construed as contracts, an 
instrument granting an easement is to be construed in connection with the intention of the 
parties and circumstances in existence at the time the easement was given and carried out. 
(Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 572 (2005), rehrg. denied June 28,2005.) 
In this case, the core contract document at issue that allegedly granted express 
easements, instrument number 1119009, was fully discussed at trial, but further 
discussion is merited herein. (Pis. Ex. 15.) The other two documents, plaintiffs' Exhibits 
14 and 16, were little discussed at trial. 
In the first ofthe three contract documents, instrument number 1119008, the 
Sanders-Henry Sale Agreement, Henry is only granted immediate possession as of June 
15,1988, and not title. (Pis. Ex. 14 at 2.) Notably, there is no reference in that Sales 
Agreement, which is instrument number 1119008, to the document recorded as 1119009, 
plaintiffs Exhibit 15. (Pis. Ex. 14.) Further, plaintiffs' Exhibit 14 only references the 
Sanders-Henry deed, the third document arguably included in the contract, which is 
plaintiffs' Exhibit 16. 
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Therefore, the first of the three contract documents is ambiguous, in each of two 
places it uses the language "any and all easements, conditions and restrictions of record 
and easements for ingress and egress," because there is no way to tell if the deed is only 
referencing easements created prior to June 6, 1988, when the document was signed, or 
whether it is meant to be prospective to include the second document of the contract, 
instrument number 1119009, and all potential later-granted easements. (PIs. Ex. 14 at 1.) 
Further, included with the second instance of the use of that language, it states, 
"[t]he seller has made a good and sufficient deed conveying said premises to the 
purchaser free and clear of all liens and incumbrances, except any and all easements, 
conditions and restrictions of record and easements for ingress and egress." (PIs. Ex. 14 
at 2.) But, the deed gives absolutely no reference to the second document, instrument 
number 1119009, so it is impossible to tell whether the "subject to" language in the 
warranty deed was meant to include any easements purportedly granted in that document 
number two, plaintiffs Exhibit 15. In fact, the language on pages one and two of the first 
of the three contract documents is exactly the same as the language in the Sanders-Henry 
deed - and in neither is there a reference to document number two, instrument number 
1119009. It is likely that the "good and sufficient deed" only referenced the easements 
existing in the Sales Agreement, i.e., the Rockford Bay, Inc. easement, here plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 10, because the language is identical, and neither the first nor the third contract 
document reference the second document. 
To address these ambiguities, the Court should find the only easement existing 
across and burdening the Sanders' property they were selling to Henry on June 8, 1998 
was located on what is exhibited as Road D in plaintiffs' expert's report. (PIs. Ex. 4.) 
That easement was granted to Rockford Bay, Inc., see plaintiffs' Exhibit 10. Thus, this 
Court should rule that plaintiffs' Exhibit 14 only referred to the Rockford Bay, Inc. 
easement previously granted by what is now plaintiffs' Exhibit 10. 
Additional justification for this finding is that since the first two documents of the 
contract, plaintiffs' Exhibits 14 and 15, were recorded contemporaneously on June 8, 
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1988 at five minutes past ten in the morning, this Court should find that the granting 
language for any easements in plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, if they are not void with no effect 
whatsoever for other reasons, were not included in any easements referenced in plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 14, because plaintiffs' Exhibit 14 was recorded first. (I.e. § 55-811; In Re Young, 
156 B.R. 282 (1993).) 
In the second of the three contract documents, instrument number 1119009, the 
purported easement grants, evidence at trial indicates significant portions of that 
document are ambiguous. 
Initially, it should be noted by the Court that in the first paragraph, the property 
description does not include the "subject to" language used to reference "any and all 
easements, conditions and restrictions of record and easements for ingress and egress" 
that is included in the sale agreement and the deed. (PIs. Exs. 14, 16.) Thus, the 
document is ambiguous because it is unclear from the face of plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 
whether Sanders meant to transfer the property to Henry with only the known Rockford 
Bay easement, or only the easement Sanders allegedly granted Henry in plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15, or some other combination. 
As to other ambiguity and related to the purported southern easement, the terms 
"existing road," and "existing logging road" are undefined in the document. At trial, 
plaintiffs' expert stated he saw nine different roadcuts as he traveled from Rockford Bay 
Road to the Belstler's home on Chandler Lane in 2009. There is no telling what was 
meant by the terms at issue here when the document was created in 1988. Therefore, the 
Court should plumb parol evidence and the circumstances present in 1988. 
"In construing an easement in a particular case, the instrument granting the 
easement is to be interpreted in connection with the intention of the parties, and the 
circumstances in existence at the time the easement was granted and utilized." (Nelson v. 
Johnson, 106 Idaho 385, 387 (1984); citing Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243 (1954).) 
In this case, as discussed herein, on June 3, 2009 Sanders conveyed the Worley 
Fire District parcel over which Henry and or Merwin needed to pass over to reach the 
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soon-to-be Henry property. There is no evidence Worley Fire District granted any 
easement right to Sanders, Henry, or Merwin. 
Sanders knew of the grant to the Fire District three days earlier, but Henry did 
not. We know Sanders did, because he and Geraldine signed the Fire District warranty 
deed. (PIs. Ex. 13.) We know Henry did not, because his unpressured statement 
regarding the 1119009 instrument was that it was "some type of formality." (Henry 
Depo. at p. 8, lines 3-24.) Further, we know from the evidence that Sanders did not 
explain this to Henry at the signing of the documents when Attorney R. Maurice Cooper 
notarized them, because Sanders appeared before that notary on June 6, and Henry did 
not appear until the following day. (PIs. Ex. 15.) Even if Sanders spoke to Henry prior to 
the signing, it is anomalous that Sanders would not have informed Henry there would be 
no way for Merwin to cross over The Worley Fire District to reach the easement Henry 
was to grant to Merwin. Even if Sanders was not being fraudulent, he was at least being 
sloppy, because there is no evidence he was suffering from dementia, and simply forgot 
what he conveyed to the Worley Fire District three days earlier. 
As to the granting language specifying the location of the easement, in Coulsen 
the Idaho State Supreme Court stated: 
The use to which a right of way is devoted or for which it is created, 
determines the character of title with which the holder is invested. The 
character of the use or the necessity of complete dominion determines 
the extent to which [the holder] is entitled to possession. No greater 
title or right to possession passes under a general grant than reasonably 
necessary to enable the grantee to adequately and conveniently make 
the intended use of [the holder's] way. 
(Villager Condominium Assoc. v. Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 986, 988 (1992); citing 
Abbott v. Nampa School Dis!. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544 (1991); citing Coulsen v. 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 626 (1929); 
"Thus, the general rule concerning easements is that the right of an easement 
holder may not be enlarged and may not encompass more than is necessary to fulfill the 
easement." (!d.) 
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In court, Ron Evans testified that he built the road past the firehouse and graveled 
it up to a certain point for the express use by Henrys when they subdivided their parcel 
and built their retirement home. (Evans Depo. at p. 12,11. 15-21; p. 13,11. 6-9.) But, it is 
unlikely there were no roads on the Webb-surveyed parcels, as Sanders "logged 
everything" and "was a logging freak." (Evans Depo. p. 21 at 1. 19.) At trial, Evans 
agreed that the flat areas on Belstler's and Conine's property could have been used as 
landing decks for logging. In his deposition Evans was more certain, testifYing, 
"[ c ]ertainly, [Sanders] was," to the query "[ s]o it was [Evans '] understanding that 
[Sanders] was also utilizing [the disputed driveway.] to get to [Conines'] piece of 
property." (Id. at p. 24, 11. 1-4.) Further, Evans testified that the now disputed southern 
road across the Belstlers parcel was put there for logging purposes. (Id. at pp. 29, 11. 2-8 
and 22-25, and 30, 11. 1-12.). Specifically, Evans recalled, "that's the reason they did this 
road like they did at the beginning, this little bottom piece was tor 0] -- because this is all 
so steep right there." (Id., p. 30, 11. 8-9.) (indicating at deposition some unknown point on 
deposition exhibit C.) 
Thus, since the "existing logging road" was used by loggers to reach the flat area 
on the southern portion of the Henry property for log storage prior to trucking them to the 
mill, then the terms "existing road" and "existing logging road" would logically be one 
and the same road. (PIs. Ex. 15.) 
However, simply because the road existed and the ambiguity can be resolved as to 
their physical location does not mean a valid easement grant wa~ or could be conveyed 
from Sanders, or from Henry to Merwin. If any easement was conveyed, even though the 
title of plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 states it is for "ingress and egress," which sounds like a 
general grant, the nature of the prior use was more likely a "logging road." (PIs. Ex. 15.) 
There is no evidence that Merwin needed any access across the southern portion of 
Henry's land for logging - or even for ingress or egress. The fact remains that even if the 
Henry-Merwin southern grant was valid, there was never any grant from Sanders or 
Worley Fire District to Merwin across the abutting parcel to the west of Henry's. 
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As to the purpOlied northern easement, the two ambiguous terms allowing this 
Court to stray from the plain language of the document into parol evidence are the terms 
"existing road" and "community road." The evidence shows it is more likely than not the 
"existing road" is Road D coming from an easterly direction. (PIs. Ex. 4, 15.) 
The document's plain language helps in this area. The final sentence of plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15 states, in pertinent part, "[s]aid easement[ is] ... the existing road from the 
community road on the north." This wording provides a direction, which is "from ... the 
north." This indicates the community road was, in fact, on the north, and that the 
easement was to be granted from the direction of Merwin's property toward Henry's on 
some road defined by its service to a community. Plaintiffs' expert at trial testified it was 
possible that the eastern terminus of Road C is located south of every portion of Road D. 
The question presents itself: is there a "community road" to the northeast of the eastern 
terminus of Road D? (PIs. Ex. 4, sketch.) 
At trial, Conines presented evidence supporting their view that the "community" 
describing the road was merely Chandler Lane from Rockford Bay Road looping up 
through Sanders property to the disputed driveway. However, evidence shows that on 
June 6, 1988 Merwin had no buildings on her property, because the first building up there 
was Kluss'. There is no evidence Merwin even visited her own property, certainly she 
did not live there. (Henry Depo. at p. 7, 11. 3-7.). It is more likely than not the future 
Conine property was simply an investment for Merwin and nothing else. Merwin lived in 
Spokane when she bought it in 1974. (PIs. Ex. 7.) 
Judy Solomon's husband "told [her] there was a building on it." (Solomon Depo. 
at p. 11.) However, to the question, "[a]nd you made no use of the property at all?," Ms. 
Solomon answered, "[n]o." (Id.) The building was not the Solomon's. Also, Kluss, the 
predecessor to Solomons "was the first one [to move] up there." (Evans Depo. at p. 11,1. 
8; p. 17, 1. 22.) In deposition, Ron Evans was shown an aerial photo and he identified the 
smaller of the Conine buildings as "the one that Kl uss buil t." (Id. at p. 19, 11. 12-13.) And, 
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Evans stated, "I never even seen [sic] this building that he had put up. That was before 
Ken ... ever built a house on this piece." (Id. at II. 3-5.) 
Chandler Lane could not be the "community road," because there was no 
community at all on that vacant land. The evidentiary time line shows Henry bought from 
Sanders in 1988, see plaintiffs' Exhibits 14-15, and that Kluss, "the first one up there," 
bought from Merwin in 1990. (Evans Depo. at p. 11, I. 8 ("first one"); PIs. Ex. 17 
Merwin-Kluss deed.) It is notable the Merwin-Kluss deed granted no easements in the 
legal description of the property, which easements Merwin had been granted from 
Anstadt in 1974, and which Anstadt had been granted from Smythe in 1961. (PIs. Exs. 6, 
7, 17.) This implies Merwin felt negatively about easements, perhaps from her 
experiences with Sanders, who was never able to procure one from her in the fifteen years 
between 1974 and 1989 when they each owned abutting properties. 
Evidence indicates Attorney Maurice Cooper knew the Sanders and worked for 
them. (PIs. Exs. 9,14, 15, 16.) If Cooper drafted the Sales Agreement, and the other two 
documents comprising the Sanders-Henry conveyance, Sanders probably created the 
language or gave it to Cooper for creation of those documents. Evidence is that Henry 
did not even know the purpose of instrument number 1119009, except a "some type of 
formality .... " (Henry Depo. at p. 8, 1. 11.) Further, Henry agreed 1119009 "was a 
document presented to [him] by Sanders'." (Id. at p. 8, 11.13-14.) Henry had "no 
independent recollection of signing that instrument during the transaction." (Id. at 11. 18-
20.) Finally, Henry did not have "any recollection of Mr. Sanders somehow indicating to 
[Henry that Sanders] had to establish some easements or roads for the benefit of 
[Merwin]." (Id. at 11. 21-24.) This last is supported by the fact that Sanders signed the 
day before Henry, which indicates Sanders and Henry did not discuss the document 
during a signing ceremony. (PIs. Ex. 15.) 
Since it was Sanders' document language, what was his perspective and definition 
of the "community road?" This is a fair and proper parol evidentiary question. 
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In 1983,jive years before Sanders' sales to Worley Fire District and Henry, Mr. 
Sanders was a partner for the purpose of developing lands known today as Black Rock 
into a "high class ... 660-acre" community for "1200 to 1500 condominium units," 
including "fancy condominiums, tennis courts, private security police, racquetball courts, 
paved road access, riding stables, a clubhouse and restaurant, an electric tram to carry 
residents from hilltop to lakeshore and an I8-hole championship golf course." (PIs. Ex. 
32 (news articles re: planned Rockford Bay Country Club.) 
It is more likely than not that the language inserted by Sanders or his attorney, 
Cooper, into instrument number 1119009 used the words "community road from the 
north" to indicate the "community" Sanders was developing to the north and east of the 
Sanders property in partnership with John Pring through their firm Rockford Bay, Inc. 
This is the same firm Sanders granted an easement across Road D to in 1983. (PIs. Ex. 
10.) This is most likely the reason Sanders' reserved the future Chandler Lane easement 
when in 1983 they conveyed the parcel labeled as 2600 in plaintiffs' expert's report 
sketch to Andrews Equipment Service of Washington, Inc. (PIs. Ex. 4, 9.) Later, in 
November 1983, Sanders, as a partner in Rockford Bay, Inc., negotiated with Andrews 
Equipment to provide the same easement access for Rockford Bay's planned community 
activities, which makes logical sense so that an entrance or exit from the "community" 
could be available as an additional lake access road for that planned "community" 
through Rockford Bay Road. 
"[WJhen [Sanders] put the roads in, he was in cahoots at the time with the John 
Appleway Chevrolet people .... and [Sanders] had the only -- Pring didn't have any lake 
frontage, but [Sanders] did. So they were going to go in pm1ners together on the golf 
course development thing, and [Sanders] would donate his lake front property. That's 
where the Black Rock office is now .... so when [Sanders J built around past the fire 
station up -- it was going to connect up into the golf course, which is just past Howard 
Conine's property right now." (Evans Depo., at pp. 7, ll. 16-25, and 8, 11. 1-6.) 
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The evidence shows, and this Court should find that the meaning of the words 
"community road from the north" is the extension of the road from what is now Black 
Rock coming down from the northeast of the Conine property and·through it heading 
west toward Belstler's. This accords with evidence from defendants' Exhibit 0, wherein 
Merwin granted an easement to Sanders "on the northwest comer of the property owned 
by [Merwin] ... to provide Mr. Sanders with the authority to complete the present road 
and provide him access to his other property." If defendants Exhibit ° has discernible 
meaning connected to other evidence, it is that Mr. Sanders needed access through 
Merwin's on her northwest comer to connect the "community road from the north," so he 
could "complete the present road," which was Road D and the lower portion of Chandler 
Lane going to Rockford Bay Road. (PIs. Ex. D, sketch.) With this interpretation all the 
evidence lines up smoothly. 
Plaintiffs believe evidentiary analysis of the easements at issue has been burdened 
with the limiting and mistaken assumption that such analysis must begin at Rockford Bay 
Road and head up the hill. This misdirection is easily embarked upon, given the 
analytical concentration on plaintiffs' property and the existing directional access to it 
from Rockford Bay Road. However, burdened with this incorrect assumption, analysis of 
all the evidence together ends up in a very difficult mishmash. If the Court abandons that 
assumption and adopts an analysis from the opposite direction, so its analysis flows east 
to west, all the evidence for interpreting the documents to find the correct easement paths 
lines up smoothly straight downhill from Black Rock to Rockford Bay Road. 
Plaintiffs thereby suggest this COUli find the meaning of the words in the last 
sentence of plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 to be that the "existing road" is road segments A, B, C, 
and D, and that the "community road on the north" indicates the road from the east at 
Black Rock, which Sanders wanted to COlmect through the northwest comer of the 
Merwin property to the eastern terminus of Road D. (PIs. Ex. 4, sketch.) 
Therefore, if this cOUli substantiates the validity of the document, it should reach 
the above conclusions regarding the ambiguous terms, and thus the overall meaning of 
plaintiffs' post-trial brief on legal arguments.doc 22 ~97 
the documents. However, substantiation of the document may fail, due to other 
circumstances before the Court through parol evidence and Idaho law. 
4. Sanders Lacked Power to Grant Henry an Easement on June 8, 1988. 
Regarding the Sanders-Henry grant in plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, plaintiffs' expert's 
report discusses that easement as "D6, 1 st Easement," and shows two locations for that 
purported grant. (PIs. Ex. 4 at 3.) However, even if the Court finds the location of the 
easement to be where plaintiffs' expert shows it in his repOli's sketch as Road E, Sanders 
would not have had the power to grant this easement on June 6, 1988, because on June 3, 
1988 Sanders conveyed the fire station parcel to the Worley Fire District, and thus did not 
own the real property upon which he would attempt to grant an easement to Henry in 
plaintiffs' Exhibit 15. (PIs. Ex. 13.) 
Plaintiff's' Exhibit 13, the warranty deed from Sanders to the Worley Fire District 
(WFD), was executed by Vaughn and Geraldine Sanders on June 3, 1988, and the 
acknowledgment on that document maintains the June 3 date for when those parties 
appeared before the notary to sign. Thus, the property was sold on June 3, 1988. 
At trial during plaintiffs' expert's testimony, and in that Sanders-WFD warranty 
deed, the evidence shows the WFD property legal description includes language stating, 
" ... a plastic cap marked PEILS 3451 on the north boundary of a 60 foot wide road right-
of-way for Rockford Bay Road; thence, North 87°41 '03" West, 75.01 feet along the 
north boundary of the Rockford Bay Road right-of-way, 60 feet north of and parallel with 
the north boundary of Sanders Rockford Bay Development Third Addition to an iron rod 
.... " Therefore, because the parcel transferred to the Worley Fire District extended all 
the way to the public Rockford Bay Road, there was no land available between the road 
and the district property that Sanders owned upon which he could convey an easement to 
Henry. 
Further supporting this point is that in plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, the Sanders-Henry 
grant purports to make that grant "in an area adjacent to Rockford Bay Road in front of 
plaintiffs' post-trial brief on legal arguments.doc 23 
the fire station located thereon." The word adjacent means "[l]ying near or close to, but 
not necessarily touching." (Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., 2004 at 44.) This means the 
purported easement grant was for an area away from the Rockford Bay Road right-of-
way, because the word adjacent was used and not the word "abutting" which means "to 
join at a border or boundary; to share a common boundary with." (Id. at 11.) However, 
because the WFD deed describes property extending all the way to the Rockford Bay 
Road right-of-way, there was no area either "adjacent" or "abutting" that right-of-way for 
the Sanders-Henry easement allegedly granted by plaintiffs' Exhibit 15. 
Therefore, Sanders did not even own the property alleged to be transferred by the 
Sanders-Henry easement grant in instrument number 1119009, even though the WFD 
warranty deed was not recorded until 4:25 o'clock in the afternoon of June 8, 1988, after 
the recordation of the Sanders-Henry Sale Agreement (PIs. Ex. 14), and the Mutual 
Agreement for Easement for Ingress and Egress (PIs. Ex. 15). This is because as between 
the Sanders and the Worley Fire District, the signed but then five days later recorded 
warranty deed was "valid as between [those] parties thereto and those who [had] notice 
thereof." (I.e. § 55-815.) Sanders had no legal power to convey the same property twice. 
Sanders certainly had notice of the conveyance to WFD. Therefore, the Sanders-Henry 
easement grant must fail. 
5. Henry Lacked Power to Grant an Easement Interest in Sanders' Property to 
Merwin on June 7, 1988, thus the Merwin Easement Grants Must Fail. 
"The possession of land is, prima facie, evidence of owners hi p, and where a third 
person is dealing with the record owner, who is not in possession of the premises, it is the 
duty of one about to purchase or become interested in the title of the record owner, to 
inquire of the one in possession." (Spencer v. Steward, 37 Idaho 6lO, 614-615 (1923).) 
In this case, according to defendants Exhibit 0, which document is argued above 
to be dated prior to June of 1988, Linda Merwin knew that Sanders owned the property to 
the west of hers, which is now owned by plaintiffs Belstler. No evidence at trial was 
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presented to show that Merwin knew Henry entered into a Sales Agreement to purchase 
the Sanders property to the west of Merwin's in June of 1988. 
In Lathrop, the court said: 
A person being the equitable owner, and in the occupancy of land 
[here Henry], the record title being in the third party [here Sanders], 
[Henry] must refrain from all acts calculated to produce a false 
impression as to the state of the title, in order to hold a person dealing 
with such ostensible owner [here purportedly Merwin] to the duty of 
inquiring with respect to the interest of such occupier. 
(Spencer, 37 Idaho at 616; citing Lathrop v. Groton Savings Bank, 31 N. J. Eq. 273; see 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, sections 616, 623, and 624.) 
In this case, the evidence shows Henry never had any dealings with Merwin. 
Henry did not know Linda Merwin, and did not meet or negotiate with her about the 
purported easement grants in instrument number 1119009. (Henry Depo. Tr. pp. 6-7, 
lines 20-25 & 1-7, respectively.) However, if defendants' Exhibit 0 has any meaning 
and is not a forgery, it is probable Merwin knew Sanders was the owner of the later-to-be 
Henry property. 
Henry was in possession as of June 15, 1988, because that is when page 2 of the 
Sale Agreement indicates Sanders granted him possession. (PIs. Ex. 14 at 2.) 
An easement is a non-possessory interest in land. (Oakley Valley Stone, Inc. v. 
Alastra, 110 Idaho 265,268 (1985), re'hrg. denied Mar. 16, 1986.) If an easement was a 
possessory interest, Henry could have granted Merwin part of his possession on June 15. 
However, because it is not, Henry could not transfer what he di~ not own or possess. 
Since an easement is a non-possessory interest in property, only a title owner may grant 
an easement appurtenant, which the alleged Henry-Merwin easements are purported to 
be, due to the Merwin property description included in instrument number 1119009. (PIs. 
Ex. 15.) 
On June 6, 1988, when Sanders and Henry signed the Sales Agreement at 
plaintiffs' Exhibit 14, Sanders retained title until Henry made the payments, and Henry 
did not have possession until June 15, 1988, nine days later. On June 7, 1988, when 
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Henry signed the Mutual Agreement for Easement for Ingress and Egress at plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15, Henry enjoyed neither title nor possession. Therefore, on June 7, 1988, Henry 
had no power to grant an easement appurtenant to Merwin at all. 
Further, the grants to Merwin in that document were present grants, not 
executory. 
In the Virginia case of Davis, the court stated: 
There is nothing executory about this language. It is a present grant ... 
The language is plain and susceptible to no other reasonable 
interpretation. Such an interpretation is consistent with the other 
provisions of the contract. 
Thus, we hold that the part of the contract that expressly granted a 
right-of-way was not executory but created a present right in land. 
Moreover, the contract of sale stands by itself and is in no way 
inconsistent with or merged in either the lease or the deed. 
(Davis v. Cleve Marsh Hunt Club, 242 Va. 29, 34 (1991) (Seller'S contract for parcel A 
grants buyer easement over seller's parcel B.) 
Similarly, the Sanders-Henry Sales Agreement is executory, because it's wording 
includes "vendors agreed to sell," "purchaser agrees to purchase," "purchaser agrees to 
pay," "purchaser agrees to keep the premises in good repair," etc. (PIs. Ex. 14.) However, 
plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 includes a present grant to Merwin: "Henry grants an easement 
[upon] the property that he is purchasing ... to Linda Merwin." However, Henry did not 
even have possession until June 15, and he made to present grant on June 7, 1988, when 
he had no power to make a present grant. Therefore, the Merwin grants should fail. 
Idaho Code section 55-50 1 states, "[a] mere possibility not coupled with an 
interest cmIDot be transferred." Idaho Code section 55-110 states, "[a] mere possibility, 
such as the expectancy of an heir appm·ent, is not to be deemed an interest of any kind." 
When Henry and the Sanders executed their installment purchase contract, there 
was only a "mere possibility," but no guarantee that Henry would fulfill his obligations 
under the agreement found at plaintiffs Exhibit 14. Linda Merwin was in the position of 
"the expectancy of an heir apparent," holding no interest whatsoever in the Sanders-
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Henry installment purchase contract. Linda Merwin was not a signator to any of the three 
documents evidencing the Sanders-Henry contract, and there is no evidence she gave any 
consideration to Henry for the alleged grant in instrument number 1119009, thus Merwin 
had a mere possibility of acquiring the easement not coupled with a then-present interest. 
Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code sections 55-110 and 55-501, no transfer from Henry to 
Merwin was effective through instrument number 1119009. 
Plaintiffs argue this Court should find Henry lacked power to convey anything to 
Merwin on June 7, 1988, and that the easement grants to Merwin must fail, unless 
Idaho's doctrine of after-acquired title allows the easement conveyance to become 
effective when Henry takes title after completing the payments to Sanders sometime in 
1989. (PIs. Ex. 16.) The after-acquired doctrine does not apply, see Argument 7 herein. 
6. Merwin and Her Successors Cannot Benefit From 1119009, Because the Grant 
Was Not Delivered To Her, Pursuant to Idaho Law. 
In Idaho, a deed "does not take effect as a deed until delivery with intent that it 
shall operate. The intent with which it is delivered is important. This restricts or enlarges 
the effect of the instrument." (Barmore v. Perrone, 2008-ID-R0219.005 at 3 (2008); 
citing Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, 228 (1908) (emphasis added).) 
"Acceptance of the conveyance by the grantee is as essential as the delivery by 
the grantor, and where acceptance is not proven, and the facts do not justify the 
presumption oflaw that the grantee has accepted, the title does not pass." (Whitney v. 
Dewey, 10 Idaho 633, 642 (1905).) 
"It is beyond controversy that the evidence of delivery must come from without 
the deed. In other words, a deed never shows upon its face nor by the terms thereof a 
delivery, and parol evidence thereof must necessarily be admitted when the question of 
delivery arises." (ld. at 4; citing Whitney v. Dewey, 10 Idaho 633, 655 (1905).) 
"Recordation of a deed creates a rebuttable presumption of delivery." (Estate of 
Skvorak v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 20 (2004).) However, "the 
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presumption of delivery is clearly rebutted [where] there was no mutual assent of the 
parties." (ld.) 
In this case, both elements of 1) physical delivery and 2) Henry's intent that the 
easement grant should operate are missing. No factual evidence at trial was presented to 
support the idea that instrument number 1119009, the Henry-Merwin easement was ever 
physically delivered to Linda Merwin, or that she knew it existed, except the fact of its 
recordation, which only raises the presumption. However, the presumption is rebutted, 
because Henry did not intend to make any easement grant. Henry's deposition testimony 
was that instrument number 1119009 was "some type of formality" and that he lacked a 
clear understanding of why he signed it. (Hem)' Depo. at p. 8, 11. 3-24.) Without a clear 
understanding of why he signed it, there was no intent to have that easement grant 
operate on behalf of Merwin, or Merwin's successors, the Conines. 
In Idaho, "an argument that a deed lacked the intent necessary to be effective is 
identical to an argument that delivery never occurred." (Barmore v. Perrone, 2008-ID-
R0219.005 at 3 (2008).) This is because "the real test of the delivery ofa deed is this: Did 
the grantor by his acts or words, or both, intend to divest himself of title? If so, the deed 
is delivered." (ld.; citing Estate ofSkvorak, 140 Idaho at 21 (2004).) 
Therefore, defendants Conine do not enjoy any easement across Belstler's 
property as purportedly conveyed by instrument number 1119009, because Henry did not 
deliver that instrument number to Merwin, either physically or with intent for it to benefit 
her. (Estate ofSkvorak, 140 Idaho at 20; Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470, 475 
(1948); Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221 (1908).) 
7. After-Acquired Doctrine Cannot Make Easements Appurtenant to Merwin's 
Land, Because the Legislature has Limited that Common Law Doctrine to Fee 
Simple Transfers. 
Idaho Code section 73-116 states, "[t]he common law of England, so far as it is 
not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all 
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cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this 
state." "By the adoption of that section[, originally sec. 18 of our Revised Codes,] this 
[S]tate did not adopt the common law of England when such common law was 
inapplicable to the conditions of the state." (Northern Pac!fic R. Co. v. Hirzel, 29 Idaho 
438,453 (1916).) 
The common law root of after-acquired title is in equity by estoppel, and 
originated in the law surrounding will devises: 
The principle deducible from these authorities seems to be, that, 
whatever may be the form or nature of the conveyance used to pass 
real property, if the grantor sets forth on the face of the instrument, by 
way of recital or avemlent, that he is seized or possessed of a 
particular estate in the premises, and which estate the deed purports to 
convey; or, what is the same thing, if the seizin or possession of a 
particular estate is affirmed in the deed, either in express terms or by 
necessary implication, the grantor and all persons in privity with him 
shall be estopped from ever afterwards denying that he was so seized 
and possessed at the time he made the conveyance. The estoppel works 
upon the estate, and binds an after-acquired title as between parties 
and privies. 
The reason is, that the estate thus affirmed to be in the party at the time 
of the conveyance must necessarily have influenced the grantee in 
making the purchase, and hence the grantor and those in privity with 
him, in good faith and fair dealing, should be for ever thereafter 
precluded from gainsaying it. 
(Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 52 U.S. 297,457, (1851) (pincite at original pages 
numbered 161-162) (emphasis added.) 
In other words, the estoppel bars the grantor, because the grantee relied on 
grantor's deed. Also of note is that historically this has been a doctrine of title transfers, 
not transfers of other interests in real property, thus it did not apply to easement interests. 
In this case, Sanders contracted to sell his title interest in the property to Henry. If 
Sanders did not actually have title to the property prior to selling it to Henry, and Sanders 
later became title owner of the property, the property would automatically transfer to 
Henry as a matter of law based on this doctrine. 
Idaho's after-acquired title statute states: 
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Where a person purports by proper instrument to conveyor grant real 
property infee simple, and subsequently acquires any title or claim of 
title thereto, the same passes by operation of law to the grantee or his 
successors. 
(emphasis added.) Further, in Idaho, a quitclaim deed does not transfer after-acquired 
title, but a warranty deed does transfer such title. (State Ex Rei. Moore v. Scroggie, 109 
Idaho 32 (1985).) 
The Conines do not enjoy an easement across Belstler's property due to the 
purported conveyance by instrument number 1119009, because Idaho's after-acquired 
property rule has been limited by the Idaho Legislature to fee simple transfers of title or 
claim of title by proper instrument. (1. e. § 73-116; Olson v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 
Idaho 706 (1990).) The Henry to Merwin attempted easement grant was not a fee simple 
transfer oftitle in fee simple, but an attempted transfer of a non-possessory appurtenant 
interest. 
Additionally, the attempted transfer was not by proper instrument, because 
Merwin's "complete mailing address" did not appear on such instrument. (I.C. § 55-601.) 
Further, Idaho's statute of frauds requirements were not met, because the location of the 
Henry-Merwin easements is not identifiable using the locations described in the 
instrument number 1119009. (I.e. § 9-503.) 
Thus, no easement was conveyed to Merwin upon Henry receiving delivery of the 
title through the Sanders-Henry deed shown at plaintiffs' Exhibit 16. (PIs. Ex. 15, 16; 
I.e. § 55-601.) 
Upon this basis, plaintiffs request this Court find the purported Henry to 
Merwin easement grants invalid and void as to her and her successors, defendants 
Conine, and Belstlers, owners of the alleged servient estate. 
/II 
1/1 
/II 
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8. The Henry-Merwin easement grants failed, because a) Merwin gave no 
consideration, and b) Merwin was not a third-party beneficiary. thus, the failed 
easements are invalid and void as to Belstlers. 
A) Merwin Gave No Consideration. 
In the Griffeth case, an "easement must be construed against successors of the 
grantor, since it was not gratuitous, but one for which consideration was given and 
compensation paid." (Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light Co., 226 F.2d 661,667 (9th Cir. 
1955) (Consideration paid for Idaho easement for flooding upon servient estate) 
(emphasis added.) This Court finds instrument number 1119009 was ineffective to 
transfer by express conveyance any easement interest from Henry to Merwin. I.C. § 55-
101; Fajen v. Powlus ,96 Idaho 625, 628 (1975) (an easement appurtenant is an interest in 
real property); I.e. § 55-601; Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light, 226 F.2d 661 (1955) 
(gratuitous easement gift unsupported by consideration or compensation cannot be 
construed against grantor's successors). 
In this case, there is no evidence that Henry received any consideration from 
Merwin for the easement grants to her in plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, thus those easements 
cannot be construed against successors Belstlers, because they were gratuitous. 
Defendants Conine may argue that the Mutual Agreement in plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 
evidences that Henry received consideration from Sanders in the form of the easement 
grant from Sanders to Henry, and that Merwin is thus a third-party beneficiary of 
plaintiffs' Exhibit 15. 
B) Merwin was nota third-party beneficiary. 
The Sanders-Henry three-document contract does not include any signature of 
Merwin, or mention of her or her land except in plaintiffs' Exhibit 15. In plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15 portion of the contract, Sanders' are grantors to whom Henry makes a promise 
of a grant to Merwin, thus Sanders' are the grantor/promisee, and Henry is the 
grantee/promisor. Ifthe alleged agreement in plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 is analyzed using 
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these terms, promisor Henry grants an easement to Merwin, the purported third-paIiy 
beneficiary, in exchange for Sanders' grant of an easement to Henry. 
"Whether the promisee may be held liable to a third-party beneficiary turns upon 
the beneficiary's status. A donee beneficiary, of course, has no rights against the 
promisee, except where the promisee has received consideration to discharge the 
promisor." (Gilbert v. City a/Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 396 (1987); citing J. Calamari 
and 1. Perillo, The Law a/Contracts § 17-10, 2d. Ed. 1977.) Certainly where Sanders' are 
the promisees, they would have no liability to Merwin, because after the sale Sanders 
would have no property for Merwin to claim an interest in, and there is no evidence that 
Merwin gave Sanders any consideration, so Merwin would have been a donee beneficiary 
without remedy. Thus, the Gilbert case cannot define the situation here, where Henry the 
promisor is alleged to be liable to Merwin's successor beneficiaries, defendants Conine. 
In the third-party beneficiary equation set up by plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, Sanders is 
the promisee, Henry is the promisor, and Merwin is the third-party beneficiary. This is 
because Sanders' granted an easement to Henry, conditioned upon Henry promising to 
give two easements to Merwin. The benefit of this equation flows to Sanders as vendor, 
and not 1) Henry as buyer whose land will be encumbered, or 2) Henry because the 
Sanders-Henry grant fails for lack of consideration due to the prior sale to Worley Fire 
District which invalidates the Sanders-Herny grant. Given the evidence, it appears that 
Sanders intended to benefit Merwin through his contract with Herny. (Stewart v. 
Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho 526 (1968).) 
The question remains, did Heruy intend for Merwin to benefit too? That does not 
appear to be the case. First, Henry's testimony related to his recollection of plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15 evinced no intent. Second, the document itself must expressly show promisor 
Henry's intent to benefit Merwin. (Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho at 
532.) There is no language in plaintiffs Exhibit 15 to show Henry intended to benefit 
Merwin by granting her the easements, or even that she needed the easements to access 
her land. The only intent found in the document is perhaps an implied intent by Henry, 
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because he signed the document granting easements to Merwin. The document clearly 
states "it is necessary to execute a joint easement for interest and egress," but that joint 
agreement would only be between Sanders and Henry, because Merwin did not execute 
anything. 
The Sanders-Henry to Merwin contract is problematic, as was the Rice-Cannon 
Agreement in the Idaho case of Cannon Builders, Inc. v. Rice, 126 Idaho 616 (1995). In 
that case, "[t]he contract [did] not state that Rice [would] satisfY McCartan's creditors." 
(Id. at 623.) Similarly, the Henry to Merwin and easement grants did not say that any 
need of Merwin would be satisfied, and it would be error for this Court to assume that she 
even required the easements to access her land, because Merwin had access directly onto 
Rockford Bay Road, as do defendants Conine today, due to that road running through the 
southern portion of that parcel. 
A further question is whether Merwin as third-party donee beneficiary, or her 
successors Conine may hold Henry, or his successors Belstler liable by claiming the 
easements purported to be granted by instrument number 1119009. (PIs. Ex. 15.) 
Initially, the theoretical Merwin claim must be considered, because if Merwin had 
no claim, her successors Conine likely do not today. Idaho Code section 29-102 states, 
"[a] contract, made expressly for the benefit of the third person, may be enforced by him 
at any time before the parties thereto rescind it." There are no facts in evidence showing 
rescission of the Sanders-Henry contract. 
It is not the case here that this contract was made expressly, as in only for the 
benefit of Merwin. The cases show that the word "expressly" in the statute refers to a 
person named as beneficiary, as opposed to an incidental mmamed beneficiary. (Jones v. 
Adams, 67 Idaho 402 (1947) (third party beneficiary may enforce contract even ifhad no 
knowledge of contract at formation); Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526 
(1968) (not necessary for third party beneficiary to be named); Baldwin v. Leach, 115 
Idaho 713 (1989) (incidental beneficiary).) 
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If the contract is two documents, Sanders expressly created it for the Sanders', 
Merwin, and Henry. Ifit is only one document, plaintiffs Exhibit 15, Sanders' created it 
expressly for at least Henry and Merwin, but probably not the Sanders. The problem with 
finding a benefit in plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 for Sanders is that Henry was not shown at trial 
to have had any intent related to plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, and Sanders had no power to 
convey the easement across the Worley Fire District property, thus that grant was invalid 
and any benefit would have to weighed in that light and found invalid too. Henry thought 
plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 was just a formality of sale, therefore the only possible intended 
benefit to the Sanders was extremely general in nature, and that is only if this Court finds 
both documents were included in the one contract. 
In any case, "such a [third-party beneficiary] contract must be strictly construed in 
favor of the person against whom such liability is asserted," here Henry. (Dawson v. 
Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331 (1937); citing Sachs v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 148 F.2d 128 
(e.C.A.7th); see also: I.e. § 29-102, identical with Ca1.Civil Code, § 1559; 12 Cal.Jur.2d 
500, Contracts § 268; 2 Williston on Contracts, 3rd Ed. § 356,402,403.) 
In this particular case, Henry's deposition clearly states he thought plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15 was a "formality." (Henry Depo. at p. 8,1. 11.) Further, Henry did not have a 
discussion with Sanders regarding the use of the lower road for Merwin's benefit. (Id. at 
p. 6,11. 15-23.) Henry did not even know Merwin owned the neighboring property, and 
had never met her prior to signing the contract to purchase from Sanders. (Id. at pp. 6, 11. 
20-25, and 7,11. 1-7.) At his deposition, Henry did not have "any independent 
recollection of signing [plaintiffs' Exhibit 15] during the transaction." (Id. at p. 8, 11. 18-
20.) Therefore, in favor of Henry, liability should not be found from plaintiffs Exhibit 
15, and this Court should deny Merwin's successors' claim. 
It is settled law in most jurisdictions that the rights of the beneficiary, here 
Merwin, against the promisor, here Henry, are subject to the defenses the promisor may 
have against the promisee, here Sanders. (17 Am. Jur. 2nd § 460.) 
The rules stated in American Jurisprudence 2nd are: 
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The right of a third person for whose benefit a promise is made is 
affected with all the infirmities of the contract as between the parties to 
the agreement. The beneficiary is subject to all the equities and 
defenses that would be available against the promisee, in the absence 
of an estoppel, as where the beneficiary has been introduced to alter 
his position by relying in good faith upon the contract made for his 
benefit, or unless a novation has been effected. Thus, generally, in an 
action by the beneficiary, the promisor may assert fraud on the part of 
the promisee, mistake, failure to comply with the statute of frauds, or 
want or failure of consideration. The promisor may also assert as 
against the beneficiary that the contract has been rescinded by the 
parties prior to acceptance or action in reliance thereon by the third 
person. 
(cited cases omitted.) 
In this case, it is not clear whether the successors of Henry or the successors of 
Merwin may utilize the third party beneficiary doctrine at all. This will be addressed 
shortly hereinafter Henry's defenses are articulated, but it is likely not the case. 
C) Henry's Defenses Against Merwin: Fraud, Mistake, 
Lack of Consideration, and No Action By Merwin In Reliance Voids the Grants. 
i. Sanders' Non-Disclosure Constituted Fraud Upon Henry. 
Henry, the promisor, may have asserted fraud against Sanders, the promisee, ifhe 
had known Sanders had sold the property over which Henry needed to travel to reach 
Henry's property to Worley Fire District three days earlier. However, Henry would not 
have brought a case of fraud, because he did not even know the meaning of plaintiff's 
Exhibit 15, according to his own deposition. This does not mean Sanders lacked a duty to 
Henry. 
"In this regard, it is established in [Idaho] that, regarding the sale of property, 
although one may not be required to make representations regarding his property, once 
undertaking to do so he must fully disclose." (Russ v. Brown, 96 Idaho 369, 370 (1976).) 
The Idaho State Supreme Court cited with approval the following statements: 
The rule decisi ve of the issue is stated in Restatement of Contracts, 
sec. 472, Comment b (1932): 
" ... if a fact known by one party and not the other is so vital that if the 
mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable, and the party 
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knowing the fact also knows that the other does not know it, non-
disclosure is not privileged and is fraudulent." 
And in Pashley v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 25 Ca1.2d 226, 153 P.2d 325 
(1944), quoting 12 R.C.L. § 71, p. 310, it is stated: 
"Even though one is under no obligation to speak as to a matter, if he 
undertakes to do so, either voluntarily or in response to inquiries, he is 
bound not only to state truly what he tells but also not to suppress or 
conceal any facts within his knowledge which will materially qualify 
those stated. Ifhe speaks at all he must make a full and fair 
disclosure. " 
(Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho 91, 96-97 (1964); see Summers v. Martin, 77 Idaho 469 
(1956) (vendor charged with telling truth); Fuchs v. Lloyd, 80 Idaho 114 (1958) 
(purchaser entitled to rely on vendor's statements).) 
In this case, Sanders created a whole separate document, plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, 
because he was apparently unable to negotiate a recordable instrument with Merwin 
directly, and apparently hoped that Henry's grant to Merwin would suffice. However, 
there is no evidence before this Court Sanders told Henry about the existence of 
defendants' Exhibit O. (Henry Depo. at p. 8, lines 3-24.) In that regard, this Court 
should note that on page two of the Sanders-Henry Sale Agreement Sanders and Henry 
agreed to waive title insurance for Henry, thus potentially subjecting Henry to conditions 
related to defendants' Exhibit 0 and Merwin, which Sanders had knowledge of but Henry 
did not. 
No evidence presented showed Henry knew about Sanders relationship with 
Merwin, because in Henry's deposition, he stated instrument number 1119009 was "some 
type of formality" and that he lacked a clear understanding of why he signed it. (ld. at p. 
8, lines 3-24.) Sanders knew that three days earlier he had conveyed the parcel to the 
Worley Fire District upon which he purported to grant an easement for Henry in 
instrument number 1119009. There is no evidence before this Court that Sanders made 
any disclosure whatsoever of his recent dealings with the Worley Fire District, or that 
Henry should have actually gotten the easement from Worley Fire District instead of 
Sanders. Thus, this Court should find that Sanders did not adequately disclose to Henry 
circumstances material to Henry's acceptance of instrument number 1119009, and that 
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thus it is a fraudulent document that should be struck from the Sanders-Henry Agreement 
having no force and effect on subsequent owners. 
ii. Sanders' Unilateral Mistake That He Could Convey Easement to Henry Voids It. 
Henry could have asserted a defense of mistake against Sanders, if benevolently 
Henry may have felt Sanders simply forgot that he had transferred the property to the 
Worley Fire District three days earlier. If Sanders forgot after three days, the Sanders-
Henry easement in plaintiffs Exhibit 15 could have been a valid grant to Henry. 
However, given the Sanders-WFD deed, the proper grant of easement should have come 
directly from Worley Fire District. 
iii. Henry Received No Consideration From Sanders For The Merwin Grants. 
Henry could also have asserted a defense of failure of consideration, as discussed 
earlier herein. If Sanders' consideration for the Henry to Merwin easement grants was 
Sanders' grant of an easement to Henry, but that consideration failed because Sanders' 
had no power to convey an easement across Worley Fire District property, the Henry to 
Merwin easements should be found void. 
iv. No Action In Reliance on Henry's Grant By Merwin. 
Finally, Henry could have argued that there was no "action in reliance thereon" by 
Merwin, because there is no evidence before this Court that Merwin acted to rely on that 
grant of easement whatsoever. Evidence before this Court is that Merwin sold to Kluss in 
July of 1990, and sometime after that date Kluss built a building on the property. There is 
no evidence before the COUli that Merwin even visited the property. 
Plaintiffs Belstler assert that under any of these four defenses to the third-party 
beneficiary doctrine claims of Conines the easements must fail. However, it is prudent to 
determine whether Conines, as Merwin's successors, would even be able to assert such a 
third party claim. 
Notably, the American Jurisprudence 2nd, at sections 435 through 464 discussing 
third-party beneficiaries does not mention the nature of the legal status of successors to 
the original named beneficiary, or even whether third-party beneficiary claims can be 
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transferred to a successor. This reflects the development of the third-party beneficiary 
concept as granting a one-time benefit without successors to the original beneficiary, 
such as the payment of a debt, I construction contracts,2 lien enforcement,3 and recovery 
under life insurance policies.4 Further, there is nothing in Idaho law addressing the 
concept of successors to a third-party beneficiary, should that even be possible under 
Idaho law. 
Therefore, if this Court does not invalidate and find void the purported Henry-
Merwin easement grants under promissor Henry's defenses stated hereinabove, or other 
reasoning in this pleading's argument, plaintiffs Belstler request this Court find no 
applicability of the third-party beneficiary doctrine here, where no law supports the 
argument of a third-party beneficiary's benefits running with the land to bind future 
owners of a promissor's real property. 
9. The Henry-Merwin Easement Grants Failed, Because Sanders' Consideration for 
Those Grants Failed, and The Easement Grant is Void as Against Belstlers. 
The Sanders-Henry grant in plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 states, " ... it is necessary to 
execute a joint easement for ingress and egress .... " However, there is no evidence that 
any of the easements granted in plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 were for Sanders' benefit. 
Therefore, there is no ''joint easement," because there was to be no use by Sanders of any 
easement granted in that document. 
The Sale Agreement at plaintiffs' Exhibit 14 does not mention any consideration 
paid or otherwise made for any grant of easements to Merwin, nor does the deed at 
plaintiffs' Exhibit 16 cite consideration paid or otherwise transfened to Henry for third-
party easements. The only conclusion is that Sanders was trying to use the grant to Henry 
near the firehouse as consideration for Henry making a grant of two easements to Linda 
I Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). 
2 Stewart v. Arrington Canst. Co., 92 Idaho 526 (1968). 
3 Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331, 372 P.2d 414 (1962); 
4 Sachs v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 148 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1945). 
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Merwin. However, this would indicate Sanders was either fraudulent or had less than a 
three-day-old memory. If Henry had understood the document as anything more than a 
"formality," he would have asked Sanders about it, because he was certainly on inquiry 
notice due to the language in the easement grant that it was located "in front of the fire 
station located thereon." (PIs. Ex. 15.) A real property buyer who thought that document 
had meaning for him would certainly have asked what the relationship was of the fire 
station to Sanders' property. How wide was the easement? Did it abut the Rockford Bay 
Road right-of-way? How far did it extend toward the firehouse? These are all questions a 
person put on inquiry notice by such language should have asked, if they had thought the 
document was more than a simple formality. 
"A written instrument is presumptive evidence of a consideration." (I.C. § 29-
103.) And, "the burden of showing a want of consideration sufficient to support an 
instrument lies with the party seeking to invalidate or avoid it." (I.C. § 29-104.) "The 
presumption may be rebutted by any substantial evidence." (McCandless v. Carpenter 
123 Idaho 386, 389 (1993).) "Where a deed contains recitals of fact purporting to 
evidence receipt or acknowledgement of payment, recitals may be challenged as untrue, 
and parol evidence is admissible for that purpose. The law uniformly allows the 
admission of parol evidence to prove that a recital of fact is untrue." (Id.; citing Vanoski 
v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381,383 (Ct.App.1988).) 
Plaintiffs Belstler do not contend the recitals of consideration in the Sanders-
Henry Sales Agreement at plaintiffs' Exhibit 14 are untrue, only that they did not 
reference that the consideration of $30,000 for the property included a requirement for 
Henry to grant easements to Merwin in a completely separate document that to Henry 
was merely "some type of formality" about which he lacked a clear understanding of why 
he signed it and what it meant to the sales transaction. (Henry Depo. at p. 8, lines 3-24.) 
Further, Plaintiffs Belstler argued hereinabove that Sanders did not own the 
property upon which he wanted to use to grant an easement to Henry in plaintiffs' Exhibit 
15. Therefore, this Court should find Sanders' consideration (the Sanders-Henry 
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easement grant in 1119009) they supposedly gave to Henry for the Merwin easements 
failed, because Sanders did not own the property, and the Sanders' grant was therefore an 
illusory promise. Further, plaintiffs argue this Court should find they have met their 
burden of proving a lack of consideration by substantial evidence, and thus neither 
Henry, nor his successors are bound by the alleged Merwin easement grants. 
10. The Purchase Agreement Contract Merged Into The Deed, but the Henry to 
Merwin Easements Did Not Survive That Merger. 
Pursuant to the doctrine of merger in Idaho, "any recitals in the real estate 
contract[ is] merged into the deed." (Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 
715 (2007).) Further, "when the deed is delivered and accepted as performance of the 
contract to convey, the contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of the deed may 
vary from those contained in the contract, the deed alone must be looked to to [sic] 
determine the rights of the parties .... " (Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 
382 (1966); quoting Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 41 N.M. 82 (1936).) 
In this case, plaintiffs have argued elsewhere in this pleading that the alleged 
Mutual Agreement for Easement for Ingress and Egress found at plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, 
which was executed prior to delivery to Henry of the Sanders-Henry deed was never 
delivered to Merwin, nor accepted by her. 
Even if it was, pursuant to the Sanders-Henry Warranty Deed, the only reference 
to easements in the deed states Henry's purchase is "[s]ubject to: any and all easements, 
conditions and restrictions of record and easements of ingress and egress." (PIs. Ex. 16.) 
There is no mention of instrument number 1119009, the gifted easements to third-party 
Merwin or the purported easement from Sanders to Henry. (PIs. Ex. 15.) There is no 
location stated in the deed of any purported easements to Merwin, even though they were 
allegedly granted by Henry less than a year previously, and concurrently with the 
execution of the deed. 
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It is more likely than not Henry, looking to his Warranty Deed, did not believe it 
included any easements to Merwin. This is highly probable, because Henry felt it 
necessary to clarify with his buddy Kluss that the parties would use Sanders Lane to 
access their respective properties. (PIs. Exs. 18, 19 at 3; Def. Ex. I at 3.) . Further, Henry 
did not believe that his Warranty Deed included any easements to Merwin, because his 
Building Permit Application never showed the disputed driveway, except as it went 
directly to Henry's house. (PIs. Ex. 29.) Finally, Henry's deposition shows no present 
intent on June 7, 1988 to grant easements to Merwin; he had no "recollection of Mr. 
Sanders somehow indicating to [Henry] he had to establish some easements or roads for 
the benefit of [Henry's] neighbor." (Ken Henry Depo., p. 8, lines 21-24.) 
rule: 
In Jolley, the Idaho State Supreme Court discussed an exception to that merger 
... which is that the contract of conveyance is not merged upon 
execution of the deed where under the contract the rights are conferred 
collaterally and independent of the deed; there being no presumption 
that the party in accepting the deed intends to give up the covenants of 
which the deed is not a performance or satisfaction. Where the right 
claimed under the contract would vary, change, or alter the agreement 
in the deed itself, or inheres in the very subject-matter with which the 
deed deals, a prior contract covering the same subject matter cannot 
be shown as against the provisions of the deed. 
(Jolley, 90 Idaho at 382-383; citing Continental Life Ins. Co., 41 N.M. at [no pincite]) 
(emphasis in orig.) 
That New Mexico State Supreme Court continued in the Continental Life 
Insurance Co. case: 
[i]n the absence of fraud, mistake, etc., the following stipulations in 
contracts for the sale of real estate are conclusively presumed to be 
merged in a subsequently delivered and accepted deed made in 
pursuant of such contract, to wit: (l) those that inhere in the very 
subject-matter of the deed, such as title, possession, emblements, etc.; 
(2) those can'ied into the deed and have the same effect; (3) those of 
which the subject-matter conflicts with the san1e subject-matter in the 
deed. In such cases, the deed alone must be looked to in determining 
the rights of the parties. 
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But where there are stipulations in such preliminary contract to which 
the delivery and acceptance of the deed is not a performance, the 
question to be determined is whether the parties have intentionally 
surrendered or waived such stipulations. If such intention appears in 
the deed, it is decisive; if not, then resort maybe had other evidence. 
(Jd., citations omitted.) 
In this case, plaintiffs have argued that Sanders' easement to Henry in plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15 likely failed due to fraud or mistake, and that said Exhibit was never delivered 
to or accepted by Merwin. 
Plaintiffs argue here that the deed alone must be looked to in determining the 
rights of the parties to this case, because they inhere in the very subject-matter of the 
deed, and are contract stipulations in which the subject-matter conflicts with the same 
subject-matter in the deed. This is because the nature of appurtenant easements is as an 
interest in land, with "references to title, possession, quantity, and emblements of the 
land." (Jolley, 90 Idaho at 383; citing Annot: 84 A.L.R. 1008; 38 A.L.R.2d 1310; 8A 
Thompson on Real Property (1963 Replacement) 331 § 4458; 55 AmJur. 937, Vendor 
and Purchaser § 543; 26 C.l.S. Deeds § 91c, p. 842.) 
As an example of the Jolley exception, the Idaho State Supreme Court has 
determined that an abstract of title "does not relate to the title, possession, quantity, or in 
moments of the land." (Christiansen v. Intermountain Association o/Credit Men, 46 
Idaho 394 (1928).) 
Following this merger exception in another case, that Court also found a 
construction company's promise to assist a lot buyer in the construction of their house 
and receive reimbursement of its costs plus 5%, was incidental to that company's sale of 
said lot to that buyer, and thus the agreement to build the house was not merged with the 
deed. (Sainsbury Constr. Co. v. Quinn, 137 Idaho 269, 273 (2002), rev, denied.) 
Finally, in its analysis in the Sells case related to that exception, the Idaho State 
Supreme Court found merger of the real estate purchase agreement's (REPSA) inclusion 
of "timber rights on said easement." (Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 772 (2005), 
re'hrg. denied, Aug. 24,2005.) This was because the "RESPA and the deed discuss the 
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timber on the Sells' property ... [and] the terms of the RESPA Robinsons [sought] to 
enforce 'inhere in the very subject-matter with which the deed deals' - the timber on the 
Sells' remaining property." (Id.) Thus "the timber language in the RESPA does not 
constitute a collateral agreement related to timber rights, independent of the terms of the 
deed." (Id.) Therefore, "only the deed's language should be considered by this Court .. 
.. " (Id.) 
In this case, the Sanders-Henry deed at plaintiffs' Exhibit 16 only carries general 
language related to easements, and does not reference the Merwin grants whatsoever. 
Due to this general language, this Court should find the deed ambiguous, because it is not 
necessarily inclusive of the purported grants to Merwin. Parol evidence on this point 
related to Henry's intent is that Henry does not remember any Merwin grants at all. (Ken 
Henry Depo., p. 8, lines 3-24.) 
"In construing an ambiguous deed, the Court should give effect to the parties' 
intentions." (Sells, 141 Idaho at 773; citing Daugharty v. Post Falls Hwy. Dist., 134 
Idaho 731, 735 (2000).) "A grantee may accept the deed as full perfonnance of a prior 
contact, even where it is not such; but whether a deed has been so accepted is, in the final 
analysis, a matter of intention." (Sainsbury Canst. Co., 13 TIdaho at 273.) 
In this case, it is clear that Henry intended no easements for Merwin, because he 
had no "independent recollection" of signing plaintiffs Exhibit 15, and thought it was 
"some sort offonnality." (Ken Henry Depo., p. 8, lines 3-24.) 
Defendants Conine will argue that Henry marked the disputed driveway on the 
2005 Dahlman Survey at plaintiffs' Exhibit 23 with an "X" during deposition. (Ken 
Henry Depo., p. 15,1. 4-13.) However, this testimony should not be given weight, 
because the "X" mark was procured by Conines' counsel having Henry mark "the one 
[road] that the Conines used." (Id. at 14,11. 22-25.) From that faulty bridge, Conine's 
counsel asked, "[i]f you signed [plaintiffs' Exhibit 15], is the road that's marked with an 
"X" the road that you thought was the road affected by that agreement?" (Id. at 11. 4-7.) 
To which a tired and sickly Ken Henry, after five pages of deposition questioning 
plaintiffs' post-trial brief on legal arguments.doc 43 11 8 
accedes, "[ w Jell, yes. I would, I would think that would be the only one that pertains that 
-- I mean at all." This pressure was exerted even though plaintiffs' counsel objected, 
stating Henry had "testified he has no independent recollection of that instrument or its 
contents." (Id. at 14-15, 11. 24-25, 1, respectively.) To which objection Ken Henry's wife 
breaks in and states, "[a]nd that's because of multiple sclerosis." (Id. at 11.2-3.) 
Therefore, this Court should reject defendants' contention that Henry's "X" marks 
the spot, either based on its lack of substantive evidentiary weight, or plaintiffs' counsel's 
objection at deposition .. Plaintiffs argue that since Henry intended nothing related to 
Merwin in the Sales Agreement or its attendant purported easement document, and was 
completely ignorant as to the contents of plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, that when he accepted the 
deed from Adept Escrow in June of 1989 he did not intend any easements to Merwin. 
(PIs. Ex. 16.) 
Plaintiffs request this Court find the Sales Agreement was merged in the deed, but 
that Henry intended no easements to Merwin, and that thus those alleged Merwin grants 
are invalid and void as to Henry and his successors, plaintiffs Belstler. 
11. The Henry-Merwin Easement Grants Failed, Because They Cannot Be Located. 
This Court should find that instrument number 1119009 did not adequately 
identify the easement interest or its location sufficient to meet the requirements of 
Idaho's statute offrauds, and thus it is unenforceable against Belstlers. (I.e. § 9-503; 
P.G. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,238 (2007) (at a 
minimum, land sale contracts must typically specify ... the subject matter thereof, the 
price or consideration, a description of the property and all other essential terms of the 
agreement); Hoffman v. S. V Co., 102 Idaho 187, 190 (1981 ) (agreements for the sale of 
real property that fail to comply with the statute of frauds are unenforceable for obtaining 
specific performance or damages); White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho 1, 3 ( 1982) (a property 
description that does not allow the court to pinpoint exactly what acreage is to be 
transferred is inadequate).) 
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In this case, both the alleged southern and northern easements are very difficult to 
locate, and the paragraph in the document that supposedly would assist anyone in 
locating them is ambiguous at best. There was no way for a professional surveyor to find 
them on the ground. (PIs. Ex. 4.) 
Further, this Court should rule the case of Simons does not allow it to consider 
parole evidence to clarifY the ambiguous property description in instrument number 
1119009, because Henry did not convey the easement to Merwin in exchange for specific 
consideration fully delivered. (Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 827-28 (2000) (contract 
failing to meet the statute of frauds only because of an inadequate property description 
cannot be interpreted through parol evidence because the parties did not admit that 1) 
they agreed to the conveyance in exchange for specific consideration and 2) one of the 
parties fully delivered that consideration).) 
Based on these deficiencies, this Court should find the easements are not located 
specifically enough in the deed for them to be enforced, and thus that they are invalid and 
completely void. 
12. Regarding the two alleged easements, what is the legal effect of the two Kluss-
Henry agreements found at instrument numbers 1224548 and 1224896? 
Sometime "on or before the first day of June, 1989," Kenneth Henry apparently 
made the payments to Sanders as promised. (PIs. Ex. 14 at 1.) This must be true, because 
on June 9, 1989, Kenneth Henry submitted the Sanders-Henry warranty deed to Kootenai 
County for recordation. (PIs. Ex. 16.) Adept Escrow Services, the neutral third-party 
deed holder, would not have released the deed to Henry unless Henry had fulfilled the 
conditions of the Sale Agreement. (PIs. Ex. 14 at 2.) 
In July of 1990, Linda Merwin sold the future Conine property to Robert ("Pete") 
and Vicki Kluss. (PIs. Ex. 17.) At that time, the Kluss couple lived in Coeur d' Alene, 
and not Rockford Bay. (PIs. Ex. 17.) There is no evidence that the Kluss' ever lived on 
their Rockford Bay property. The evidence before the COUli is that the Kluss' never lived 
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there, because when the Solomons purchased from Pete Kluss, by then unmarried5 in 
1993, the Solomons wanted to buy the Kluss residence in Coeur d' Alene, and the 
Rockford Bay property was required by Kluss to be purchased for the sale of the Coeur 
d' Alene residence to proceed. (PIs. Ex. 20; Judith Solomon Depo., p. 7,11. 16-25.) Also, 
Evans recalled Kluss "didn't have a house [up there]." (Evans Depo., p. 17,11. 22-23.) 
Sometime during the fall of 1990 after his purchase of the property from Merwin, 
Pete Kluss built a building on the now-Conine's land. (Judith Solomon Depo., p. 11,11. 1-
7.) Georgia Henry believed that Kluss' metal building, the smaller one existing on the 
land now, was already built when Ken Henry bought the property next door. (Geo. Henry 
Depo., p. 10, ll. 7-1l.) But this further demonstrates the fragility of Ms. Henry's memory, 
because Kluss did not buy the property from Merwin until 1990, a full year after Henry 
recorded his deed from Sanders, and two full years from the date Henry took possession 
on June 15, 1988. (PIs. Exs. 17 (Merwin-KIuss), 16 (Sanders-Kluss), and 14 at 2 (Sales 
Agreement).) There is no evidence Merwin hired Kluss to build a building on her land 
prior to Kluss' purchase from her. 
Kenneth Henry "grew up with Pete Kluss in Iowa." (Geo. Henry Depo., p. 10,11. 
23-24.) "Pete and Ken and all ofthose people knew each other." (Evans Depo., p. 27, 1. 
13.) "All those guys [were] from Iowa ... there was three of them that moved in that 
[sic] Rockford Bay area from Iowa, and they all knew each other from college. Kluss was 
one ofthem and Cm1 Smith ... and then they had another buddy ... but there was about 
four of them that had moved to the Coeur d' Alene area from Iowa. I think they were from 
Clarion. That's where Ken was -- I guess Ken had a -- his family had a big fann in Iowa. 
They were from the 4-H country." (Id. at p. 18,11. 13-23.) 
Obviously, Henry and Kluss were good enough friends to not mind living next 
door to each other after moving 1,475 miles. Ken Henry's spouse, Georgia, testified at 
deposition initially that "[i]t was coincidence that [Kluss] had the property next to us." 
(Geo. Henry Depo., pp. 10,1. 25, and 11,1. 1.) However, being pressed on the point by 
5 Judicial notice can be taken of Robert P Kluss vs. Vicki L Kluss, CV -1991-0084880 (1991), for divorce. 
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the questioner, she answers twice, "I don't remember." (Id., p. 11,11. 2-9.) Later on, 
disclaiming personal knowledge ofthe existence of easements across the Henry property, 
Ms. Henry states, "must to make a point, back in those days, Ken handled everything. I 
was the new bride." (1d., p. 12,11. 13-24.) It is more likely than not that Ms. Henry's 
testimony is shaky and umeliable at best, and that Ken Henry and Robert "Pete" Kluss 
purchased properties next door to each other on purpose, because they were old buddies, 
strangers in a strange land, who would then be able to maintain their lifelong friendship. 
There is no evidence before the Court that Henry and Kluss were partners in any criminal 
schemes.6 
Sometime in 1991, Ken and Georgia Henry built their residence. (Geo. Henry, p. 
10,11.2-3.) 
On the 12th day of July, 1991, one year and two days after Kluss bought from 
Merwin, the Henrys and Kluss entered into the first of two Joint Use and Maintenance 
Agreements between them which were both recorded. (PIs. Exs. 18, 19.) The second 
agreement, plaintiffs Exhibit 19, is exactly the same as the first, except for the additional 
recording stamps, a handwritten note at the top stating "correted legal," [sic] and the 
addition of handwriting following the third line of the legal description stating, 
"[a ]pproximately four-tenths of a mile, stmting at Rockford Bay Road." Both documents 
were recorded at the request of Kenneth Henry. (1d.) 
According to the terms of this agreement, Kluss and Henry agreed to maintain 
Sanders Lane, now Chandler Lane from Rockford Bay Road to their respective 
properties, and for that road to be the only road each would use to access their properties. 
(PIs. Exs. 18 and 19.) There is no evidence before the Court as to which party added the 
handwritten note regarding the distance from Rockford Bay Road upon which the 
maintenance would occur. There is no evidence as to whether Kluss ever saw the 
6 State v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 14 (1993), rev. denied Feb. 7, 1994, re: Kluss' Rockford Bay marijuana 
operations. 
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alteration or the second document, although it is reasonable to assume that Henry did, 
because he recorded it. (PIs. Ex. 19.) 
However, the plain language of the document indicates, and this Court should 
find, that Henry and Kluss intended to cancel and relinquish any easement grants to 
Kluss' parcel through instrument number 1119009. This is because in the Joint Use and 
Maintenance Agreement. The following language is found: "[t]he parties hereto agree to 
use said roadway for normal ingress and egress and utilities purposes relating to the 
property they own adj acent. (PIs. Ex. 18 at 3.) (emphasis added.) Further, those parties 
agreed "this agreement shall be binding on the heirs, successors and assigns of the parties 
hereto." (Id.) 
Karen Conine agreed the Henry-Kluss agreement applied to both plaintiffs and 
defendants during her deposition. She was asked if it would "be fair ... to say that 
[Karen] believer d] [plaintiffs' Deposition Exhibit 14, here plaintiffs' Exhibit 18] would 
be binding on both [Conines] and the Belstlers." (Conine Depo., p. 131,11.13-15.) She 
answered, "[y]es, I would think that. I think it would tum over to the next property 
owners." (Id. atll. 16-17.) 
As far as Kluss was concerned, the definition of "said roadway" was Sanders 
Lane, now Chandler Lane, all the way through Henry's property on what plaintiffs' 
expert labeled Road D. (PIs. Ex. 4, sketch.) Given the evidence, we don't know whether 
Kluss agreed to the handwritten changes of plaintiffs' Exhibit 19, but it makes sense that 
Henry would want to limit his maintenance responsibilities to what he actually used, 
which was Sanders Lane, now Chandler Lane, up to or near the western edge of Henry's 
property, after which his private driveway exited that road south toward the Henry 
residence. Henry would maintain his own driveway, while Kluss would be responsible 
for maintaining the Road D above, which today goes up to the third hole at Black Rock. 
(PIs. Ex. 1,2,3, and 4, sketch.) 
As lifelong friends, Henry probably had little trouble giving permission to Kluss 
to use Henry's private driveway until Kluss could construct his own driveway off the 
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upper road. Further, as between friends, Kluss probably shared with Henry that Kluss' 
"building plans showed a storage area and office over a basement," where Kluss did not 
plan to reside. (State, 125 Idaho at 23.) 
Since Kluss did not sign the second recordation of the Joint Use and Maintenance 
Agreement or acknowledge it as required when an instrument is recorded in Idaho, 
plaintiffs argue this Court should not find that Kluss agreed that Kluss' road maintenance 
would be limited to the handwritten distance information found in the second document, 
but that Henry believed Henry's maintenance responsibilities should stop at Henry's 
western property line. This would make sense as between the parties. 
Finally, evidence of Henry's intent in this regard is shown by his Building Permit 
Application to Kootenai County dated May 23, 1995, for the garage pole barn on his 
property. (PIs. Ex. 19; Def. Ex. 1.) The sketch attached and signed by Mr. Henry 
appearing on page 3 of that Application shows Sanders Lane, outlined horizontally 
straight across the page, while Henry's private drive exits Sanders Lane at his western 
property line and terminates at a square called "house." (Id.) There is no road on that 
sketch going through to the Kluss property in a location similar to that found today and 
called in this trial "the disputed driveway." 
This supports earlier contentions in this pleading that Henry saw plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15 as merely a "formality," that he lacked "an independent recollection of 
signing," and that Henry had no "recollection of Mr. Sanders somehow indicating to 
[Henry] he had to establish some easements or roads for the benefit of [Henry's] 
neighbor." (Ken Henry Depo., p. 8, lines 3-24.) This testimony indicates that Henry was 
concerned about how his buddy Kluss was going to access Kluss' property, which is why 
the Henry-Kluss agreement was necessary for road maintenance, which, as to Kluss, 
would run all the way to the eastern terminus of Road D, and as to Henry would 
terminate at the western edge of Henry's propeliy. 
Plaintiffs argue, this Court should find that Kenneth Henry confirmed Chandler 
Lane (formerly Sanders Lane) ran from west to east through his property on the Road D 
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to Black Rock leading to the east of his property, and that his driveway was his private 
driveway. (PIs. Ex. 4,29.) Further, this Court should find the Kluss-Henry Joint Use and 
Maintenance Agreement at plaintiffs' Exhibit 18 is the supervailing easement agreement 
applicable to the Conine land, because it explicitly was to "be binding on the heirs, 
successors and assigns of the parties hereto," including defendants Conine. 
13. Conines do not enjoy a prescriptive easement right across the disputed driveway, 
or across the lower road. 
"In order for a claimant to establish that he has acquired a private prescriptive 
easement by adverse use, he must submit reasonably clear and convincing proof of open, 
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use, under a claim of right, with the knowledge of 
the owner of the servient tenement, for the prescriptive period. (West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 
"" 550,557 (1973).) "A prescriptive right cannot be acquired if the use of the land is with 
the permission of its owner." (Id.) The list of elements clarifies that the evidentiary 
standard is not a preponderance of the evidence, but "clear and convincing evidence." 
(Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 17 fn. 2 (1989); citing Last Chance Ditch Co. v. Sawyer, 
35 Idaho 61 (1922).) "Each element is essential to the claim, and the trial court must 
make findings relevant to each element in order to sustain a judgment on appeal." 
(Backman v. Lawrence, 2009-ID-0513.098 at 6; citing Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 
229 (2003).) 
Prescriptive easement rights are non-possessory rights to use the land of another 
governed by the common law, while adverse possession-based rights are possessory 
rights 10 possess or own the land of another controlled by statute at Idaho Code section 5-
203. (Sinnettv. Were/us, 83 Idaho 514, 520 (1961).) However, even though the common 
law governs prescriptive easement rights, "[t]he prescriptive period applicable to an 
easement ... is as specified in Idaho Code section 5-203. (Id. at 523.) 
However, in 2006 the Idaho legislature altered the prescriptive period from five to 
twenty years. (S.L. 2006, ch. 158, § 1, eff. Jul. 1, 2006.) Since plaintiffs filed this lawsuit 
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on April 9, 2007 to recover their real property, and defendants Conine filed their 
counterclaim for the prescriptive easement claim on August 8, 2007, the entire lawsuit 
should be governed by the twenty-year prescriptive period. By quadrupling the 
prescriptive period, it is clear the Idaho Legislature determined to make it more difficult 
for one to take a property interest in the land of another, and private easements by 
prescription have traditionally been "not favored under Idaho law." (Backman, 2009-ID-
0513.098 at 7; citing Elder v. N. W Timber Co., 10 I Idaho 356, 358 (1980).) 
The Backman case is the only case to have reached the Idaho State Supreme 
Court's final judgment since the statutory change in 2006. (I.C. § 5-203, 2009 pocket 
part.) However, Backman was filed on February 24,2006 as Bonner County Case 
Number CV-2006-0000365. 7 Therefore, Backman's five-year prescriptive period cannot 
be determinative here. Plaintiffs have found no subsequent Idaho case available to 
provide guidance. 
However, it is clear to plaintiffs that if Conines could exercise a vested right in a 
five-year period they accrued prior to the statutory change, and could bring that claim 
after July 1, 2006, such a claim would essentially eviscerate the Legislature's intent, 
which was to quadruple the statutory time period for claims made after July 1, 2006. 
The revised Idaho Code section 5-203 effective July 1, 2006'states: 
''In]o action for the recovery of real prope11y, ... can be maintained, 
unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or grantor, 
was seized or possessed of the property in question within twenty (20) 
years before the commencement of the action; and this section 
includes possessory rights to land and mining claims. 
Conines brought their action on August 8, 2007, thus it cannot "be maintained" 
and must fail, unless the elements can be proven by clear and convincing evidence to 
have been exercised for the statutory period of twenty years. If Conines coul d bring a 
claim in 2009 based on an accrued pre-2006 prescriptive period, could they bring a claim 
7 Idaho State Court Case Repository, 
https:llwww.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=BONNER&county=Bonner&p 
artySeq=61 1 12&displayName=Backman%2C+Bobby+J, accessed 10-28-09. 
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within twenty years of June 26, 2003 on June 25, 2023, which is within the time when 
their counterclaim would have to be brought if all the elements were met during the five-
year period after which they took ownership? (PIs. Ex. 21, Solomon Deed dated 6/25/98.) 
This does not make sense, because it would essentially delay enactment of the 2006 
statute by setting its effective date aside for twenty years in favor of a theory of vested 
rights involving enforcement of a prescriptive right not favored under Idaho law. 
Conines brought their counterclaim in August of 2007, which is over one year 
from the statutory change date\Of July 1, 2006. In order to give effect to the legislative 
intent and uphold the law in effect as of August 8, 2007, this Court should recognize the 
legislative intent, and require that Conines must have been "seized or possessed of the 
property in question within twenty (20) years before the commencement of the action," 
which would require them to prove the elements of prescriptive easement by clear and 
convincing evidence since August 8, 1987, twenty years from the filing of their 
counterclaim. 
A) Open and Notorious Use is Not Established. 
"A use must be sufficiently open and notorious said that a reasonable person 
would have discovered its occurrence." (Backman, 2009-ID-0513.098 at 7; citing 4 
Powell on Real Property, § 34.10(2)(£)(2000).) 
Evidence at trial is that Belstlers purchased their property in September of 2005. 
(PIs. Ex. 22.) The Belstlers moved on to the property November 15, 2005. (Dana Belstler 
Testimony, 9-22-09.) Howard Conine met Dana Belstler in the latter part of the spring of 
2006, when she was outside doing some weeding and their new garden. (Id.) Dana 
testified that Howard's visit was the first time they had seen the Conines. Thus, there was 
no open and notorious use from mid-November 2005 to approximately mid-April of 
2006. 
At trial, Karen Conine was led through a series of dates during defendants' cross-
examination, such dates including from June 1998 through the fall of2007. (Karen 
Conine Testmony, 9-23-09.) The substance of the answers was that Karen claimed she 
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visited the property less in the winter and more in the summer, but generally every other 
weekend, or "at least twice per month." (Id.) However, on redirect, plaintiffs' counsel 
determined that Karen Conine works for a welfare office in Western Washington, and 
that she frequently has to work on Saturdays, which often precludes visiting the property. 
(Id.) Ms. Conines testimony is not reliable. At deposition, she stated that during the 
winter "we try to get over at least once a month, sometimes twice." (Conine Depo., p. 29, 
11. 3-4, Oct. 20, 2009.) 
Further, Howard Conine's unverified Affidavit submitted in opposition to 
plaintiff s motion for summary judgment on June 23, 2008, stated, "[0 ]ver the course of 
ownership we have visited our Idaho property ... literally every other weekend, 
including the wintertime, with one exception when the snow on Snoqualmie Pass was 
treacherous to get through (we live in Western Washington)." (Howard Conine Aff. at 16, 
6-23-08.) Mr. Conine's claims were mirrored identically by Karen Conine's unverified 
Affidavit submitted on the same date for the same purpose, even down to the paragraph 
in the same wording. (Karen Conine Af. at 16, 6-23-08.) 
At best, the alleged open and notorious use of the disputed driveway by the 
Conines is spotty. Sometimes they visit, sometimes they don't; sometimes they visit 
"literally every other weekend, including the wintertime," (Howard and Karen in 2008), 
but other times they "try to get over at least once a month, sometimes twice." (Kaen 
Conine Depo., p. 29,11. 3-4.) At still other times they visit "at least twice per month," but 
less in the winter. (Conine Tr. Testimony, 9-23-09.) 
Therefore, the Conines cannot establish any open and notorious use during the 
period of their ownership, from 1998 to 2007, when they apparently stopped visiting with 
such frequency, whatever that frequency was, because it was "less, not much fun, ... 
didn't feel comfortable," because the "lawsuit started." (Id.) 
The Conines purchased from the Solomons on June 25, 1998. Judith Solomon 
answered the question in deposition "[a]nd you made no use of this property at all?, with 
a "[n]o." (Solomon Depo., p. 11,11.6-7.) Further, Judith Solomon had no memory of how 
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to get to the property. (Id. at 9, 11. 5-9.) She remembers visiting the property only one 
time. (Id. at 8, 11. 10-13.) She doesn't remember how she got to the property and was 
sure if she visited today that she "couldn't even find it." (Id. at 10,11. 15-20.) Finally, she 
would have to visit the courthouse "and find out the length of time that we would have 
owned it. [She didn't] remember." (Id. at 12,11. 1-6.) 
The Solomons purchased the property from Pete Kluss in November of 1993, in 
tandem with Kluss' residence in Coeur d' Alene, which is the house that Solomons 
wanted to buy. Mr. Kluss required the Solomons to purchase his Rockford Bay property 
as a condition ofthe Coeur d' Alene purchase. However, Mr. Kluss was not interested in 
doing anything that was open and notorious. 
To clarify why Kluss required the two properties to be sold together, this Court is 
allowed, and plaintiffs request it take judicial notice of Kootenai County District Court 
case State of Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement, eta!' v. Real Property Located Within 
Kootenai County, eta!., CV-1991-0087687, which was filed on October 17, 1991 and 
reached judgment8 on March 30, 1993, eight months before Kluss sold the property to 
Solomon. (PIs. Ex. 20; State v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 14 (1993), rev. denied Feb. 7, 1994.) 
In the criminal case, both Kluss' Coeur d'Alene and Rockford Bay properties 
were up for seizure by the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement ("IDLE"). (IDLE v. 
Kluss, Case Nos. 87687 (CdA land) & 87779 (Rockford Bay land), Memo. & Order, Oct. 
1,1992.) Final Summary Judgment in favor of Kluss was rendered February 3,1993. 
(Id., Judgment, Feb. 3, 1993.) The Rockford Bay land was subject to seizure because on 
that "rural property owned by Kluss away from the City of Coeur d' Alene[,]" ... "Kluss . 
. . was constructing a storage building ... over a basement room where Kluss planned to 
put a marijuana growing operation." (State, 125 Idaho at 22-23.) The State Court found, 
along with other detailed information, that the police officer's "investigation provided ... 
8 Related cases are 1) State of Idaho VS. Robert Pete KIlIss, CR-1991-0073081, possession of controlled 
substance: manufacture and intent to deliver; appealed as State v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 14 (1993), rev. denied 
Feb. 7, 1994; 2) Robert Pete KIliss v. State Of Idaho, CY-1994-0004120, for post-conviction relief. 
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corroboration of the incriminating information furnished by the anonymous caller." (Id. 
at 23.) 
Further, Georgia Henry remembers Kluss "got into some legal trouble, if! 
remember right," and that his land was purchased by "some attorneys," and then "the 
Conines purchased it from [those attorneys]." (Geo. Henry Depo., pp. 11,11. 13-25, and 
12,11. 1.) Ron Evans recalled, "they caught up with [Kluss], because his electric bill was 
pretty high ... [for his] big old green building with a dirt floor and it .... " (Evans Depo., 
pp. 17, 11. 22-25, and 18,1. 1.) "[H]e got in trouble with -- he was -- had marijuana 
growing operation there and they busted him and put it [sic] in jail." (Id. at 11,11. 3-5.) 
There is no testimony before the court regarding Kluss' actual usage of his 
property or the disputed driveway between July of 1990, when he bought it from Merwin, 
and November 1993 when he sold it to Solomons. Therefore, there is a complete lack of 
evidence that there was any open and notorious use during Kluss' period of ownership. 
Finally, as discussed earlier, Kluss built the first building on the Conine property, 
and there is no evidence Linda Merwin used the property at all. 
Plaintiffs request this Court find that at no time since Merwin's purchased in 1974 
has there been open and notorious use of the disputed driveway, or the alleged lower 
easement on Belstlers' property. 
B) Continuous and Uninterrupted Use is Not Established. 
There is no evidence that Linda Merwin ever used the property. 
Pete Kluss used the property, built a building on it, and ran an illegal marijuana 
growing operation upon it, but there is no evidence he was continuously visiting the 
property or that there was any uninterrupted use, except possibly his illegal use. An 
illegal use cannot support a claim of prescriptive easement. 
The Solomons did not use the property at all. Judith Solomon answered the 
question in deposition "[a]nd you made no use of this property at all?, with a "[n]o." 
(Solomon Depo., p. 11,11. 6-7.) Further, Judith Solomon had no memory of how to get to 
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the property. (Id. at 9, 11. 5-9.) She remembers visiting the property only one time. (Id. at 
8,11. 10-13.) She doesn't remember how she got to the property and was sure if she 
visited today that she "couldn't even find it." (Id. at 10,11. 15-20.) Finally, she would 
have to visit the courthouse. "And find out the length of time that we would have owned 
it. [She didn't] remember." (ld. at 12,11. 1-6.) 
The Conines purchased from the Solomons on June 25, 1998. The Conines have 
used the property only intermittently, and their testimony is suspect, because it appears to 
be calculated only to support their arguments in this case, and not their actual use. 
Plaintiffs request this Court find no continuous and uninterrupted use has 
occurred across any easement on the Belstler land for a twenty-year period, and that thus 
the claim of prescriptive easement must fail. 
C) Conines Claim of Right Fails, Because They Had Permissive Use. 
In Idaho, "a prescriptive right can't be granted if the use of the servient tenement 
was by permission of its owner, because the use, by definition, was not adverse to the 
rights of the owner." (Backman, 2009-ID-0513.098; citing Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 
474,480 (2006).) "The use of the land must also constitute some actual invasion or 
infringement of the right of the landowner." (Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 13 (1989, 
rev. denied Jan. 16, 1990.) "A prescriptive right cannot be obtained ifuse of the servient 
estate is by permission of the landowner." (Id.; citing State ex rei Haman v. Fox, 100 
Idaho 140 (1979).) 
Here, it is clear that Henry gave permission to Kluss to use the disputed driveway, 
and there is no evidence Kluss ever used the alleged southern easement. Kenneth Henry 
"grew up with Pete Kluss in Iowa." (Geo. Henry Depo., p. 10, ll. 23-24.) "Pete and Ken 
and all of those people knew each other." (Evans Depo., p. 27, l. 13.) "All those guys 
[were] from Iowa ... there was three of them that moved in that [sic] Rockford Bay area 
from Iowa, and they all knew each other from college. Kluss was one of them and Curt 
Smith ... and then they had another buddy ... but there was about four of them that had 
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moved to the Coeur d' Alene area from Iowa. I think they were from Clarion. That's 
where Ken was -- I guess Ken had a -- his family had a big fann in Iowa. They were from 
the 4-H country." (Id. at p. 18, II. 13-23.) 
As lifelong friends, Henry probably had little trouble giving pennission to Kluss 
to use Henry's private driveway until Kluss could construct his own driveway off the 
upper Road D. Further, as between friends, Kluss probably shared with Henry that Kluss' 
"building plans showed a storage area and office over a basement," where Kluss did not 
plan to reside. (State, 125 Idaho at 23.) 
The Solomons sold the property to the Conines on June 25, 1998. From June 1998 
to November 2005, the Henry's lived next door to the Conines. At trial, Karen Conine 
stated she had visited the Henry's at their home on September 22,2009, and gave Ken 
Henry a gift of pajamas. (Conine Testimony, 9-23-09.) More than four years later after 
'*' the Henry's moved from Rockford Bay, their relationship with the Conines remains one 
of a strong friendship. Karen stated that when the two families lived next door they got 
along very well, and that she would have enjoyed having them live on the southern half 
of the parcel in Rockford Bay if Henry's multiple sclerosis did not prevent it. (Id.) Karen 
answered, "[n]o," to the question whether the Henry's ever objected to the Conines' use 
of the driveway. It is clear Conines' use was with Henry's pennission. 
The Solomons did not even use the property enough to have to ask pennission of 
anyone. It appears they may have visited the property a handful of times within the five 
years they owned it. Judith Solomon answered the question in deposition "[a]nd you 
made no use of this property at all?, with a "[n]o." (Solomon Depo., p. 11, II. 6-7.) 
Further, Judith Solomon had no memory of how to get to the property. (Id. at 9, II. 5-9.) 
She remembers visiting the property only one time. (Id. at 8, II. 10-13.) She doesn't 
remember how she got to the property and was sure if she visited today that she "couldn't 
even find it." (Id. at 10, II. 15-20.) Finally, she would have to visit the courthouse "and 
find out the length of time that we would have owned it. [She didn't] remember." (Id. at 
12, II. 1-6.) 
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At trial, Karen Conine testified during her cross-examination that neither she nor 
her husband tried to remove the cable across the lower easement after the Belstlers strong 
a cable across it to block usage. (Conine Tr. Testimony, 9-23-09.) Further, she never 
asked for a key. (Id.) This indicates that she understood the Conines' use ofthe southern 
logging road across the Belstlers property was by permission. A person who thought they 
had a claim of right to use a road would protest the cable being put there, or at least ask 
for a key to the lock so they could access it while keeping strangers at bay. The Conines 
did neither of these, thus they acknowledged that their use was by permission. 
Plaintiffs request this Court find that Conines' use of both the disputed driveway 
and the alleged southern easement were by permission, if and when they were used at all. 
D) Belstlers Had No Knowledge of Conines' Use. 
Belstlers had no knowledge of the Conines' intermittent use until the middle of 
the spring of 2006, five to six months after the Belstlers moved in. After that, the Conines 
continued their infrequent use, and the Belstlers protested by placing a cable across the 
alleged southern easement, and finally filing this lawsuit in April of 2007, a year after 
they first met the Conines. 
The Henrys, prior owners of the Belstler land, knew the Conines were using the 
two alleged prescriptive easements, but these were clearly permissive uses as between old 
and dear friends. According to Karen Conine, the Henrys "were very good friends." 
(Conine Depo., p. 46, 1. 6.) They were such good friends that when Conines "drove in one 
weekend, as a surprise, [Ken Henry] had put that gate up for us," speaking of a gate at the 
Conine side of the disputed driveway. (Id. at 11. 2-4.) Karen claims that Ken Henry took a 
gate off the upper road on Chandler Lane and brought it down to the disputed driveway 
as a gift to the Conines. (Id. at p. 123,11. 2-15.) On the other hand, Ron Evans stated in 
his deposition "in fact, the gate was always there and there was a gate up here [on 
Chandler Lane, the upper road] and a gate here [indicating the Conine's end of the 
disputed driveway] on the property lines." (Ron Evans Depo., p. 23,11. 11-16.) It is 
plaintiffs' post-trial brief on legal arguments.doc 58 
difficult to tell whose testimony is credible, but it is clear that Henry knew of the Conines 
use. 
E) COllines' Have Not Met Elements A-D for the prescriptive period. 
Given the evidence of this case, plaintiffs request this Court find the Conines, 
neither alone nor in combination with their predecessors, have gained an easement 
prescriptively, because their use did not meet the elements, especially the use elements of 
being continuous and without permission. (I.e. § 5-203; Oakley Valley Stone, Inc. v. 
Alastra, 110 Idaho 265, 268 (1985); see R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck and D. Whitman, 
The Law of Property §§ 8.7, 11.7 (1984) (elements); Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854 
(1997) (burden of proving all of the essential elements of adverse possession is upon the 
party seeking title and every element must be proven with clear and satisfactory 
evidence); Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441 (1984); Loomis v. Union Pacific Railroad, 97 
Idaho 341 (1975).) 
None of Co nines' predecessor owners, beginning with Linda Merwin, either alone 
or in combination used any road crossing Belstlers' property, including purported 
easements described in instrument number 1119009, openly and notoriously, 
continuously and uninterruptedly, under a claim of right with the knowledge of the 
respective owners for the twenty-year prescriptive period. 
Therefore, plaintiffs respectfully request this court granted judgment in their favor 
on their claims, and deny Conines counterclaim in its entirety. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of October 2009. 
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Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney at Law 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
DEFENDANTS. 
KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
COUNTER PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
COUNTER DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NUMBER: CV-07-2523 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER PLAINTIFFS' 
POST TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
I-DEFENDANTS/COUNTER PLAINTIFFS' POST TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
COMES NOW, KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD CONINE, the 
Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs in the above entitled matter, and hereby submit their Post Trial Brief 
pursuant to the Court's oral order entered on the 24th day of September, 2009 and as follows: 
FACTS 
The Plaintiffs, BELSTLER are the owners of real property located in the general Rockford 
Bay area of Kootenai County. The Defendants, CONINE own the property immediately east of the 
BELSTLERS (as defined on Defendants' Exhibit "S". BELSTLERS acquired their property from 
the Henrys (Defendants' Exhibit "R") and the Henrys from V. A. Sanders (Defendants' Exhibit 
"A"/Plaintiffs Exhibit "5"). The CONINES purchased their property from Solomon (Defendants' 
Exhibit "S") who purchased their property from Kluss (Plaintiffs' Exhibit" 19"), who purchased that 
property from Linda Merwin (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "26"), who purchased the property from Anstadt 
( Plaintiffs' Exhibit" 18"). V. A. Sanders was the owner of the BELSTLER property but did not own 
any interest in the CONINE property at any time based upon the facts educed at trial. V. A. Sanders 
apparently developed some parcels of property as identified in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No.8, consisting 
of parcels A, B, C, and D identified on Plaintiffs' Exhibit No.8, parcel A being the BELSTLER 
property. V. A. Sanders and Geraldine C. Sanders created a sixty (60) foot easement across the 
parcel A, B, C and D identified on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8 as specifically referenced in Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits, 9, 10, and 14 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14 being the Sale Agreement from V. A. Sanders and 
Geraldine C. Sanders to Kenneth L. Henry) the BELSTLERS' predecessor in interest. The location 
ofthe road was identified at the time oftrial by a yellow line on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. 
On the 3rd of June, 1988 the Sanders conveyed to the Worley Fire District a certain portion 
of property for the benefit of the Fire District, over and upon which traverses what is referred to in 
this brief and at trial as the southern most easement referenced in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, the Mutual 
Agreement for Easement for Ingress and Egress. Also on the 1 st day of June, 1988 the Sanders sold 
to Henry (BELSTLERS predecessor in interest) the BELSTLER property which was at that time 
"subject to any and all easements, conditions, restrictions of record, and easements for ingress and 
egress (see Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14). The sale was by way of title retaining contract, and at the time 
of the sale, Linda Merwin was the owner of the currently owned CONINE property. Apparently 
there was a disagreement between Sanders and Merwin regarding the continuation of the road which 
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commenced at Rockford Bay and continued through parcels A, B, and C as identified on Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 8 through the Merwin property, Sanders never having the legal authority to grant such an 
easement through the Merwin property. That disagreement, and the necessity for access was 
referenced in Defendants' Exhibit 0, the agreement between Merwin and Sanders which clearly 
establishes that Merwin had an interest in the resolution of the easement issue identified on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, which was dual grant of easement, first from Sanders to Henry, and second 
from Henry to Merwin. 
At the time of purchase, the CONINE property was accessed by two easements of record, 
namely Chandler Lane/Sanders Road and the easement claimed by CONINE under that certain 
document recorded as Instrument No. 1119009, the Deed from Sanders to Henry and Henry to 
Merwin (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "5"/Defendants' Exhibit "A"); the access commonly referred to as the 
private drive being described in Plaintiffs Exhibit "15" and Defendants' Exhibit "A", which 
traverses some distance behind the BELSTLER residence to a gate at the approximate property line 
ofthe BELSTLER property and the CONINE property and thereafter directly, at the approximately 
same elevation, to a building that existed upon the CONINE property at the time of purchase, and 
a building that was later constructed by CONINES on the premises; and a lower road (reflected in 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit "15" Defendants' Exhibit "A"). The extension of Chandler Lane/ Sanders Road 
at the West edge of the BELSTLER property takes a steep upward incline, and dead ends at the 
Black Rock Golf Course. The elevation of Chandler Lane/Sanders Road is significantly above the 
structures located upon the CONINE property. Additionally, an easement exists past the "fire 
station" across the BELSTLER property to serve the CONINE property (the Southerly easement). 
For all ofthe ten years the CONINES owned their property they traversed the "private drive" 
(see Affidavit of Karen Conine and Affidavit of Howard Conine lodged with the court June 23, 
2008). That private road had been in existence since approximately 1985 or 1986 (see Deposition 
of Jerry Ronald Evans (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "12"/Defendants' Exhibit "F") and had been acquiesced 
in by the Henrys, who were predecessors in interest to the BELSTLERS (see Deposition of Kenneth 
Henry and Georgia Henry, Plaintiffs' Exhibits "13 and 14"/Defendants' Exhibits "G and H"). 
In approximately the summer of 2006, the BELSTLERS approached the CONINES to 
request they cease using the lower road and the private drive. The CONINES ceased using the lower 
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road due to it being cabled off, but refused to cease using the private drive. Notwithstanding 
discussions were had between the parties as to a possible resolution, those discussions are not 
admissible under Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Thereafter the litigation ensued, which 
includes a claim for an express easement, prescriptive easement, and implied easement by the 
CONINES. The CONINES abandoned their claim for implied easement during the course of trial 
but maintain their claim for express easement and prescriptive easement. 
Trial commended on the 21st of September, 2009 before the HONORABLE JAMES 
MICHAUD, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE, sitting in the place and stead of the HONORABLE 
LANSING HAYNES. 
ARGUMENT 
As to the prescriptive right, the only argument made by the Plaintiffs in contravention of the 
prescriptive right is the statement that "the Solomons, the Conines predecessor in interest, made no 
llse of the Conine property". Every reasonable inference must be drawn from the Defendants' 
position, with particular reference to the Affidavits of the CONINES indicating that the property had 
been used, and in point of fact a vehicle was left on the property (in a building) which required 
contact to have the vehicle removed. (See affidavits of Howard and Karen Conine filed of record 
on June 23,2008). That is evidence of use of the Solomon property by Solomons or their guests or 
invitees. The Plaintiffs also argue that Linda Merwin was a stranger to the transaction between 
Henry and Sanders which gave rise to Instrument No. 1119009. As exemplified by Exhibit "C" 
attached to the Affidavits of Conines (filed ofrecord on June 23, 2008) and Defendants' Exhibit 
"0", Merwin was an integral part and beneficiary of the Agreement and the use of the "private 
drive". The Conines, by the verified Counterclaim, and the Affidavits (filed of record on June 23, 
2008) in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and KAREN CONINE'S uncontested 
testimony have made a prima facie case ofthe elements of a prescriptive easement. Notwithstanding 
the Legislature changed the time period for prescriptive easement from the former five year statute 
in 2006, (see changes to Idaho Code 5-204, 206, 207, 210, 211 as well as 213) the CONINES rights 
were vested five years subsequent to their purchase, under the then existing statute, more 
partiCUlarly, those rights became vested in 2004, prior to the filing of the instant action. Further, the 
Idaho legislature, in the Session Laws of 1985, Chapter 252, Section 1 , passed, and the Governor 
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signed into law, Idaho Code 55-313. That Code Section clearly provides in the event the 
BELSTLERS were to move the private road, which is currently constructed across their private 
lands, they must, if they change such access, change it in such a manner as to not obstruct motor 
vehicle traffic or otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such access. To 
change the access in this case to a higher elevation would cause an obstruction to motor vehicle 
travel during certain periods of the year when snow fall was evident, ice, or even rainy conditions 
due to the increased elevation that would be in place should the road be moved (the injury that would 
be caused is exemplified by the work sheet prepared by Scott Rasor on behalf of the Plaintiffs, 
Defendants' Exhibit "T"). The BELSTLERS have a statutory obligation not to move the road unless 
they meet the requirements of Idaho Code 55 -313. 
The BELSTLERS further argue that any express easement created under Instrument No. 
1119009 is ineffective because they believe there was no evidence that Linda Merwin, the Grantee 
of the Easement was a party to the contract. That instrument certainly created an easement and is 
states expressly in Plaintiffs' Exhibit "15", Defendants' Exhibit "A", (Linda Merwin the CONINES 
predecessor in interest, was fully aware of its intention, and the need to continue the use of the 
private driveway during Merwin's ownership). While Linda Merwin was not a party to the 
transaction between Bemy and Sanders, she was a third party beneficiary of that transaction, and was 
aware of its existence and the import to her property, which is now the property of CONINES. As 
exemplified by Defendants' Exhibit 0, Linda Merwin was not necessarily a party but certainly 
involved in the transaction which resulted in the easement across the Bemy property, which is now 
the BELSTLER property to serve the CONINE property as exemplified in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15. 
Particular attention must be paid to Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, with regard to the grant of easement by 
Bemy for the benefit of Merwin. The language contained within plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 (Instrument 
No. 119009) and the last paragraph thereof specifically states "Kenneth L. Bemy grants an easement 
continuing the existing road in the southerly portion of the property that he is purchasing from V. 
A. Sanders and Geraldine C. Sanders and the Northerly part o/the property he is purchasingfrom 
V A. Sanders and Geraldine C. Sanders to Linda Merwin who owns the property in the Northeast 
Quarter a/Section 17, Township 48 North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho. 
Said Easements are the continuation of the existing logging road running parallel to Rockford Bay 
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Road on the South and the existing road/rom the community road on the North" (not to centerline 
of the community road to the North of the "private driveway"). To the extent, if any, that grant of 
easement is ambiguous, it has been throughly explained by the evidence and the witnesses. No one 
has contested that the "Southerly Easement" is as demarked on Exhibit A, also as viewed by the 
court and the parties at the view ofthe premises. There remains then the dispute ofthe "continuation 
of the existing road from the community road on the North" and to what its meaning was. Based 
upon the uncontroverted testimony of Ronald Evans, an historical witness, uncontroverted, it is clear 
that the road referenced as "the existing road from the community road on the North" is what has 
commonly referred to during the course of trail as the private drive across the Northern portion of 
the BELSTLER property that is further proven by Kenneth Henry's deposition testimony (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 26, Defendants' Exhibit "0"). 
Further, as to prescriptive rights attention is directed to the Deposition of Jerry Ronald Evans 
where he clearly states that the private drive has been in existence since approximately 1985 or 1986, 
and based upon his knowledge of the area and continuous visits has been used since that time. (See 
Evans deposition Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12, page 15, lines 9 through 25; page 16, lines 1 through 25; 
page 17, lines 1 through 25; page 19, lines 10 through 25; page 20, lines 1 through 25; page 22, lines 
17 through 25; page 23 lines 1 through 25; page 24, lines 1 through 25; page 25, lines 1 through 25; 
page 26, lines 1 through 25; page 27, lines 1 through 25; page 28, lines 1 through 25, page 29, lines 
1 through 15 and exhibits and testimony at trial). It must further be pointed out in 1988 the Mutual 
Agreement and Easement for Ingress and Egress (Instrument No. 1119009) there is specific 
provision in the last paragraph that Ken Henry, the predecessor in interest of the BELSTLERS 
specifically granted rights to cross an existing road in the northerly part of the property that Henry 
was purchasing from the Sanders for the benefit of Linda Merwin who was the Successor In Interest 
to Sanders. Those easements are referenced as "a continuation of the existing logging road running 
parallel to Rockford Bay on the south and the existing road from the community road on the north". 
That reference can only be to the private drive. (See Deposition of Jerry Ronald Evans.) 
The Supreme Court ofthe State ofIdaho in Checketti vs. Thompson (65 Idaho 715 [at 721]) 
noted: 
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"One who purchases land expressly subject to an easement or with notice, actual or 
constructive, that it is burdened with an existing easement takes the land subject to 
the easement." 
In this particular matter there was no question that the express easement on the North side 
ofthe BELSTLER property existed, as acknowledged by all of the parties in their testimony that at 
the time of purchase by the BELSTLERS, that BESTLERS had knowledge of the existence of the 
"private drive", although the BELSTLERS testimony was hedged to some degree, but when pressed 
acknowledged that the existence ofthe road was visible on the face ofthe earth. Further, the express 
easement created by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 further buttresses the argument of the CONINES that the 
easement not only was of record and an express easement, but also, based upon testimony, a 
prescriptive easement. 
The Plaintiffs further argue that because Linda Merwin was a stranger to Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
15, that it would have no effect and should be void and unenforceable. Webster's New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary Second Edition describes "stranger" as "one not privy or party to an act, 
agreement or title". As noted from Defendants' Exhibit 0, Linda Merwin was not a stranger to the 
transaction and was privy to the actions, the only reasonable inference which can be drawn is the 
Sanders, in order to make his peace with Merwin, and based upon the writing exemplified in 
Defendants' Exhibit 0 required Henry to grant an easement for the benefit of Merwin across Henrys' 
property (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15). 
One must review in detail, the current status of the pleadings to determine the nature of the 
relief requested and, based upon the evidence and the pleadings determine what relief may be 
granted. In the Plaintiffs' pleadings they request a judicial determination of the meaning of 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9, the Deed from Sanders to Andrews Equipment, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10, the Deed 
from Sanders to Rockford Bay, and Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, the Deed from Andrews to Rockford Bay. 
As to those exhibits, they speak for themselves, and the evidence educed at trial indicates that it was 
Sanders' intention to create a community road running through parcels A, B, C, and D as identified 
on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8. That is uncontested by the Defendants CONINE. Further, the Plaintiffs 
have asked for judicial determination of the meaning of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14, the Sale Agreement 
between V. A. Sanders and Geraldine Sanders as Sellers and Kenneth Henry as Buyer. The response 
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to that is quite simple. It is a title retaining contract executed at a time when a Warranty Deed was 
also executed (and subsequently recorded - see Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16). The Agreement, the Warranty 
Deed, and the easements created in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, the Deed from Sanders to Henry and 
Henry to Merwin creating the easements, was binding upon all parties thereto, including Linda 
Merwin who was a beneficiary thereof, as an express easement, and therefore binding upon all 
parties who purchased subsequent to either Henry or Merwin. The Supreme Court in Jolly vs. Idaho 
Securities, 414 P 2d 879, 90 Idaho 373 (1966) determined that an express easement is not merged 
in a Deed. Therefore the argument of the Plaintiffs that the easements created in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
15 merged with the Warranty Deed are not effective. 
The Plaintiffs further requested judicial interpretation of Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 and 19 (the 
Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement entered into between Kluss and Henry as modified by Henry 
and re-recorded. The documents speak for themselves, it is simply a Joint Use and Maintenance 
Agreement for a roadway, which has been identified in yellow marking on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. The 
testimony during the course of the trial indicated that both parties and their successors in interest 
have contributed to the maintenance of portions ofthe yellow marked roadway on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
1, and therefore any further interpretation is not necessary. That Joint Use and Maintenance 
Agreement does not supercede or extinguish the terms and conditions set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
15, the document which created the easements for the benefit of Henry from Sanders, and from 
Henry to Merwin for the beneficial use of not only the "private drive" but also the Southern 
easement. Plaintiffs, however, further argue that Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 is not effective regarding the 
CONINE property, formerly the Merwin property, because the document was not delivered. The 
Supreme Court of Idaho in the case of Barmore vs. Perrone, 179 P 3d 303, 145 Idaho 340 (2008) 
noted "the controlling element in the question of delivery is the intention of the Grantor and the 
Grantee. The question of deli very is one of intention and the rule is that delivery is complete when 
there is an intention manifest on the part of the Grantor to make the instrument his deed (page 308)". 
Therefore, it must be determined that the document creating the easement from Sander to Henry and 
the easements from Henry to Merwin (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15) was indeed, delivered. The 
Defendant/Counter Plaintiffs conversely claim that there are two express easements on the 
BELSTLER property consisting of the Southern most easement (apparently capitulated to by the 
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, 
Plaintiffs) and a Northern most easement. As set forth in the evidence at trial the question of where 
the Northerly easement lies was a question of fact to be determined by the court. It is the 
Defendant/Counter Plaintiffs, CONINES' position that the evidence clearly demonstrates (see 
testimony of Ronald Evans, and the deposition testimony of Kenneth Henry) that the easement in 
question granted on the Northerly portion ofthe then Henry property (now the BELSTLER property) 
was for the private drive. Ken Henry, when pushed to explain what easement was referenced in his 
deposition, indeed marked on his deposition Exhibit "3" an X on the private drive. The CONINES 
further allege that they have a prescriptive right on the private drive (if it is ultimately determined 
that the express easement is ambiguous and can not be determined). The terms and requirements 
of a prescriptive easement must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Base upon the 
testimony of KAREN CONINE, there has been open, continuous and notorious use of the private 
driveway for the period of ownership of approximately ten years. That would vest the rights ofthe 
CONINES under prescriptive claims notwithstanding the legislature chose to modify the prescriptive 
claim statute (Title 5, Chapter 2 ofIdaho Code) from the previously existing five year requirement 
to a twenty year requirement. The Defendants' rights were vested prior to the legislature changing 
the law, and the legislature cannot "take" without appropriate compensation (United States 
Constitution). 
While not plead, there is another issue pending before the court. That is, if the court 
determines that the easements claimed by the CONINES are valid and subsisting easements, whether 
or not the Plaintiffs can change the location of the easements. Idaho Code 55-313 allows for a 
subservient estate to change the location of an easement that benefits the dominant estate. However, 
that statute requires that there be no injury, or more particularly that such change be made in a 
manner as to not obstruct motor vehicle traffic or otherwise injure any person or persons using or 
interested in such access. Further, the subservient estate must pay the cost of such a move. As 
exemplified by a view of the premises, and Defendants' Exhibit T, (the worksheet or road grades 
prepared by Scott Rasor) to change the location of the easement as referenced in the alternatives by 
Mr. Rasor (Defendants' Exhibit T) would create grave risk of injury and hann due to the topography, 
and the slope which by far exceeds any of the slopes upon the existing approach on the community 
road from Rockford Bay. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the evidence educed at trial, and the status of the pleadings, the 
court should order that the Northerly and Southerly easements created by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, as 
referenced on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, are express easements specifically created for the benefit of the 
CONINE property and impose an encumbrance upon the lands of the BELSTLERS, and that the 
Northerly easement is the "private drive". In the alternative the court should determine, if it cannot 
find an express easement as to the Northerly easement, that the CONINES have established a 
prescriptive easement upon the Northerly easement (the "private drive"). Further, should the court 
determine the existence ofthe easements in favor ofthe CONINES, under either theory as set forth 
herein, the court may further enter an order that in the event the BELSTLERS desire to change the 
location of either of the easements that they must do so at their own cost, and to a grade not to 
exceed the greatest grade upon the community road from its inception at Rockford Bay Road to its 
terminus at the Western boundary ofthe BELSTLER prpperty, and at the BELSTLERS' expense. 
{,.// } 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J 1/ dayW-Gctober, 2009. ~:;::~~= 
k. 
I hereby certify that on the lifL day of 
October, 2009, a true and correct copy 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/COUNTER 
PLAINTIFFS 
of the foregoing was transmitted via facsimile 
to: 
ARTHUR B. MACOMBER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
408 Sherman Avenue, Suite 2 I 5 
Coeur d 'Alene ID 83814 
VIA FACSIMILE 664-9933 
and mailed, postage prepaid 
to: 
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Attorney at Law 
1424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814 
(208) 664-1577 
Facsimile (208) 666-9211 
ISB #2134 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
DEFENDANTS. 
KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
COUNTER PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
COUNTER DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NUMBER: CV-07-2523 
DEFENDANTS' CONINES RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFFS' POST TRIAL BRIEF 
I-DEFENDANTS' CONINES RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' POST TRIAL BRIEF 
COMES NOW, the above named Defendants, KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, by and through their Attorney of Record, CHARLES M. DODSON, 
and hereby submit the following response to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief pursuant to the Order of the 
court. 
Defendants further acknowledge that Defendants, through counsel and counsel for the 
Plaintiffs, have stipulated to simultaneously file their Response Briefs on the 23rd day of November, 
2009, notwithstanding the previously existing Order requiring the filing of the same on the 19th of 
November,2009. Said Agreement to modify the submission date was agreed upon verbally between 
counsel for the parties on the 18th of November, 2009. 
Plaintiffs raise a number of legal questions as set forth on page 4 of their Post Trial Brief. 
To the extent a response is necessary, the following is the response of the Defendants: 
Question 1. What is the legal status and effect of Defendants' Exhibit "O"? 
Plaintiffs devote a substantial portion of their Brief (page 5 through Page 12) arguing that 
there is no effect whatsoever of Exhibit "0". To the contrary, the Defendants stipulated for the 
admission of Exhibit "0", and the practical effect and meaning of Exhibit "0" is left to the sound 
discretion of the trier of fact. In this case, Exhibit "0" tends to verify that there was a dispute 
between Sanders and Merwin because Sanders had implaced a road (the upper extension of 
Sanders/Chandler Lane) upon the property of Merwin without authority. In order to effectuate a 
resolution Sander and Merwin agreed that Sanders would correct the problem (Exhibit "0") and 
accomplished the same through the sale to Henry and the requirement that Hemy convey an 
easement to Merwin (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "15"). It is therefore again left in the sound discretion of 
the court to determine the weight of which Exhibit "0" will be given and the ultimate determination 
of the effect of Plaintiffs' Exhibit "15", which is one ofthe primary claims for declaratory relief of 
Plaintiffs. Exhibit "0" provides meaning to, explanation, and intent of Plaintiff Exhibit "15". 
Question 2. What documents comprise the Sanders/Hemy Purchase Agreement? 
As able counsel for the Plaintiffs clearly points out in Olmstead v Heidelberg Inn, Inc., 105 
Idaho 774 (1983), when there is a contract of sale it basically includes all elements ofthat contract, 
including the granting of rights by and between parties, including parties who are not either the seller 
or the buyer, as well as the ultimate Deed. Plaintiff does, however, misquote the Jolley case as 
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standing for the sole proposition that the Agreement of Sale and Purchase, and the grants of 
easement merge with the ultimate recording of the Sanders to Henry Deed, (Jolley v Idaho Securities, 
90 Idaho 373,414 P 2d 879) (1966). The Supreme Court in the Jolley (supra) case determined that 
an express easement is not merged in a Deed. Further, to the extent the Sanders/Henry Purchase 
Agreement is ambiguous, the clarification of the ambiguity is indeed left to the trier of fact with 
particular reference to the greatest impetus being placed upon the intention of the parties (Olmstead 
v Heidelberg Inn, Inc., 105 Idaho 774 (1983) Argosy Trust v Wininger, 141 Idaho 570 (2005)). 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs further argues that Henrys' had no right to grant easements for the benefit 
of Merwin because they were not in legal title. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho in Clark 
v Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 715 P 2d 993 (1986) clearly acknowledged that property is indeed a bundle 
of rights. Further the Supreme Court in Ellis vs Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 570 P 2d 334 (1977) 
recognized the equitable rights of a contract for title purchaser who had not yet obtained the deed 
transferring legal title. This case, however, is somewhat different in that the Henrys did subsequently 
obtain the Deed from Sanders vesting full legal title in addition to the equitable title they obtained 
at the time of purchase (and the rights to and actual request by Sanders to grant an easement to 
Merwin). 
3. In response to the third question raised by the Plaintiffs as to the ambiguity of the purchase 
agreement, the only ambiguous issue is what constitutes the community road (and based upon the 
evidence educed by the Plaintiff through their expert, as well as the testimony ofMr. Evans, the only 
"community" served would be the "community" that was put together with Sanders and Pring), 
therefore the only conclusion can be that the community road was referencing what is now referred 
to as Roads A, B, C, and D and the extension thereof eastwardly (see aerial photo attached to 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit "4"). Note that as Plaintiffs point out on page 21 of their brief, there was going 
to be "a high class 660 acre community for 1200 to 1500 condominium units" which could be the 
only "community" contemplated. 
5. Plaintiffs argue that Henry lacked the power to grant an easement interest in Sanders 
property (then Henry's) to Merwin and therefore the easement must fail. As noted above, the entry 
into a title retaining executory contract provides some rights of ownership to the purchaser, which 
rights are ultimately vested in full upon conveyance of the Deed (generally related to the payment 
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in full of the debt). In this case it was clear that Sanders requested Henry, and Henry acquiesced 
(abet without fully understanding according to the testimony of Kenneth Henry in his deposition 
which has been admitted to evidence that he did not quiet understand the "formalities"). 
Notwithstanding the same, the Sanders/Henry documents (Plaintiffs' Exhibits "14, 15, and 16") 
when reviewed together make it clear that Sanders requested Henry, as a condition precedent to his 
purchase, to grant to Merwin an easement across the then Henry property. Counsel points out Idaho 
Code 55-505 regarding mere possibilities. In this instance, there is not a mere possibility but a 
factual reality (See Plaintiffs' Exhibits "14", "15", and "16"). 
Item 6, Plaintiffs argue that Merwin and her successors cannot benefit from the Grant of 
Easement because it was not delivered to her. Defendants simply point out to the court in 
Defendant/Coeur Plaintiffs' Post Trial Memorandum at page 8 the Barmore VS. Perrone case (179 
P 3d 303, 145 Idaho 340 (2008)) notes that the controlling element in the question of delivery is the 
intention ofthe Grantor and Grantee. In this case the intentions of Sanders and Henry are clear, and 
the intentions regarding Merwin's desire to have a resolution of the easements upon her property 
were clear by Defendants' Exhibit "0", which was admitted by Stipulation. 
In item 7 of Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief, they attempt to torture the rule oflaw in Idaho. The 
Olsen v JA. Freeman Company case, 117 Idaho 706, cited at Page 30 of Plaintiffs' Brief stands 
merely for the proposition that the legislature when exercising its authority appropriately may enact 
statutes. Plaintiff fails to recognize Idaho Code 55-603, which specifically states: 
"The transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto and creates in 
favor thereof an easement to use other property of the person whose estate is 
transferred, in the same manner and to the same extent as such property was 
obviously and permanently used by the person, whose estate is transferred. for 
the benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or 
completed." (Emphasis added). 
Secondarily, the Sale Agreement (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "14") meets the requirements ofIdaho 
Code 55-818 as a summary of an instrument creating an interest in and affecting the title and 
possession of real property. As such, due to the fact that it was a recorded document, it constitutes 
"notice to the world" of the existence of the easements granted therein (Idaho Code 55-811). 
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Plaintiffs' counsel brings up the possibility of Henry's defenses against Merwin for fraud, 
mistake, and lack of consideration, none of which were plead nor issues to be determined in this 
litigation. 
As noted by Plaintiffs' counsel on page 39 of their Brief"a written instrument is presumptive 
evidence of consideration" (noting Idaho Code 29-103). In the particular case at hand, the 
consideration passing from Sanders to Henry was the transference of an interest in real property from 
Sanders to Henry; from Henry to Sanders - monetary consideration; and from Sanders and Henry 
(Sanders requested document and Henry's execution thereof) a resolution of the dispute between 
Sanders and Merwin by the grant of an easement. 
In item 10 of Plaintiffs , brief, they argue that the purchase agreement merged into the Deed 
and that therefore the easements did not survive that merger. Again, as pointed out in the Jolley v 
Idaho Securities, Inc., case, (90 Idaho 373, 414 P 2d 879 (1966), the Supreme Court of Idaho 
determined that an express easement is not merged in a Deed. In this case an express easement was 
created by the easement document (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "15). 
As to item 11 of Plaintiffs Post Trial Brief, this writer finds it fascinating that the Amended 
Complaint in the matter requests a Judicial Determination of what Instrument No. 1119009 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit "15") means but then argues that parole evidence may not be introduced (abet 
it was introduced by both parties herein) as to what was intended. It must be also pointed out that 
Kenneth Henry, at his deposition, when pressed for a determination of where the easements were in 
place clearly identified what is referred to as the lower road, and the "disputed driveway". 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue in Item 12 of the Post Trial Briefthat the Kluss/Henry Agreements 
somehow negate the position of the Defendants, CONINE, regarding the disputed driveway as being 
the easement described in Plaintiffs' Exhibit "15". In support thereof, the Plaintiffs' argue at page 
48 of their Brief "as far as Kluss was concerned the definition of said roadway was Sanders Lane, 
now Chandler Lane .... " That is a very far reach in terms of the evidence, Mr. Kluss never having 
been called to testifY at court, and the parties being left solely with whatever the meaning is of 
Plaintiffs' Exhibits "18, and 19", which are not germane to the establishment of the easements 
granted in the Sanders/Henry/Merwin easement (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "15") but only an agreement to 
contribute for maintenance. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respectfully requested that upon entry of appropriate findings and conclusions, 
that the court authorize the execution of a Judgment declaring the rights of the Defendants, 
CONINE, to traverse the southerly road as well the northerly road which is constituted by the 
disputed driveway. 
VI 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J l---, a of November, 2009. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife; 
Plaintiffs. 
KAREN SHELER and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife. and the 
, , 
marital community composed thereof; 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CV-07-2523 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER 
PLAINTIFFS' POST-TRIAL 
MEMORANDUM 
COME NOW Plaintiffs CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA BELSTLER, by and. 
through their attorney of record, Arthur B. Macomber, replying to Defendants/Counter 
P]aintiff.~' Post-Tr.ial Memorandum filed with this Court on October 27~ 2009. Pursuant 
to an agreem.ent in this Court's chambers at the end oftri.al~ concurrent responses from 
the parties were due on November 19,2009, but by te1ephonic agreem.ent on November 
18.2009 plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel agreed to enlarge the time for submission of 
these responses until November 23,2009, pursuant to l.R.C.P. 6(b). 1 53 
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INTRODUCTION 
This case pertains to an easement dispute between Plaintiffs Belstler and 
Defendants Conine in regard to the subject property on Chandler Lan.e in Kootenai 
County. Defendants claim a right to use a disputed dr.iveway and southern easement 
crossing the Belstlers' property under legal theories of express and prescriptive easement. 
The facts of this case are known to the Court through the recent trial that ended 
on September 24,2009, and Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Legal Arguments. Without taking the 
Court's time by reiterating all the relevant facts~ Plaintiffs disagree with portions of 
Defendants' renditi on of the facts in the~r Post-Trial Memorandum.. Specifically, 
Defendants omit important dates and facts related to the chrono)ogy of events in. the 
Sanders-Henry and Sanders-Worley Fire District sales in early June, 1988. (Def. Br., p.2, 
ll. 16-28). Through these omissions, Defendants improperly infer that Sanders had a 
legal basis to grant an. express easement to Henry. 
Plaintiffs herein rejteratc that instrument number 1119009 has no legal bearing 
to the outcome of the instant case and should be set aside under basic rules of contract 
interpretation as discussed in detail in Plaintiff's Post-Trial Legal Arguments. Plaintiffs 
briefly refer to argl1ments made in their Post-Trial Legal Arguments to rebut the 
Defendants' argument that Merwin was a third party beneficiary, and that her associated 
rights should also vest with Defendants. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have no legal 
right to use the southern access to their property by virtue of either all express easement 
or prescriptive easement. The fa.cts demonstrate that Defendants did not have a legaUy 
recognizable express easement. The facts further demonstrate that defendants cann.ot 
prove the elements of easement by prescription by clear and convincing evidence. 
Significantly, the Idaho Legislature changed the requisite prescriptive period from 
fi.ve years to twenty years in. January 2006. Defendants' claim did not arise until 2007. 
To allow Defe:ndants' claim to a five-year prescriptive period in a case brought in 2007 
would wholJy defeat the Legislature's intent and would open the floodgates of litigation. 
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Finally, this Court should not consider Defendants' argument that Idaho Code section 55-
313 applies to the facts of the instant case faUs because it was not pled before or during 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Defendants Mischaraderize And Misconstrue The Transactions That 
Occurred Between Sanders-Henry, Sanders~Worley Fire District, and Henry-
Merwin Tn .June, 1988, And Therehy Incorrectly Conclude That An Express 
Easement Was Created. 
Defendants ,misstate facts and mischaracterize the pur.ported "dua] grant of 
easement, frrst from Sanders to Henry, and second from. Henry to Merwin." (Def. Br., 
pJ. U. 6-7). Defendants state on page two of their Post-Trial Memorandum that on the 
3rd of June, 1988. Sanders conveyed the subject land to the WorJey Fire District. 
Defendants subsequently state that "[a]Iso on the 1st day of June, 1988 the Sanders sold 
to Henry ... the Belstler property which was at that tin1e 'subject to any and an 
easements, conditions, restriction.s of record, and easemen.ts for ingress and egress. m 
Defendants erred in construing the transactions in early June 1988 as a dua1 grant of 
easement from Sanders to Henry and Henry to Merwin. As Plainti:ff.~ n.oted in their Post· 
Trial Legal Arguments, Sanders lacked power to grant Henry an easement on June 6, 
1988. (PI. Br., p. 23), because on .Tune 3, 1998, Sanders conveyed the fire station parcel 
to the Worley Fire District, and thus did not own the real property UpOl1 which 
Defendants claim an easement was granted from Sanders to Henry. (Jd.). The Sales 
Agreement was dated .Tune 1, 1999, bu.t was not signed until June 6~ 1988; the Worley 
Fire District deed was signed on June 3, 1988. When the'parti.es showed their agreement 
by their signatures, the Sanders had no ownership in the Worley Fire District parcel. 
Therefore, in Defendants' Post-Trial Mem.orandum., the assertio11 of an easement "over 
and upon:~ the Worley Fire District parcel is incorrect. There was n.ever a valid. grw.'\t 
from Sanders to Henry in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15. This error. is replicated. on page three in 
1SS 
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the last sentence of the first ful1 paragraph of Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum. 
where Defendants state, "an easem.ent exists past the 'f'i.re station' [then] across the 
Belstler. property ... " Regardless of when these instruments were recorded, however, 
Sanders had notice of both tran.sactions (see I.e. § 55-815) and thereby had 0.0 legal 
power to convey the same property twice. (P1. Br., p. 24). 
Similarly, the pUTported grant of easement from Henry to Merwin sh,ould be held 
invalid. As Plaintiffs stated in their Post-Trial Legal Arguments, Henry had neither title 
nor possession. of the subject property when he signed the Mutual Agreement for 
Easement for Ingress and Egress on June 7, 1988. Therefore, Henry did n,ot have any 
legal power to grant an easement appurtenant to Merwin. (PI. Br., p. 26). 
Furthemlore, as Plaintiffs stated on page 30 of their Post-Trial Legal Argum.ents, 
the Idaho Legislature has restricted Idaho's after-acquired property rule to fee simple 
transfers oftitle or claim of title by proper instrument. (I.C. § 73-] 16; Olson 'V. J.A. 
Freeman Co., 117 Tdaho 706 (1990).) The Henry to Merwin attempted easement grant 
was not a fee simple transfer of tit1e in fee simple, but an attempted transfer of a non.-
possessory appurtenant interest. Therefore. no easement "vas conveyed to Merwin upon 
Henry recejv.in,g delivery of the title throu.gh th.e Sanders-Henry deed shown at plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 16 (p1.s. Ex. 15,16; I.e. § 55-601), and Defendants cannot claim that instrument 
number 1119009 grants a easement across Plaintiffs' property because Idaho's after-
acquired property ntle is ill applicable. 
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On page eight of Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum, Defendants state "[t]he 
Supreme Court in Jolly (sic) Wi. Tdaho Securities, 414 P 2d. 879, 90 Idaho 373 (1966) 
determ,l.lled that an express easem.ent is not merged i,n a Deed." In Jolley, the Court stated 
"If the stipulation has reference to title, possessjon, quantity, or em.blements of the land, it 
is generally, but not always, held to inher.e in the very subject-matter with which the deed 
deals, and is merged therein." Further, "when. the deed is delivered and accepted as 
perfonnance of the contract to con.vey, the contTact is m.erged in the deed. Though tbe 
terms of the deed may vary from those contained io. the contract, the deed alone m.ust be 
1.1/23/2009 16: 49 208 MACOMBER LAW PAGE 06/14 
looked to to [sic] determine the rights of the parties .... " (Jolley v. Idaho Securities,. Inc., 
90 Idaho 373, 382 (1966); quoting Continental L~fe Ins. Co. v. Smith, 41 N.M. 82 
(1936).) PI,aintiffs argue that a non-possessory easement affects title to Belstlers' land 
because it turns it jnto a servi.ent estate if the easement 1.S upheld. Since such easement 
"inheres in the suqject-matter with which the deed deals," it is merged with the deed. Tn 
Sells v. Robinson, 14J Idaho 767, 772 (2005), the Idaho State Suprem.e Court found 
merger of the real. estate purchase agreement's (REPSA) inclusion of "timber rights on 
said easement." (Compare to Sainsbury Constr. Co. v. Quinn, 137 Idaho 269, 273 (2002) 
(Court finds that a construction compan.y's promise to assist a I,ot buyer in, the 
construction of their house and receive reimbursement of its costs plus 5%, was 
incidental to that company's sale of said lot to that buyer~ and thus the agreem.ent to buiJd 
the house was not merged with the deed.) 
n. Defendants' Argument On Merwin's Third Pa.rty Beneficiary Status Fails 
Because Henry Never Intended To Benefit Menvin and Merwin Could, At 
Best, Bc Considered Only a Donee Beneficiary Without Legal Recourse. 
Defendants argue on page five of their Post-Trial Memorandum that Merwin was 
a third party ben.eficiary of the transaction between Henry and Sanders, and that 
jnstrument number 1 ] 19009 expressly grants an easement from Henry to MelWin. 
Simply stated, Merwin was a donee benefj,ciary and had no enforceable lcgal rights 
against Henry or Sanders. "A donee beneficiary, of course, has no rights against the 
promisee except where the promisee has received consi.deration to discharge the 
promi.sor." (Gilbert v. City o/Caldwell, 11.2 Idaho 386, 396 (1987); citing J. Calamari 
and J. Perillo, The Law (?fContracts § 17-10~ 2d. Ed. (1977). 
Plaintiffs provided a careful analysis of the third party beneficiary argument on 
page 32 of their Post-Trial. Legal Arguments. Even if Sanders intended to benefit 
Merwin through his contract with Berny, the Question remains whether Henry intended 
Merwin to also benefit. There is no J,an,guage in. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 to show that Henry 
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intended. to benefit Merwin by grantin.g her the easements, or even that she needed the 
easements to access her land. (PI. Br., p. 32). Again~ Henry believed that the easement 
grant in instrument number 1] ] 9009 was merely "some type offonnality" about which 
he lacked a clear understanding of why he signed it and what it meant to the sales 
transaction .. (Henry Depo., at p. 8, 11. 3~24). 
Even. jfthis Court found that Henry did intend to benefit Merwin 'With an 
easement grant in instrument number 1119009. the Hen.ry-Menvin easement grant would 
fail because the document did not adequately identify the easement interest or its location 
to satisfy Idaho's statute of frauds. As Plaintiffs stated in their Post-Trial Legal 
Arguments, the alleged southern and northern easements are very difficult to locate. and 
the language in instrument n.um.ber 1119009 is ambiguous at best. A professional 
surveyor could not locate the purported easement granted in lnstmment number 1119009 
based on the descri.ption in. the document. (PI. Br., p. 45). Thus, this Court should find 
that 1) Merwin was not a third party benefi.ciary; and 2) the easements are not located 
specifically enough in the deed for them. to be enforceable lUlder Jdaho's statute offrauds. 
III. Defendants Cannot Claim An Express Easement Under Instrum.cnt Number 
1119009 Because It Was Not Delivered. And It Does Not Sati.sfy Idaho's Statote 
of Frauds. 
On page eight of Defendants' Post-Trial Memorand urn, Defendants cite Barmore 
v. Perrone, 179 P. 3d 303, 145 Idaho 340 (2008) for the proposition that "[t]he question 
of delivery is one of intention and the rule i.s that delivery is complete when there is an. 
intention manifest on ·the part of the Grantor to make the instrument his deed." From this 
rule statement~ DefendmJ.ts then simply conclude that the easements from Henry to 
Mer'Wi.n were therefore delivered. Quoting from the same case, Plaintiffs argue that in 
Idaho, "an argument that a deed lacked. the jntent necessary to be effective is identical to 
an argument that delivery never occurred." (Barmore v. Perrone, 2008-ID-R0219.005 at 
3 (2008).) This results because "tbe real test of the delivery of a deed is this: Did the 
1S8 
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g.rantor by his acts or words, or both, intend to divest himseJf of title? If so, the deed is 
del"ivered.~· (Ii; citing Estate o/Skvorak, 140 Idaho at 21 (2004).) Even though 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Henry signed instntment number 1119009, he beJieved that 
instrument number J t 19009 was "some type of fonn,ality" and he lac1<ed a clear 
understanding of why he signed it. (Henry Depo. at p. 8. II. 3-24). Without a clear 
understanding of why he signed it, this Court should find that Henry lacks the requisite 
intent to have the easement grant operate in favor of Merwin, or Merwin's successors, the 
Conines. The Conines do not enjoy an easement across the Belstlers' property as 
purportedly conveyed by instrum.ent number 1119009, because Henry did not deliver that 
in,strument to Merwin, either physically or with intent for it to benefit her. (Pl. Br., p. 
28). 
Defendants have asserted in their Post-Trial Memorandum that the Conines 'are 
entitled to an express easem.ent across the Belst.lers' property. However, Defendants 
provide little factual support or evidence in support of this assertion.. Defendants have 
essentiaIJyasked this Court to ignore the complexities i.n the transactjons that OCCUlTed in 
early .T Ul1e~ 1.988 to fmd simp1y that Sanders granted Henry some easements and Henry 
then granted Merwin some easem.ents. Plaintiffs have provided in their Post-Trial Legal 
Arguments a detailed account of what actually occurred. In summary and simply stlted, 
1) Sanders did not have legal authority to grant an. easem,ent to Henry; 2) Henry did not 
have legal authority to grant Merwin an easement; 3) Merwin could not be considered a 
thi.rd party beneficiary of any agreement between Sanders and Henry; 4) Henry la.cked 
the requisite intent to benefit Merwin by grant of an easement; 5) instrument number 
1119009 does not satisfy the statute of frauds because it does not provide an adequate 
descripti.on of the subject property; and 6) instrument number 1119009 is invalid because 
it was not delivered under ldaho law. 
Further.more, Merwin. was a stranger to the tr.ansactions between Sanders and. 
Henry. Defen.dants attempt to link Defendants' Exhibit "0" to PI,aintiffs' ExhibHs 14, 15, 
and 16 to argue that Merwin was not a stranger to the tran.sactlon.. However, Defendants' 
1 c q J .' 
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Exhibit "0" is undated, unrecorded, and unacknowledged, and thus could have as likely 
been written yesterday as ill 1983. See page 30 of Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Legal Argwnen.ts. 
On page six of Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum, Defendants misquote 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 by stating "There r.emains then the dispute of the 'continuation of 
the existin.g road from the community road on the North' and to what its meanjng was." 
The actual text i.n Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 states "Said easements are the cOl1tinuation. of the 
existing logging road running parallel to Rockford Bay Road on the South and the 
existing road from the community road on the North." Plaintiffs argue that the 
"community road on the North" must refer to the Black Rock community road from the 
east because there is lJO other portion of the community road that comes from the North. 
Roads A, B, and C are all south of Road D. (PI. Exhibit 4). 
IV. Defendants Cannot Claim An Easement By Prescription Because They Are 
Barred From Filing The Claim under Idaho Code section 5-203. 
Defendants correctly state that the Idaho "Legislature changed the time period for 
prescriptive easement from the fonner five year statute in. 2006." (Def. Br., p.4, ]). 23-
25). By changingthc time period for prescriptive easements from five years to twenty 
years, the Idaho Legislature clearly intended to make it much more difficult for claimants 
to bring adverse possession claims. Defendants, however, simply state that the Court 
should find that their rights vested in 2004, prior to the legislative change. 
Under Idaho Code sectlon 5-203. "[n]o action for the recovery of real property, or 
for the recovery of the possessjon thereof. ean be maintained unless it appears that the 
plaintiff ... possessed of the property in question. wlthin twenty (20) years before the 
comm.encement of the action .... " Defendants commenced this actiolJ in 2007, and 
thereby did not possess "the property in question. within twenty years (20) before the 
commencement of the action." 
To reiterate from Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Legal Arguments, "ifConin.es could 
exercise a vested right in a five-year. period they accrued prior to the statutory change, 
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and could bring that claim after July 1, 2006~ such a cJaim would essentially evi scerate 
the Legislature's intent, which was to quadruple the statutory tim.e period tor claims made 
after July l~ 2006." (Pt. Br., p. 51). Defendants are invitin.g th.is Court to open the 
floodgates of litigation to aHow claimants to argue simply that their claim.s vested at some 
convenient point prior to the Idaho Legislature's change of law. Thjs ra.tionale could be 
broadl.y applied to any change of law that the Idaho Legislature makes, and would vastly 
erode the general judicial protections of statutes of limitation. 
Defendants later state that the "[ d]efendants' rights were vested prior to the 
legislature changing the law:' (Def. B.r., p. 9.11. l5-16). ironically, Defendants cite the 
United State Constitution concluding that "the legislature cannot 'take' without 
appropriate compensation." Defendants did not offer any facts or legal substantiation of 
this conclusory takings argument. Plaintiffs argue, however, that private takings without 
compensation are exactly what the Idaho Legislature aims to prevent by in.creasing the 
prescriptive period from five years to twenty years. Plaintiffs again note that Defendants 
brought their action on August 8, 2007, almost a full year after the Idaho Legislature 
revised and made effective Idaho Code section 5-203. Since Defendants cannot claim 
possession for a period of or exceeding twenty years. thei.r claim of prescriptive easement 
must fail. 
V. Defendants Cannot Maintain A Claim For Easement By Prescription Because 
The Other Elements or A Prescriptive Easement Have Not Been Met. 
Even if this Court decided to apply the former five-year prescriptive period, 
Defendants have not proved by clear and convincing evidence any of the other requisite 
elements of a p.rescriptive easement. On page four of Defendants' Post-Trial 
Memorandum. Defendants incorrectly state, "[e]very reasonable inference must be drawn 
from the Defendants' position." Defendants repeat this error in the second fun paragraph 
on page seven of their Post-Trial Memorandum. In Idaho, a claimant must prove the 
elements of a prescriptive easement by offerin.g clear and con.vincing proof. (West v. 
1 t:: 1 
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Smith, 95 Idaho 550,557 (1973).) The evidentiary standard is not a preponderance ofthe 
evidence OT. as the Defendants assert "[e]very reasonable inference." COllrts in Idaho 
require "clear and convincing evidence." (Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 17 fn. 2 (1989); 
citing Last Chance Ditch Co. v. Sawyer, 35 Idaho 61 (J 922).) "Each elem.ent is essential 
to the claim, and tbe trial court must make find.ings relevant to each element in order to 
sustain ajudgm.ent on. appeaL" (Backman v. Lawrence, 2009-10-0513.098 at 6 (2009); 
citing Hodgins v. Sales~ 139 Idaho 225~ 229 (2003).) 
Without citin.g the record or provi.ding any substantiation. Defendants claim that 
"[a]s to the prescriptive righ~ the only argument made by the Plaintiffs in. contravention. 
of the prescriptive right is the statement that 'the Solomons, the Conines ( sic) predecessor 
in interest, made no use of the Conine property." (Def. Br., p. 4, 11. 10-11). However, 
Defendants' only proffered evidence of use is '<in point of fact a vehicle was left on the 
property (in a building) which required contact to have the vehicle removed." (Def. Br. p. 
4,11. 13·1.5). As stated on page 50 of Plaintiff's Post-Trial Legal Arguments, "[i]n order 
for a claimant to establish that he has acquired a private prescri.ptivc easement by adverse 
use, he m.ust submit reasonably clear and convincing proof of open, notorious, 
continuous, uninterrupted use, und.er a claim of ri.ght, with the knowledge of the owner of 
the servient tenement, for the prescriptive period." (West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557 
(1973).) Again. the requisite standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. 
Plaintiffs argue that the alleged evidence of a vehicle left indefinitely in. storage in one of 
the buildings on Defendants' property does not provide clear and convincing evidence of 
any of the requ.isite elements of a private prescri.ptive easement. 
Defendants also state on page six their Post-Trial Memorandum that "[:f]urther, as 
to prescriptive rights attention is directed to the Deposition of Jerry Ronald Evans where 
he cJ.early states that the private drive has been in existence sin.ce approximately 1.985 or 
1986, and based upon his knowledge of the area and continuous visits has been used 
since that time." Plaintiffs do not di.spute Ronald Evans' testimony about the road's 
existence, but argue only that the extrcme.ly limited and nOlJ"conti.nuOll.'il use was by 
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penDl ss 1011. Again, Defend.ants fail to provi.de any facts or evidence to support: thei.r 
claim. of a private prescriptive easement by adverse use, While Defendants make 
numerous citations to Mr. Evan's deposition, his statement that the road existed and that 
it was used docs not provide clear and convincing pr.oofthat the use met any of the 
elements of a private prescri.ptivc easement. The evidence does not indicate who used the 
private drive, whether the Plaintiffs or their predecessors had any knowledge of the use, 
how frequently the private drive was used, or whether those using the prjvate dti.ve had 
perm.ission. Clearly, Defendants have not met their strict burden of proof by providing 
clear and convincing evidence to support a claim of private prescriptive easement by 
adverse use. 
On page nine of Defendants' Post-Tri.al Mcn10randum, Defendants claim once 
again "they have a prescriptive right on the private drive .. , there ha':l been open. 
continuou.s and notorious use of the private driveway for the period of approximately ten 
yeats." (De!. Br.~ p. 9, Ii. 7-12). Defendants have stated in their Post-Trial Memorandum 
that they can claim. "a prescriptive right on the private drive" ~ hut they have not yet 
provided any facts or evidence to support this bare claim. 
Plaintiffs have provided ample evidence both at trial and in their Post-Trial Legal 
Arguments to show that De1:endants have not met their evidentiary burden to prove a 
prescriptive easement. 
First, Defendants' use was not open and notorious. As Plaintiffs stated in their 
Post-Trial Legal Arguments, the Belstlers moved to the property on November 15, 2005 
(Dana Belstlel' Tr. Testimony~ 9-22~09), and did not even see the Coni11es until mid-April 
2006. (Jd.). Plaintiffs provided substantial evidence that Defendants' use of the property 
wac; infrequent and incon.sistent from 1998 to 2007 (Conine Tr. Testimony, 9-23~09). 
Plaintiffs demonstrated that Dcfendal1t5' predecessors' usc of the property ~-as not open 
and notorious, because there is li.ttle evidence as to how Kluss used the property or the 
disputed driveway between July of 1990 and November 1993, Solomon. did not use the 
..... 1_·_ ... ·#OJIi>_. _ •. -
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land except for storage of one boat at som.e unknown time, and there is no evidence that 
Merwin llsed the property at all. (PI. Br.! p. 55). 
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Second, Defendants have n.ot proved continuous and uninterrupted use of the 
property or the disputed driveway. Again, the Conines onl.y used their property 
intemljttently from 1998 to 2007. (Pl. Br., p. 56). The Solomons did not use the property 
at all, Kluss used the property to run an. illegal marijuana gr.owing oper.ation. and there is 
no evidence that Merwin ever used the property. (Id.). Clearly, Defendants cannot 
establish continuous and uninterrupted use of the property. 
Third, Defendan.ts' claim of right fails because it was permissive. As noted in 
Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Legal Arg\.1ments~ "a prescripti.ve right can't be granted if the use of 
the servient tenement was by pennission of its owner, because the l1se~ by dcfmition., was 
not adverse to the rights of the owner,'" (Backman, 2009-ID-0513.098; citing Hughes v. 
Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,480 (2006).). As stated in Defendants~ Post-Trial Memorandum~ 
the Conines "ceased using the lower road due to its being cabled off ... " (Def. Br., p.3-4). 
As n.oted by Plaintiffs in their Post-Tria] Legal Arguments, Defendants did not attempt to 
remove the cable across the I.ower easement or ask for a key. Defendants' response 
clearly demonstrates that they understood the access to the lower easement to be wholly 
perm.issive. The evidence adduced at trial shows 1) Solomon. did not use the property; 2) 
Henry gave his buddy K1uss penn.ission. to use the disputed dri.veway; and there is no 
evidence that Kluss used the lower easement; and 3) Merwin also did llot use the 
property. (PI.. Br., p. 58). Finally, aU the elemen.ts must be proven cleady and 
convjncingly to have existed together for the prescripti.ve period of twenty years, so if 
there was a period ofperr.nissive use~ or use not open and notorious for period such as 
K]uss', the claim must faiL 
VI. Defendants' Argument That Idaho Code Section 55-313 Applies Is Improper 
And Unwarranted Because It Requires An Entirely New Factual And Legal 
Analysis That Was Not Raised At Trial. 
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Defendants argue on page nine of their Post· Trial Memorandum that ''while not 
plead, there is another issue pending before this court ... whether or not the Plaintiffs can 
change the location of the easements" under Idaho Code section 55·313. Plaintiffs have 
not changed location of any alleged easem.ent, and they do not believe an.y easements 
exist to change. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' argument is improper at thi.s stage of 
litigation. 
In a case factually similar to the instant case, the Court stated, "Cold Springs 
neither plearlnoT addressed whether it was entitled to relocate the easement. Cold 
Springs waited until filing motions to clarify and amend the judgment to address the 
issue. As a result, the district court correctly declined to rule on whether the easement 
was open to relocation ... Similarly, Cold Springs is barred from maki.ng such an 
argument before this Court because it did not properly raise the issue beJ.ow." (Turner 11. 
Cold Springs Canyon Ltd Partnership, 143 Idaho 227 (2006).) Plaintiffs argue that the 
decision. in Turner applies to the facts of the instant case, and that Defen.dants' argument 
to apply Idaho Code section 55·313 should therefore be denied because it was not plead 
at or before trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court find 
Defendants are not entitled to an express easement through Plaintiffs~ property, 
Defendan.ts are not entitled to an easement by prescription, and that Idah.o Code section 
55·313 does not apply to Defendants' claims because it was not plead before or during 
trial. 
Dated: " .... '2.3 -Or 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney at Law 
Counsel for Plainti.ffs 
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CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
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KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
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KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
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CASE NUMBER: CV-07-2523 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND 
ORDER FOR JUDGMENT 
Arthur B. Macomber for Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants 
Charles M. Dodson for Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs 
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY 
Plaintiffs Chris and Dana Belstler ("BELSTLERS") requested this COUli quiet title to the 
purported easement areas, and enjoin defendants from their use. Defendants Karen and Howard 
Conine ("CONINES") filed a counterclaim requesting this Court recognize and affirm the two 
alleged easements 1 either by prescription or express recorded document, one of which purported 
I Defendants had also alleged that an easement by implication existed; however, they withdrew that claim at trial. 
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easements became known at trial as the "disputed private driveway." Plaintiffs filed their 
amended complaint on January 30, 2009, requesting this COUl1 declare a judgment interpreting 
various recorded documents attached as exhibits thereto, the core document including a 
purported grant of two easements from Kelmeth and Georgia Henry ("Henry"), a former owner 
of plaintiffs' land, to Linda Merwin ("Merwin"), a former owner of defendants' land. In the 
Plaintiffs' pleadings they request a judicial determination of the meaning of the Deed from Mr. 
and Mrs. V. A. Sanders ("Sanders") to Andrews Equipment (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9); the Deed 
from Sanders to Rockford Bay (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10) and the Deed from Andrews Equipment to 
Rockford Bay (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11). Further, Plaintiffs requested this Court quiet title to the 
purported easement areas and enjoin defendants from their use. 
A four day Court trial commenced on September 21, 2009. The Court requested the 
pm1ies submit post-trial briefs m1d the final brief was filed with the Court on November 23, 
2009? 
At trial, the pm1ies agreed that the cOUli should adjudicate whether the BELSTLERS may 
move the easement in accordance with I.C. § 55-313 to a location further n01ih on their propeliy 
as shown on Defendants' Exhibit T. 
Any of the following findings of fact that should be denominated as a conclusion of law 
shall be deemed to be a conclusion oflaw. Any ofthe following conclusions oflaw that should 
be denominated a finding of fact shall be deemed a conclusion of law. 
II. DISCUSSION 
The BELSTLERS are the owners of real propeliy located in the general Rockford Bay 
area of Kootenai County. The CONINES own the prope11y immediately east of the 
BELSTLERS (as defined on Defendm1ts' Exhibit "S"). The BELSTLERS acquired their 
propeliy from Henry (Defendants' Exhibit "R") and Henry from Sanders (Defendants' Exhibit 
"A"/Plaintiffs Exhibit "5"). The CONINES purchased their property from Judith Solomon 
("Solomon") (Defendants' Exhibit "S") who purchased their propeliy from Robe11 "Pete" and 
2 The Court notes that during the trial, the Court made a physical site visit, with counsel and the pat1ies present, 
where it viewed the properties at issue in this case; however, that site visit served an illustrative purpose only and 
does not constitute evidence considered by this Court in making its decision. 
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Vicki Kluss ("Kluss") (Plaintiffs' Exhibit" 19"), who purchased that property from Merwin 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit "26"), who purchased the property from Richard Anstadt (Defendants' 
Exhibit "K"). Sanders was the owner of the BELSTLERS' property but did not own any interest 
in the CONINES' prope11y at any time based upon the facts educed at trial. 
In 1979 Sanders subdivided some parcels ofprope11y (as identified in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
No.8) consisting of parcels A, B, C, and D, wherein parcel A is the BELSTLERS' prope11y. 
Sanders created a sixty (60) foot roadway easement across parcels A, B, C and D (identified on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8, as specifically referenced in Plaintiffs' Exhibits, 9, 10, and 14). Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 14 is the Sale Agreement from Sanders to Kenneth L. Henry, the BELSTLERS 
predecessor in interest. The location of the road was identified at trial by a yellow line on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. 
On the 3rd of June, 1988, Sanders conveyed to the Worley Fire District a certain p0l1ion 
of prope11y for the benefit of the Fire District, over and upon which traverses what was refened 
to at trial as the southern most easement referenced in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, the Mutual 
Agreement for Easement for Ingress and Egress. Also on the 1 st day of June, 1988, the Sanders 
sold to Henry the BELSTLERS property which was at that time "subject to any and all 
easements, conditions, restrictions of record, and easements for ingress and egress (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 14). 
The sale from Sanders to Henry was by way of a title retaining contract (Exhibit 14), and 
at the time of the sale, Merwin was the owner of the currently owned CONINES' prope11y. 
There was a disagreement between Sanders and Merwin regarding the continuation of the road 
which commenced at Rockford Bay and continued tlu·ough parcels A, B, and C shown on 
Exhibit 8 through the Merwin prope11y, Sanders never having the legal authority to grant such an 
easement tlu'ough the Merwin prope11y. That disagreement, and the necessity for access was 
referenced in Defendants' Exhibit 0, the agreement between Merwin and Sanders which clearly 
establishes that Merwin had an interest in the resolution of the easement issue by Exhibit 15 
which was a serial grant of easement, first from Sanders to Henry, and second from Henry to 
Merwin. 
At the time of purchase by CONINES, the CONINES' propeliy was accessed by two 
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easements of record described at trial as the upper or northerly easement and the lower or 
southerly easement. The upper or northerly easement was also referred to at trial as the "disputed 
private driveway. The upper or northerly easement extends from Chandler Lane/Sanders Road 
across the BELSTLERS' propel1y to the CONINES' property. This northerly easement is set 
forth in that ce11ain document recorded as Instrument No. 1119009, the Deed from Sanders to 
Henry and Henry to Merwin. (Exhibit 15). This easement is an access described in Plaintiff s 
Exhibit "15" and Defendants' Exhibit "A". This easement for access by CONINES across the 
BELSTLERS' property traverses some distance on the north side of the BELSTLERS' 
residence. It continues across the BELSTLERS' property to a gate at the approximate propel1y 
line of the BELSTLERS' property and the CONINES' property. It continues at the 
approximately same elevation, to a building that existed upon the CONINES' property at the 
time of purchase, and a building that was later constructed by the CONINES on the premises. 
The second easement was referred to as the lower road and is also described in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
"15" Defendants' Exhibit "A". This lower or southerly easement exists across what is now the 
Worley Fire District property past the "fire station" and then across the BELSTLERS' property 
to serve the lower portion of the CONINES' property. 
While the upper and lower portion of the CONINES' property is fairly level there is a 
mid portion of the CONINES propel1y which is quite steep making road access between the 
upper and lower portions practically impossible. 
The extension of Chandler Lane/ Sanders Road at the West edge of the BELSTLERS' 
property is a steep upward incline, and dead-ends at the Black Rock Golf Course property. The 
elevation of Chandler Lane/Sanders Road is significantly above the structures located upon the 
CONINES' property. 
For all of the ten years the CONINES owned their propel1y they traversed the "disputed 
private driveway." They did so with intent, knowledge and belief that it was their rightful access 
under the express easement. Therefore they used the disputed private drive under a claim of 
rights. Their use was open and obvious. The private road had been in existence since sometime 
during the period 1983 to 1986 and its use by predecessors to the CONINES had been 
acquiesced in by Henry, who is the predecessor to the BELSTLERS. Henry had knowledge of 
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the use of the private road. He signed documents intended to provide easement access to the 
CONINES property when he purchased from Sanders. He confirmed in his deposition the 
location of the easement access as the disputed private driveway as being the easement described 
in the documents. The existence of the roadway was plainly visible upon the ground after its 
initial construction. Henry had knowledge of the use of the roadway by the BELSTLERS. He 
would have to have known of their use because of the proximity of the Henry residence to the 
disputed private driveway. Use by the BELSTLERS and their predecessor Henry simply could 
not go unnoticed. 
During the summer of 2006, the BELSTLERS requested that the CONINES cease using 
the lower road and the upper private drive. The CONINES ceased using the lower road due to it 
being cabled and locked by the BELSTLERS, but refused to cease using the private drive. 
Discussions to resolve the dispute were had between the parties, but resolution was not reached 
and litigation ensued. 
A. Express Easements 
The BESTLERS have asked for judicial determination of the meaning of Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 14, the sale agreement between V. A. Sanders and Geraldine Sanders as sellers and 
Kem1eth Henry as buyer. The sale agreement is a title retaining contract executed at a time when 
a Warranty Deed was also executed (and subsequently recorded - see Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16). 
CONINES in their counterclaim argue that there are two express easements on their 
propel1y consisting of the southerly easement and a northerly easement. The BELSTERS 
contend that the CONINES do not have these easement rights. The CONINES contend that their 
easement emanates from The Sale Agreement (Exhibit 14) and the Mutual Agreement and 
Easement for Ingress and Egress (Exhibit 15). They fm1her contend that Exhibit 0 together with 
other testimonial evidence shows an intent showing that the intent of the pat1ies to the Mutual 
Agreement and Easement for Ingress and Egress (Exhibit 15) and that that intent was to create an 
easement benefiting what is now the CONINES' property. 
The evidence at trial clearly demonstrates that the easement in question granted on the 
nOl1herly portion of the then Henry propel1y (now the BELSTLERS' propel1y) was for the 
private drive. It is shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23. Also Henry, at his deposition, marked on 
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Exhibit 3 the northerly easement with an "X" to show the private drive. 
In the last paragraph of the Mutual Agreement and Easement for Ingress and Egress 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15) Henry, the predecessor in interest of the BELSTLERS, specifically 
granted easement rights. It is specifically stated that "Kenneth L. Henry grants an easement 
continuing the existing road in the southerly portion of the property that he is purchasing from V. 
A. Sanders and Geraldine C. Sanders and the Northerly part of the property he is purchasing 
from V A. Sanders and Geraldine C. Sanders to Linda Merwin who owns the property in the 
Northeast Quarter of Section J 7, Township 48 North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai 
County, Idaho. Those easements are referenced as "a continuation of the existing logging road 
rulming parallel to Rockford Bay on the south and the existing road from the community road on 
the north". That reference is to the private drive across the northern portion of the BELSTLERS' 
property that was intended, and does, provide access to the CONINES' property. The grant of 
that easement by Henry was for the benefit of Merwin. 
The sale agreement, the warranty deed, and the express easements created in Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15, and the deed from Sanders to Henry and Henry to Merwin creating the easements 
form the basis for the express easement benefiting the CONINES. Linda Merwin was a 
beneficiary under the arrangements. The express easements therefore benefitted Merwin. The 
CONINES are a successor in interest to Linda Merwin and have easement rights of ingress and 
egress over the disputed private driveway. 
The BEL TLERS contend the sale agreement between Sanders and Henry is merged in the 
deed from Sanders to Henry and the easement agreement is an antecedent document with no 
effect which benefits the CONINES. The court disagrees. The Supreme Court in Jolley vs. Idaho 
Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P 2d 879 (1966) determined that an express easement is not 
merged in a Deed. The holding in Jolley is contrary to the argument of the Plaintiffs that the 
easements created in Exhibit 15 merged with the Warranty Deed. 
In Jolley the Idaho Supreme COUli stated, "the acceptance of a deed to premises generally 
is considered as a merger of the agreements of an antecedent contract into the terms of the deed, 
and any claim for relief must be based on the covenants or agreements contained in the deed, not 
the covenants or agreements as contained in the prior agreement. There is a generally recognized 
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exception to the foregoing rule which exception relates to collateral stipulations of the contract, 
which are not incorporated in the deed." Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 382, 414 
P.2d 879, 884 (1966). The Court went on to explain, "[t]he authorities may perhaps be 
reconciled by a determination of what are 'collateral stipulations'. If the stipulation has reference 
to title, possession, quantity, or emblements of the land, it is generally, but not always, held to 
inhere in the very subject-matter with which the deed deals, and is merged therein.' Id. at 383 
and 414 P.2d 879 at 885. In the present case Exhibit 15 was a collateral stipulation of the 
contract and is not merged with the deed. 
The BESTLERS have requested judicial interpretation of Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 and 19 
(the Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement entered into between Kluss and Henry as modified 
by Henry and re-recorded). Those documents provide for joint use and maintenance for a 
roadway, which has been identified in yellow marking on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. The testimony 
during the course of the trial indicated that both pmiies and their successors in interest have 
contributed to the maintenance of portions of the yellow marked roadway on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
l. The Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement does not modify, supersede or extinguish the terms 
and conditions set f011h in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15. Exhibit 15 created the easements for the benefit 
of Henry from Sanders, and from Henry to Merwin. The beneficial use of the easement inuring 
to Linda Merwin and her successors is not altered in any way. This applies to both the northerly 
easement over the disputed private driveway m1d also the southern or lower roadway easement. 
The BESTLERS argue that Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 is not effective as providing an 
easement benefiting what is now the CONINES' property, formerly the Merwin property, 
because the document was not delivered. The Supreme Court of Idaho in the case of Barmore 
vs. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 179 P.3d 303 (2008) noted the controlling element in the question of 
delivery is the intention ofthe pm1ies. The rule is that delivery is complete when there is an 
intention manifest on the pm1 of the Grantor to make the instrument his deed. The document 
creating the easement from Sanders to Henry and the easements from Henry to Merwin 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15) was indeed delivered. Both Sanders and Henry fully intended the result 
of the documentation of the transaction between them. There is no tenable claim that there was 
no delivery. 
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The BELSTLERS also argue that any express easement created under Instrument No. 
1119009 (Exhibit 15) is ineffective because Merwin, the Grantee of the Easement was not a 
party to the contract. The BELSTLERS contend that Merwin was a stranger to the transaction 
between Henry and Sanders which gave rise to Instrument No. 1119009. The benefit to Merwin 
intended by Sanders and Henry was an integral paIi oftheir agreement. She is mentioned by 
name in the agreement. Merwin was therefore much more than an incidental beneficiary of the 
Agreement. She obtained legal access over and easement, specifically the use of the "private 
drive." BELSTLERS argue that there is no effect whatsoever of Exhibit "0,,3 in explaining 
Exhibit 15. 
The Court finds that Exhibit "0" verifies that there was a dispute between Sanders and 
Merwin arising from the fact that Sanders had placed a road (the upper extension of 
... 
Sanders/Chandler Lane, i.e. the private road) upon the property of Merwin without authority. In 
order to effectuate a resolution of the road placement Sanders and Merwin agreed that Sanders 
would correct the problem, as shown by Exhibit "0". They accomplished the same at the time of 
the sale to Henry by the requirement that Henry convey an easement to Merwin (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15). 
The court concludes Exhibit "0" provides meaning to, explanation of, and the intent of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15. Exhibit 15 created an easement favoring Merwin. Merwin, Sanders and 
Henry were fully aware of its intention, and the need to continue the use of the private driveway 
during Merwin's ownership. Specifically, they were all aware of the existence of the driveway 
access across the Henry property to the Merwin property. The easement was granted with intent 
to serve the Merwin propeliy now owned by the CONINES. 
In Pm'tout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 183 P.3d 771 (2008), the Court provided: 
"The test for determining a party's status as a third-party beneficiary ... is 
whether the agreement reflects an intent to benefit the third party." Idaho 
Power Co. v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110, 112, 90 P.3d 335, 337 (2004). The third 
party must show the contract was made primarily for his benefit; it is not 
3 The Court notes that the paI1ies stipulated to the admission of Exhibit "0" and stipulated that the cOUl1 consider 
that document, so as to interpret the meaning of Exhibit 15, The practical effect and meaning of the exhibit was left 
to the sound discretion of the trier offact by stipulation of the parties, 
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sufficient that the third party is a mere incidental beneficiary to the contract. 
Id (quoting Adkison Corp. v. Am. Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 409,690 P.2d 
341,344 (1984)); Fenwick v. Idaho Dep'! of Lands, 144 Idaho 318, 323, 160 
P.3d 757, 762 (2007) (quoting Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331,337,372 
P.2d 414, 418 (1962) (quoting Sachs v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 148 F.2d 128, 
131 (7th Cir.1945))). The intent to benefit the third party must be expressed in 
the contract itself. Idaho Power Co., 140 Idaho at 112,90 P.3d at 337 (quoting 
Adkison COlp., 107 Idaho at 409,690 P.2d at 344;) Fenwick, 144 Idaho at 
323,160 P.3d at 762 (quoting Adkison COlp., 107 Idaho at 409,690 P.2d at 
344). 
The Court observes that Merwin is not a party to this litigation and is not seeking to 
enforce Exhibit 15. As such, it may not be pertinent to determine whether she was a patiy who 
could assert rights under Exhibit 15; however, she would have standing to assert rights under 
Exhibit 15 should it have ever become necessary. The granting ofthe easement was certainly of 
pecuniary benefit to Merwin and Exhibit 15 clearly shows the intent and motivation of Sanders 
and Henry that part of their agreement was to confer the easement benefit on Merwin. She was 
no incidental beneficiary; she was an intended beneficiary because she was specifically named. 
In Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470, 199 P.2d 264 (1948) the court 
held that "before a deed can operate as a valid transfer of title, there must be a 
delivery of the instrument, and it must be effected during the life of the grantor." 
However, in Hinckley Estate Co., v. Gurry, 53 Idaho 551, 26 P.2d 121 (1933) the court 
stated "proof of the recording of a deed by the grantor, without other circumstances, is not 
sufficient to bind the grantee or establish delivery or the grantee's acceptance thereof. [TJhe 
grantee's acceptance of such a deed need not be by formal or express words to that effect, but 
may be shown by acts, conduct, or words of the parties showing an intention to accept. Thus, 
there may be an acceptance by atl asseliion of title in him, by his conveyance of the propeliy or 
by acts of ownership generally in respect to the property." (emphasis added). 
Therefore, the fact that Merwin is not a signer to Exhibit 15 will not preclude the 
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CONINES from being a successor to the easement rights of Merwin. The Court, guided by the 
above cited case law, finds that Merwin was a third party beneficiary of that transaction and 
accepted the easements by her acts described in Exhibit O. 
The two roadway accesses in dispute in this case are express easements in favor of the 
CONINES. To the extent, if any, that grant of easements in Exhibit 15 is ambiguous; the purpose 
of the express easements has been thoroughly explained by the evidence. The CONINES are 
entitled to judgment declaring their easement rights and the BELSTLERS' claims of quiet title to 
those easement claims shall be denied. 
B. Prescriptive Easement 
The CONINES seek judgment against the BELSTLERS on the alternative ground of 
prescriptive easement rights. The evidence shows that the private drive has been in existence 
since approximately 1985 or 1986 and perhaps as early as 1983. 
The Supreme Court of the State ofIdaho in Checketts vs. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715,721, 
152 P.2d 585,591 (1944), noted: 
"One who purchases land expressly subject to an easement or with notice, actual 
or constructive, that it is burdened with an existing easement takes the land 
subject to the easement." 
In this paIiicular matter there was no question that the roadway access across the 
BELSTLERS' propeliy to what is now the CONINES' propeliy existed. It is, aI1d was, plainly 
visible upon the ground as an obvious roadway access or driveway. The BESTLERS have had 
knowledge of the existence of the "private drive." Henry had that same knowledge. The 
CONINES contend that both easements were not only of record as express easements, but must 
also be recognized by the court as benefiting the CaNINES as prescriptive easements. 
An easement can also be obtained by prescription. A district court's determination that a 
claimant has or has not established a prescriptive easement involves entwined questions of law 
and fact. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223 (2006). A prescriptive easement is 
established if the dominant landowner can show by clear and convincing proof that there has 
been an open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse use under a claim of right with the 
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actual or imputed lmowledge of the owner of the servient estate for the statutory period of five 
years. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 210 P.3d 75 (2009). 
If a party can show proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
property during the prescriptive period, but fail to prove how that use commenced, then the 
presumption is that the use is adverse and under a claim of right. The burden then shifts to the 
servient owner to show that the use was permissive. The one exception to the rule of prescriptive 
easements is where the use occurs on wild, unenclosed or unimproved land. In such an event, to 
protect the rights of the servient owner and avoid inequitable results, the presumption is that the 
use is permissive. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 76 P.3d 969 (2003). That exception is not 
applicable here as these lands are not wild, unenclosed or unimproved. 
The CaNINES have proved that they have used the disputed private drive where they 
claim a northerly easement by use that has been open, continuous and notorious for the period of 
their ownership of approximately ten (l0) years. That would vest the prescriptive easement 
rights of CONINE. 4 This Court finds that the CaNINES' rights accrued priorto the Legislature 
changing the law regarding the time period for prescriptive easement. 5 
The CaNINES have proved entitlement to a prescriptive easement as to the disputed 
private driveway across the northerly pOliion of the BELSTLERS' propeliy. They have proved 
by clear and convincing evidence that their use has been open, notorious, continuous, and 
uninterrupted use of the property during the prescriptive period of five years. They have the 
beneifit of the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Moreover they 
have proved the claim of right through the existence of the express easement document Exhibit 
15 and by being in the line of succession from Linda Merwin. 
This Court finds that the use by the CONINES of the disputed private driveway across 
the northerly part of the BELSTLER propeliy during the time Henry owned it not to be 
permissive as the BELSTLERS used it under a claim of right emanating from the easement 
4 The Legislature modified the prescriptive claim statute, I.e. § 5-203, from the previously existing five (5) year 
requirement to a twenty (20) year requirement in 2006. 
5 Further, the changes to Idaho Code Sections 5-204, 206, 207, 210, 211 as well as 2 J 3 were made after CONINES' 
rights were vested, five (5) years subsequent to their purchase, under the then existing statute. More particularly, 
those rights became vested in 2004, prior to the filing of the instant action. 
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granting agreement (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15). The fact that Henry may have acquiesced in the use 
by the BEL TLERS is not permission because he knew the BELSTLERS, as successors to 
Merwin, had a right to use both the upper and lower roadways under the express easement he had 
granted to Merwin. The use by the BELSTLERS' of the disputed private driveway easement was 
continuous. 
The CONINES purchased the property from Solomon on June 25, 1998. The CONINES 
visited the property generally every weekend in summer and less when Snoqualmie Pass 
presented snowy driving conditions. In winter, the CONINES generally visited their property 
two weekends per month. Solomon did not use the property at all. The CONINES have not 
established any open and notorious use of the lower easement during the period of their 
ownership, from 1998 to when this lawsuit commenced. The evidence does not establish use of 
the lower roadway by predecessors to the CaNINES which could be described continuous. So, 
there is no evidence to SUppOlt a claim of tacking. The CONINES are entitled to a ruling in their 
favor on the issue of prescriptive easement over the nOltherly roadway access described at trial 
as the disputed private drive. There is no showing of open and notorious use of the lower 
easement on BESTLERS' property. 
The scope of a prescriptive easement is fixed by the use made during the prescriptive 
period. Becksteadv. Price, 146 Idaho 47,190 P.3d 876 (2008)(rehearing denied). The scope of 
the CONINES' use based their claim of prescriptive rights over the private driveway is ingress 
and egress for motor vehicle and pedestrian travel for residential and recreational purposes. The 
width, length and location of the easement is as shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23. 
The CONINES are denied any claim to an easement by prescription as to the southerly 
easement claim across the lower road. The CaNINES are entitled to judgment of prescriptive 
easement rights, as an alternative to their express easements claim recognized herein across the 
private driveway on the northerly portion of the BELSTLERS' property. 
1'7fl, \ l . 
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e. Easement Relocation Pursuant to I.e. § 55-313 
The BELSTLERS, in their brief, contend that they do not seek to have the location of the 
nOliherly easement changed and argue that the CONINES cmIDot seek a ruling by the court as to 
the applicability ofIdaho Code § 55-313. Neither evidence nor argument was provided as 
regards to relocation of the southerly easement. The BELSTLERS base their argument on their 
claim that they do not believe any easements exist to change. The parties did extensively litigate 
the relocation issue at trial and the pleadings are deemed amended to include a claim for 
relocation of the northerly easement. Throughout the trial the pmiies took the position that if the 
court should determine that the easements claimed by the CaNINES are valid easements, the 
Court should then determine whether or not the BELSTLERS could, pursuant to I.C. § 55-313 
change the location ofthe northerly easement. Therefore, that issue is ripe for determination at 
this time by this Court. 
Idaho Code § 55-313 allows for a subservient estate to change the location of an 
easement that benefits the dominant estate. However, that statute requires that there be no injury, 
or more pmiicularly that such change be made in a manner as to not obstruct motor vehicle 
traffic or otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such access. Fmiher, the 
subservient estate must pay the cost of such a move. 
The court concludes from the persuasive testimony of Scott Rasor, as illustrated by 
Exhibit T, that there would be injury to the CaNINES in the form of unreasonably steep road 
grades which would create inconvenience and undue risk of harm to person and propeliy due to 
steep road grades required by the existing topography. Winter weather, when snow fall and ice 
are evident, would further aggravate motor vehicle and pedestrian travel on such a steep 
roadway. The road grade slopes not only exceed any of the slopes upon the existing approach on 
the road from Rockford Bay but are so steep as to constitute injury within the meaning of Idaho 
Code § 55-313. 
The proposed relocation of the northerly easement is not a reasonable alternative shown 
by the evidence due to the topography of the real property owned by both the BELSTLERS and 
the CONINES. Therefore, the CONINES are entitled to judgment against BELSTLERS for 
injunctive relief that they may not move the road to the location shown on Exhibit T. 
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III. ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the nOliherly ("private drive") and southerly easements 
granted to Merwin in Instrument No. 1119009 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15) and fUliher referenced on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, are express easements specifically created for the benefit of the CONINES' 
property and impose an encumbrance upon the BELSTLERS' property. The judgment shall 
include the legal descriptions for the easements and shall be based as shown on Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 23. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that tl!e judgment shall reflect that the 
CONINES have established a prescriptive easement upon the northerly easement, but have not 
established a prescriptive easement as to the southerly easement and shall specify the nature, 
length, width and location of the nOliherly easement over the private drive. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment shall deny to the BELSTLERS 
any right to change the location of northerly easement to the location referred to on Exhibit T. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that considering all claims and defenses 
presented that the CONINES are entitled to their costs but not attorney fees as this action was not 
frivolously or unreasonably pursued nor defended by the BELSTLERS. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the CONINES prepare a judgment 
consistent with this Memorandum Decision and present the same to Judge Lansing Haynes as 
James R. Michaud's service to the State ofIdaho as a senior district judge is concluded upon the 
issuance of this memorandum decision. 
Dated this ;t '3~ay of December, 2009. 
Senior District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
COUNTER PLAINTIFFS, 
vs. 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
COUNTER DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NUMBER: CV-07-2523 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND 
ORDER FOR JUDGMENT 
Arthur B. Macomber for Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants 
Charles M. Dodson for Defendants/Counter ,Plaintiffs 
1. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY 
Plaintiffs Chris and Dana Belstler ("BELSTLERS") requested this Court quiet title to the 
purported easement areas, and enjoin defendants from their use. Defendants Karen and Howard 
Conine ("CONINES") filed a counterclaim requesting this Court recognize and affirm the two 
alleged easements] either by prescription or express recorded document, one of which purported 
J Defendants had also alleged that an easement by implication existed; however, they withdrew that claim at trial. 
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easements became known at trial as the "disputed private driveway." Plaintiffs filed their 
amended complaint on January 30, 2009, requesting this Court declare a judgment interpreting 
various recorded documents attached as exhibits thereto, the core document including a 
purported grant of two easements from Kelmeth and Georgia Henry ("Henry"), a former owner 
of plaintiffs' land, to Linda Merwin ("Merwin"), a former owner of defendants' land. In the 
Plaintiffs' pleadings they request a judicial determination of the meaning of the Deed from Mr. 
and Mrs. V. A. Sanders ("Sanders") to Andrews Equipment (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9); the Deed 
from Sanders to Rockford Bay (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10) and the Deed from Andrews Equipment to 
Rockford Bay (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11). Further, Plaintiffs requested this Court quiet title to the 
purported easement areas and enjoin defendants from their use. 
A four day COUli trial commenced on September 21, 2009. The COUli requested the 
parties submit post-trial briefs and the final brief was filed with the COUli on November 23, 
2009.2 
At trial, the parties agreed that the court should adjudicate whether the BELSTLERS may 
move the easement in accordance with I.e. § 55-313 to a location fUliher north on their property 
as shown on Defendants' Exhibit T. 
II. DISCUSSION 
The BELSTLERS are the owners of real propeliy located in the general Rockford Bay 
area of Kootenai County. The CONINES own the property immediately east of the 
BELSTLERS (as defined on Defendants' Exhibit "S"). The BELSTLERS acquired their 
property from Henry (Defendants' Exhibit "R") and Henry from Sanders (Defendants' Exhibit 
"A"/Plaintiffs Exhibit "5"). The CONINES purchased their propeliy from Judith Solomon 
("Solomon") (Defendants' Exhibit "S") who purchased their propeliy from Robeli "Pete" and 
Vicki Kluss ("Kluss") (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "19"), who purchased that property from Merwin 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit "26"), who purchased the property from Richard Anstadt (Defendants' 
Exhibit "Kif). Sanders was a prior owner of the BELSTLERS' property but did not own any 
2 The COUli notes that during the trial, the COUli made a physical site visit, with counsel and the paIiies present, 
where it viewed the propeliies at issue in this case; however, that site visit served an illustrative purpose only and 
does not constitute evidence considered by this COllrt in making its decision. 
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interest in the CONINES' property at any time based upon the facts educed at trial. 
In 1979 Sanders subdivided some parcels of property (as identified in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
No.8) consisting of parcels A, B, C, and D, wherein parcel A is the BELSTLERS' property. 
Sanders created a sixty (60) foot roadway easement across parcels A, B, C and D (identified on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8, as specifically referenced in Plaintiffs' Exhibits, 9, 10, and 14). Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 14 is the Sale Agreement from Sanders to Kenneth L. Henry, the BELSTLERS 
predecessor in interest. The location ofthe road was identified at trial by a yellow line on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. 
On the 3rd of June, 1988, Sanders conveyed to the Worley Fire District a certain portion 
of property for the benefit of the Fire District, over and upon which traverses what was referred 
to at trial as the southern most easement referenced in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15, the Mutual 
Agreement for Easement for Ingress and Egress. Also on the 1st day of June, 1988, the Sanders 
sold to Henry the BELSTLERS' prope11y which was at that time "subject to any and all 
easements, conditions, restrictions of record, and easements for ingress and egress (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 14). 
The sale from Sanders to Henry was by way of a title retaining contract (Exhibit 14), and 
at the time of the sale, Merwin was the owner of the currently owned CONINES' property. 
There was a disagreement between Sanders and Merwin regarding the continuation of the road 
which commenced at Rockford Bay and continued tlu'ough parcels A, B, and C, shown on 
Exhibit 8, through the Merwin property; Sanders never having the legal authority to grant such 
an easement through the Merwin property. That disagreement, and the necessity for access was 
referenced in Defendants' Exhibit 0, the agreement between Merwin and Sanders which clearly 
establishes that Merwin had an interest in the resolution of the easement issue by Exhibit 15 
which was a serial grant of easement, first from Sanders to Henry, and second from Henry to 
Merwin. 
At the time of purchase by CONINES, the CONINES' property was accessed by two 
easements of record described at trial as the upper or n0l1herly easement and the lower or 
southerly easement. The upper or northerly easement was also referred to at trial as the "disputed 
private driveway. The upper or northerly easement extends from Chandler Lane/Sanders Road 
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across the BELSTLERS' property to the CONINES' property. This nOliherly easement is set 
forth in that certain document recorded as Instrument No. 1119009, the Deed from Sanders to 
Henry and Henry to Merwin (Exhibit 15). This easement is an access described in Plaintiff s 
Exhibit "15" and Defendants' Exhibit "A". This easement for access by CONINES across the 
BELSTLERS' property traverses some distance on the north side of the BELSTLERS' 
residence. It continues across the BELSTLERS' property to a gate at the approximate property 
line of the BELSTLERS' property and the CONINES' property. It continues at the 
approximately same elevation, to a building that existed upon the CONINES' property at the 
time of purchase, and a building that was later constructed by the CONINES on the premises. 
The second easement was referred to as the lower road and is also described in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
"15" Defendants' Exhibit "A". This lower or southerly easement exists across what is now the 
Worley Fire District property past the "fire station" and then across the BELSTLERS' property 
to serve the lower portion of the CONINES' property. 
While the upper and lower portion of the CONINES' property is fairly level there is a 
mid portion of the CONINES property which is quite steep making road access between the 
upper and lower portions practically impossible. 
The extension of Chandler Lane/ Sanders Road at the West edge of the BELSTLERS' 
propeliy is a steep upward incline, and dead-ends at the Black Rock Golf Course property. The 
elevation of Chandler Lane/Sanders Road is significantly above the structures located upon the 
CONINES' property. 
For all of the ten years the CONINES owned their property they traversed the "disputed 
private driveway." They did so with intent, knowledge and belief that it was their rightful access 
under the express easement. Therefore they used the disputed private drive under a claim of 
rights. Their use was open and obvious. The private road had been in existence since sometime 
during the period 1983 to 1986 and its use by predecessors to the CONINES had been 
acquiesced in by Henry, who is the predecessor to the BELSTLERS. Henry had knowledge of 
the use of the private road. He signed documents intended to provide easement access to the 
CONINES property when he purchased from Sanders. He confirmed in his deposition the 
location of the easement access as the disputed private driveway as being the easement described 
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in the documents. The existence of the roadway was plainly visible upon the ground after its 
initial construction. Both Henry and BELSTLERS had knowledge of the use of the roadway by 
the CONINES. Henry acknowledged it. Moreover, Henry and BELSTLERS would have to have 
known of the use by CONINES because of the proximity of the house to the disputed private 
driveway. The use simply could not go unnoticed. 
During the summer of 2006, the BELSTLERS requested that the CONINES cease using 
the lower road and the upper private drive. The CONINES ceased using the lower road due to it 
being cabled and locked by the BELSTLERS, but refused to cease using the private drive. 
Discussions to resolve the dispute were had between the pmiies, but resolution was not reached 
and litigation ensued. 
A. Express Easements 
The BELSTLERS have asked for judicial determination of the meaning of Plaintiffs' 
.. 
Exhibit 14, the sale agreement between V. A. Sanders and Geraldine Sanders as sellers and 
Kenneth Henry as buyer. The sale agreement is a title retaining contract executed at a time when 
a Warranty Deed was also executed (and subsequently recorded - see Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16). 
CONINES in their counterclaim argue that there are two express easements on their 
property consisting of the southerly easement and a northerly easement. The BELSTLERS 
contend that the CONINES do not have these easement rights. The CONINES contend that their 
easements emanate from The Sale Agreement (Exhibit 14), the Mutual Agreement and Easement 
for Ingress and Egress (Exhibit 15) and the Warranty Deed (Exhibit 16). They further contend 
that Exhibit 0 together with other testimonial evidence shows an intent showing that the intent of 
the parties to the Mutual Agreement and Easement for Ingress and Egress (Exhibit 15) and that 
that intent was to create an easement benefiting what is now the CONINES' property. 
The evidence at trial clearly demonstrates that the easement in question granted on the 
northerly portion of the then Henry property (now the BELSTLERS' property) was for the 
private drive. It is shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23. Also Henry, at his deposition, marked on 
Exhibit 3 the northerly easement with an "X" to show the private drive. 
In the last paragraph of the Mutual Agreement and Easement for Ingress and Egress 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15) Henry, the predecessor in interest of the BELSTLERS, specifically 
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granted easement rights. It is specifically stated that "Kenneth L. Henry grants an easement 
continuing the existing road in the southerly p011ion of the property that he is purchasing from V. 
A. Sanders and Geraldine C. Sanders and the Northerly part of the property he is purchasing 
fi'om V A. Sanders and Geraldine C. Sanders to Linda Merwin who owns the property in the 
Northeast Quarter of Section 17, Township 48 North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai 
County, Idaho. Those easements are referenced as "a continuation of the existing logging road 
running parallel to Rockford Bay on the south and the existing road from the community road on 
the n011h". That reference is to the private drive across the northern portion of the BELSTLERS' 
property that was intended, and does, provide access to the CONINES' property. The grant of 
that easement by Henry was for the benefit of Merwin. 
The sale agreement, the walTanty deed, and the express easements created in Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15, and the deed from Sanders to Henry and Henry to Merwin creating the easements 
form the basis for the express easement benefiting the CONINES. Linda Merwin was a 
beneficiary under the arrangements. The express easements therefore benefitted Merwin. The 
CONINES are a successor in interest to Linda Merwin and have easement rights of ingress and 
egress over the disputed private driveway and the lower road across the southerly easement. 
The BELSTLERS contend the sale agreement between Sanders and Henry is merged in 
the deed from Sanders to Henry and the easement agreement is an antecedent document with no 
effect which benefits the CONINES. The court disagrees. The Supreme Court in Jolley vs. Idaho 
Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373,414 P 2d 879 (1966) determined that an express easement is not 
merged in a Deed. The holding in Jolley is contrary to the argument of the Plaintiffs that the 
easements created in Exhibit 15 merged with the Warranty Deed. 
In Jolley the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "the acceptance of a deed to premises generally 
is considered as a merger of the agreements of an antecedent contract into the terms of the deed, 
and any claim for relief must be based on the covenants or agreements contained in the deed, not 
the covenants or agreements as contained in the prior agreement. There is a generally recognized 
exception to the foregoing rule which exception relates to collateral stipUlations of the contract, 
which are not incorporated in the deed." Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 382, 414 
P.2d 879, 884 (1966). The Court went on to explain, "[t]he authorities may perhaps be 
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reconciled by a determination of what are 'collateral stipulations'. If the stipulation has reference 
to title, possession, quantity, or emblements of the land, it is generally, but not always, held to 
inhere in the very subject-matter with which the deed deals, and is merged therein.' Id at 383 
and 414 P.2d 879 at 885. In the present case Exhibit 15 was a collateral stipulation of the 
contract and is not merged with the deed. 
The BELSTLERS have requested judicial interpretation of Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 and 19 
(the Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement entered into between Kluss and Henry as modified 
by Henry and re-recorded). Those documents provide for joint use and maintenance for a 
roadway, which has been identified in yellow marking on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. The testimony 
during the course of the trial indicated that both parties and their successors in interest have 
contributed to the maintenance of portions of the yellow marked roadway on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
1. The Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement does not modify, supersede or extinguish the terms 
and conditions set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15. Exhibit 15 created the easements for the benefit 
of Henry from Sanders, and from Henry to Merwin. The beneficial use of the easement inuring 
to Linda Merwin and her successors is not altered in any way. This applies to both the northerly 
easement over the disputed private driveway and also the southern or lower roadway easement. 
The BELSTLERS argue that Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 is not effective as providing an 
easement benefiting what is now the CONINES' property, formerly the Merwin property, 
because the document was not delivered. The Supreme Court of Idaho in the case of Barmore 
liS. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 179 P.3d 303 (2008) noted the controlling element in the question of 
delivery is the intention of the parties. The rule is that delivery is complete when there is an 
intention manifest on the part of the Grantor to make the instrument his deed. The document 
creating the easement from Sanders to Hemy and the easements from Henry to Merwin 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15) was indeed delivered and recorded. Both Sanders and Henry fully 
intended the result of the documentation of the transaction between them. There is no tenable 
claim that there was no delivery. 
The BELSTLERS also argue that any express easement created under Instrument No. 
1119009 (Exhibit 15) is ineffective because Merwin, the Grantee of the Easement was not a 
party to the contract. The BELSTLERS contend that Merwin was a stranger to the transaction 
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between Hemy and Sanders which gave rise to Instrument No. 1119009. The benefit to Merwin 
intended by Sanders and Hemy was an integral part of their agreement. She is mentioned by 
name in the agreement. Merwin was therefore much more than an incidental beneficiary of the 
Agreement. She obtained legal access over the easement, specifically the use of the "private 
drive." BELSTLERS argue that there is no effect whatsoever of Exhibit "0,,3 in explaining 
Exhibit 15. 
The Court finds that Exhibit "0" verifies that there was a dispute between Sanders and 
Merwin arising from the fact that Sanders had placed a road (the upper extension of 
Sanders/Chandler Lane, i.e. the private road) upon the property of Merwin without authority. In 
order to effectuate a resolution of the road placement Sanders and Merwin agreed that Sanders 
would correct the problem, as shown by Exhibit "0". They accomplished the same at the time of 
the sale to Hemy by the requirement that Henry convey an easement to Merwin (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15). 
The court concludes Exhibit "0" provides meaning to, explanation of, and the intent of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15. Exhibit 15 created an easement favoring Merwin. Merwin, Sanders and 
Henry were fully aware of its intention, and the need to continue the use of the private driveway 
during Merwin's ownership. Specifically, they were all aware of the existence of the driveway 
access across the Hemy property to the Merwin property. Both the upper or northerly easement 
as well as the lower or southerly easement was granted with intent to serve the Merwin propeliy 
now owned by the CONINES. 
In Parlout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 183 P.3d 771 (2008), the Court provided: 
"The test for determining a party's status as a third-party beneficiary ... is 
whether the agreement reflects an intent to benefit the third party." Idaho 
Power Co. v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110,112,90 P.3d 335, 337 (2004). The 
third party must show the contract was made primarily for his benefit; it is 
not sufficient that the third party is a mere incidental beneficiary to the 
contract. Id. (quoting Adkison Corp. v. Am. Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 409, 
690 P.2d_341, 344 (1984)); Fenwick v. Idaho Dep'! of Lands, 144 Idaho 
318,323, 160 P.3d 757, 762 (2007) (quoting Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 
331,337,372 P.2d 414, 418 (1962) (quoting Sachs v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. 
3 The Court notes that the parties stipulated to the admission of Exhibit "0" and stipulated that the cOUl1 consider 
that document, so as to interpret the meaning of Exhibit 15. The practical effect and meaning of the exhibit was left 
to the sound discretion of the trier of fact by stipulation of the parties. 
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Co., 148 F.2d 128,131 (7th Cir.1945))). The intent to benefit the third 
party must be expressed in the contract itself. Idaho Power Co., 140 Idaho 
at 112,90 P.3d at 337 (quoting Adkison COlp., 107 Idaho at 409, 690 P.2d 
at 344;) Fenwick, 144 Idaho at 323,160 P.3d at 762 (quoting Adkison 
Corp., 107 Idaho at 409,690 P.2d at 344). 
The COUli observes that Merwin is not a party to this litigation and is not seeking to 
enforce Exhibit 15. As such, it may not be pertinent to determine whether she was a party who 
could asseli rights under Exhibit 15; however, she would have standing to assert rights under 
Exhibit 15 should it have ever become necessary. The granting of the easements was certainly of 
pecuniary benefit to Merwin and Exhibit 15 clearly shows the intent and motivation of Sanders 
and Henry that part of their agreement was to confer the easement benefits on Merwin. She was 
no incidental beneficiary; she was an intended beneficiary. She was specifically named as the 
beneficiary of the specifically described easements at issue in this case. 
In Crensha'w v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470,199 P.2d 264 (1948) the court held that "before 
a deed can operate as a valid transfer of title, there must be a delivery of the instrument, and it 
must be effected during the life of the grantor." 
However, in Hinckley Estate Co., v. Gurry, 53 Idaho 551, 26 P.2d 121 (1933) the court 
stated "proof of the recording of a deed by the grantor, without other circumstances, is not 
sufficient to bind the grantee or establish delivery or the grantee's acceptance thereof. [T]he 
grantee's acceptance of such a deed need not be by formal or express words to that effect, but 
may be shown by acts, conduct, or words of the parties showing an intention to accept. Thus, 
there may be an acceptance by an asseliion of title in him, by his conveyance of the property or 
by acts of ownership generally in respect to the property" (emphasis added). 
Therefore, the fact that Merwin is not a signer to Exhibit 15 will not preclude the 
CONINES from being a successor to the easement rights of Merwin. The Court, guided by the 
above cited case law, finds that Merwin was a third party beneficiary of that transaction and 
accepted the easements by her acts described in Exhibit O. 
The BELSTLERS also argue that although the Worley Fire District Deed was recorded 
after the recordation of the Sanders-Henry Sale Agreement (Exhibit 14) and the Mutual 
Agreement for Easement for Ingress and Egress (Exhibit 15), it was valid as between those 
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parties thereto and those who had notice thereof, pursuant to I.C. § 55-815. Therefore, 
BELSTLERS conclude that Sanders had no legal power to convey the same propeliy twice, 
because he had notice of the conveyance to Worley Fire District. 
CONINES argue that the entry into a title retaining executory contract provides some 
rights of ownership to the purchaser, which rights are ultimately vested in full upon conveyance 
of the Deed. Therefore, CONINES argue it was clear that Sanders requested Henry, and Henry 
acquiesced, to provide Merwin an easement across the Henry propeliy. 
I.e. § 55-815 provides: 
An unrecorded instrument is valid as between the parties thereto 
and those who have notice thereof. 
However, Idaho follows tlle race notice rule, or first in time, first in right. Under Idaho's 
established recording statutes that recording provides constructive notice of the contents of the 
recorded document to any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee from the time it is filed. Kalange 
v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192,30 P.3d 970 (2001). 
The effect of recording an instrument is provided in I.e. 55-811 wherein it states: 
Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and 
certified, and recorded as prescribed by law, from the time it is 
filed with the recorder for record, is constructive notice of the 
contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortgage e )es. 
Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and 
certified, and recorded as prescribed by law, and which is executed 
by one who thereafter acquires an interest in said real propeliy by a 
conveyance which is constructive notice as aforesaid, is, from the 
time such latter conveyance is filed with the recorder for record, 
constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent 
purchasers and mortgagees. 
Further, I.e. § 55-813 states: 
The term "conveyance" as used in this chapter, embraces every 
instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in real 
property is created, alienated, mortgaged or encumbered, or by 
which the title to any real property may be affected, except wills. 
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As such, a conveyance under this statute includes every instrument by which any interest 
in real property is created or encumbered or by which title to any property may be affected. 
Therefore, under the Idaho Code recording statute, an easement which is properly recorded is an 
instrument which falls within the province of the recording statute and the priority created 
therein. The Sanders-Henry Sale Agreement and the Mutual Agreement for Easement for 
Ingress and Egress were recorded before the Worley Fire District Warranty Deed and they have 
priority. Additionally, I.C. § 55-815 would not apply because that statute applies to 
"umecorded" instruments and these instruments were recorded. This COUli finds that Sanders 
had the power to grant an easement to Henry on June 8, 1988. 
The two roadway accesses in dispute in this case are express easements in favor of the 
CaNINES. To the extent, if any, that grant of easements in Exhibit 15 is ambiguous; the purpose 
of the express easements has been thoroughly explained by the evidence. The CaNINES are 
entitled to judgment declaring their easement rights and the BELSTLERS' claims of quiet title to 
those easement claims shall be denied. 
B. Prescriptive Easement 
The CONINES seek judgment against the BELSTLERS on the alternative ground of 
prescriptive easement rights. The evidence shows that the private drive has been in existence 
since approximately 1985 or 1986 and perhaps as early as 1983. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho in Checketts vs. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 
152 P.2d 585,591 (1944), noted: 
"One who purchases land expressly subject to an easement or with notice, actual 
or constructive, that it is burdened with an existing easement takes the land 
subject to the easement." 
In this particular matter there was no question that the roadway access across the 
BELSTLERS' property to what is now the CONINES' propeliy existed. It is, and was, plainly 
visible upon the ground as an obvious roadway access or driveway. The BELSTLERS have had 
knowledge of the existence of the "private drive." Henry had that same knowledge from when 
BELSTLERS first acquired the propeliy from him. The CONINES contend that both easements 
were not only of record as express easements, but must also be recognized by the court as 
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benefiting the CONINES as prescriptive easements. The comi agrees. 
An easement can also be obtained by prescription. A district court's determination that a 
claimant has or has not established a prescriptive easement involves entwined questions of law 
and fact. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223 (2006). A prescriptive easement is 
established if the dominant landowner can show by clear and convincing proof that there has 
been an open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse use under a claim of right with the 
actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient estate for the statutory period of five 
years. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 210 P.3d 75 (2009). 
If a party can show proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
property during the prescriptive period, but fail to prove how that use commenced, then the 
presumption is that the use is adverse and under a claim of right. The burden then shifts to the 
servient owner to show that the use was permissive. The one exception to the rule of prescriptive 
easements is where the use occurs on wild, unenclosed or unimproved land. In such an event, to 
protect the rights of the servient owner and avoid inequitable results, the presumption is that the 
use is permissive. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 76 P.3d 969 (2003). That exception is not 
applicable here as these lands are not wild, unenclosed or unimproved. 
The CONINES have proved that they have used the disputed private drive where they 
claim a northerly easement by use that has been open, continuous and notorious for the period of 
their ownership of approximately ten (10) years. Their use was under a claim of right. The 
CONINES have proved entitlement to the prescriptive easement by clear and convincing 
evidence.4 This COl:1rt finds that the CONINES' rights accrued prior to the Legislature changing 
the law regarding the time period for prescriptive easen~ent. 5 
The CONINES have proved entitlement to a prescriptive easement as to the disputed 
private driveway across the northerly portion of the BELSTLERS' property. They have proved 
by clear and convincing evidence that their use has been open, notorious, continuous, and 
uninterrupted use of the property during the prescriptive period of five years. They have the 
4 The Legislature modified the prescriptive claim statute, I.C § 5-203, from the previously existing five (5) year 
requirement to a twenty (20) year requirement in 2006. 
5 Further, the changes to Idaho Code Sections 5-204, 206, 207, 210, 211 as well as 213 were made after CONINES' 
rights were vested, five (5) years subsequent to their purchase, under the then existing statute. More particularly, 
those rights became vested in 2004, prior to the filing of the instant action. 
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benefit of the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Moreover they 
have proved the claim of right through the existence of the express easement document Exhibit 
15 and by being in the line of succession from Linda Merwin. 
This Court finds that the use by the CONINES of the disputed private driveway across 
the northerly part of the BELSTLER property during the time Henry owned it was not 
permissive as the CONINES used it under a claim of right emanating from the easement granting 
agreement (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15). The fact that Henry may have acquiesced in the use by the 
CONINES is not permission because he knew the CONINES, as successors to Merwin, had a 
right to use both the upper and lower roadways under the express easement he had granted to 
Merwin. The use by the CONINES of the disputed private driveway easement was continuous. 
The CONINES purchased the property from Solomon on June 25, 1998. The CONINES 
visited the property generally every weekend in summer and less when Snoqualmie Pass 
presented snowy driving conditions. In winter, the CONINES generally visited their property 
two weekends per month. Solomon did not use the property at all. The CONINES have not 
established any open and notorious use of the lower easement during the period of their 
ownership, from 1998 to when this lawsuit commenced. The evidence does not establish use of 
the lower roadway by predecessors to the CONINES which could be described as continuous. 
So, there is no evidence to support a claim of tacking. The CONINES are entitled to a ruling in 
their favor on the issue of prescriptive easement over the northerly roadway access described at 
trial as the disputed private drive. There is no showing of open and notorious use of the lower 
easement on BELSTLERS' property. 
The scope of a prescriptive easement is fixed by the use made during the prescriptive 
period. Becksteadv. Price, 146 Idaho 47,190 P.3d 876 (2008)(rehearing denied). The scope of 
the CONINES' use based their claim of prescriptive rights over the private dri veway is ingress 
and egress for motor vehicle and pedestrian travel for residential and recreational purposes. The 
width, length and location of the easement has been proven as shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23. 
The CONINES are denied any claim to an easement by prescription as to the southerly 
easement claim across the lower road. The CONINES are entitled to judgment of prescriptive 
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easement rights, as an alternative to their express easements claim recognized herein across the 
private driveway on the northerly portion of the BELSTLERS' prope11y. 
C. Easement Relocation Pursuant to I.e. § 55-313 
The BELSTLERS, in their brief, contend that they do not seek to have the location of the 
northerly easement changed and argue that the CONINES cannot seek a ruling by the cOUl1 as to 
the applicability ofIdaho Code § 55-313. Neither evidence nor argument was provided as 
regards to relocation of the southerly easement. The BELSTLERS base their argument on their 
claim that they do not believe any easements exist to change. The parties did extensively litigate 
the relocation issue at trial and the pleadings are deemed amended to include a claim for 
relocation of the n0l1herly easement. Throughout the trial the parties took the position that if the 
court should determine that the easements claimed by the CONINES are valid easements, the 
Court should then determine whether or not the BELSTLERS could, pursuant to I.e. § 55-313 
change the location of the northerly easement. Therefore, that issue is ripe for determination at 
this time by this Court. 
Idaho Code § 55-313 allows for a subservient estate to change the location of an 
easement that benefits the dominant estate. However, that statute requires that there be no injury, 
or more particularly that such change be made in a manner as to not obstruct motor vehicle 
traffic or otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such access. Further, the 
subservient estate must pay the cost of such a move. 
The court concludes from the persuasive testimony of Scott Rasor, as illustrated by 
Exhibit T, that there would be injury to the CONINES in the form of unreasonably steep road 
grades which would create inconvenience and undue risk of harm to person and property due to 
steep road grades required by the existing topography. Winter weather, when snow fall and ice 
are evident, would further aggravate motor vehicle and pedestrian travel on such a steep 
roadway. The road grade slopes not only exceed any of the slopes upon the existing approach on 
the road from Rockford Bay but are so steep as to constitute injury within the meaning of Idaho 
Code § 55-313. 
The proposed relocation of the northerly easement is not a reasonable alternative shown 
by the evidence due to the topography of the real property owned by both the BELSTLERS and 
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the CONINES. Therefore, the CONINES are entitled to judgment against BELSTLERS for 
injunctive relief that they may not move the road to the location shown on Exhibit T. 
III. ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the northerly ("private drive") and southerly easements 
granted to Merwin in Instrument No. 1119009 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15) and further referenced on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, are express easements specifically created for the benefit of the CONINES' 
property and impose an encumbrance upon the BELSTLERS' property. The judgment shall 
include the legal descriptions for the easements and shall be based as shown on Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 23. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment shall reflect that the 
CaNINES have established a prescriptive easement upon the northerly easement, but have not 
established a prescriptive easement as to the southerly easement. The judgment shall specify the 
nature, length, width and location of the northerly easement over the private drive. It shall also 
specify the legal description for the claimed southerly prescriptive easement which has not been 
proven. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment shall reflect that the quiet title 
claims of BELSTLERS are dismissed and the CONINES claim for a southerly easement by 
prescription are dismissed. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment shall deny to the BELSTLERS 
any right to change the location of northerly easement to the locations referred to on Exhibit T. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that considering all claims and defenses 
presented that the CaNINES are entitled to their costs but not attorney fees as this action was not 
frivolously or unreasonably pursued nor defended by the BELSTLERS. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the CONINES prepare ajudgment 
consistent with this Memorandum Decision and present the same to Judge Lansing Haynes as 
James R. Michaud's service to the State ofldaho as a senior district judge is concluded upon the 
issuance of this memorandum decision. 
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Dated this 3Gday ofDecem:ber, 2009. 
Senior District Judge 
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs and Counter Defendants, CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
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BELSTLER, pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rules 52(b) and 7(b), by and through their attorney of record, 
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Arthur B. Ma.comoor, and provide their brief in support of their Motion for Reconsideration and 
Amendment of Memo Tan dum Decision. filed with this Court on January 6, 2010. 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 23, 2009, this Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order for 
Judgment. On Decem.ber 30, 2009, this Court issued its Order to Withdraw and Substitute 
Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment ("S.M.D."), in order to correct minor errors and 
omissions. In this Brief~ Plaintiffs provide legal and factual support of their arguments that this 
Court should reassess facts found and law relied upon in that decision, and request a different 
decision be .made based on said fa.cts and law. 
ARGUMENT 
Un.der Idaho Code of Civil Procedure 7(b). "Any brief submitted in support of a m.otion 
shall be filed with the court and served so that it is recei.ved by the parties at least fourteen (14) 
days prior to the hearing." The hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and 
Amendment of Memorandum Decision is to be March 16,2010, thus, Plainti.ffs' brief in support 
of this Motion is h.erein timely filed on or beforc March 2, 2010. 
A. Easements in Instrument No.1] 19009 Cannot Exist as a Miltter of Law. 
Plaintiffs argue that this Court erroneously ci.ted Defendants' Post Trial Memorandum for 
the legal proposition that the Supreme Court in Jolley v. Idaho Securities, In.c., 90 Idaho 373 
(1. 966), "determined tbat an express easement is not merged in a Deed." Con.sequently, this 
Court's conclusion that "[t]he holding in ./olley 1S contrary to the argument of the Plaintiffs that 
tbe easements created in Exhibit 15 merged with the Warranty Deed" was incorrect. The Jolley 
case docs n.ot address easements and the term "easement" does not appear anywbere in the .Jolley 
opinion. On page 6 and 7 of this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment 
("Decision"), this Court properly clted the Jolley opinion for the rule on doctrine of merger and 
2fl " . v I 
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the recognized exception that collateral stipulations of a contract are not incorporated in the 
deed. (citing .lolley, 90 Idaho at 382 and 414.) Thi.s Court further cited .Io11ey to explai.n that'~ 
[i]fthc [collateral) stipulation has reference to title, possession. quantity, or emhJem.ents of the 
land, it is generally, but not always, held to .inhere in the very subject-matter with which the deed 
deals, and is merged therein." (Id. at 383) On page 7 of its Decision, this Court simply 
concluded witbout any explanation that "[1]0 the present case Exhibit 15 was a collateral 
stipulati.on of contract and is not merged with the deed.?~ 
this Court's conclusion that Exhibit 15 was a collateral stipulation and therefore did not 
merge with the deed was clearly erron.eous. As discussed on page 42 of Plaintiffs' Post Tda! 
Legal Arguments, "the nature of appurtenant easements is an interest in land, with 'reference to 
title, possession, quantity, and emblements ofJand .... (Jolley, 90 Idaho at 383; citing Annot: 84 
A.L.R. 1008; 38 A.L.R.2d 1310; 8A Thompson. on. Real Property (1963 Replacement) 331 § 
4458; 55 Am.Jur. 937, Vendor and Purchaser § 543; 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 91 c, p. 842.) In Jolley, 
the Idaho Suprem.e Court found that an. abstract of title "does not relate to th.c title, possession., 
quantity, or in moments of1and." (citing Christiansen v. Intermountain Association afCredit 
.Men., 46 Idaho 394 (1928).) Clearly, there i.s a marked difference between an easement and an 
abstract of title. An. abstract of title could reasonably be construed under Idaho Law as a 
collateral stipulation, but it would be wboUy unreasonable to extend this reasoning to an. 
appurtenant easement that affects title evidenced by a deed. Plaintiffs noted on page 42 of their 
Post Trial Legal Arguments that in Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 772 (2005)~ the Idaho 
Supreme Court fOl.md merger of the real estate purchase agreement's (REPSA) inclusion of 
''timber rights on. said easement." The Court stated: 
"[bJoth the REPSA and the deed discuss 1h.e timber on tbe Sens' property. Applying the 
rule of law from .Jolley, the distr.ict court determined that the tenns of the REPSA merged 
2Cl2 
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into th.e deed conveying th.e property to Robinson. The district court's determination. is 
correct because the tenns oftbe REPSA Robinson seeks to enforce 'inh.ere i.n the very 
subject-matter with which the deed deals' ... [t]he timber language in. the REPSA does 
not constitute a collateral agreement relating to timber rights, independent ofthe terms of 
the deed. Therefore, the tenns of the REPSA merged into the deed ... " 
On page 8 of their Post Trial Memorandum, Defendants mi.stated the Court's findings in 
Jolley by asserting that the Supreme Court [in JolleyJ "detennined that an express easement is 
not merged in. a Deed." Plaintiffs argue that thi.s Court made its consequent decision as to 
whether PJaintiffs' Exhibit 1 S merged with the deed based upon Defendants' faulty premise. 
Therefore~ Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reconsider Plaintiffs' argument that 
Exhibit 15 was not a collateral stipulation, Idaho's doctrine of merger applies, and therefore 
Exhibit 15 merged with the deed. Not being m.entioned or otherwise given a Jegal description in. 
the deed, the easements at issue cannot exist due to th.e merger thereof of the alleged contractual 
conditions. 
B. The Court Erred When it Used a Five-year Time Period Instead of a Twenty-year 
Adverse Possession Time Period. 
Plaintiffs further argue that this Court's application of a five-year statutory period for 
prescriptive easements versus the current twenty-year statutory period was clearly erroneous. On 
page 12 of its Decision, this Court cited Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390 (2009) for the rule 
on prescri.ptive easements, that they ate su.bject to a statutory period of five years. As Plaintiffs 
discussed OD pages SO - 52 of their Post~ Trial Legal Arguments, in 2006 the Idaho legislature 
altered the prescriptive period from five to twenty years. (S.L. 2006, ch. 158, § 1, eff. Jul. 1, 
2006.) Since Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on April 9, 2007 to recover their real property, and 
Defendants Conine fiJed their counterclaim for the prescriptive easement claim. on August 8, 
2007, the entire lawsuit should be governed by the new twenty-year prescriptive period. To 
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Plaintiffs' knowledge, the Backman case is the on.ly case to bave reached the Idaho State 
Supreme Court's final judgment since the statutory change in. 2006. (J.C. § 5-203, 2009 pocket 
part) However, Backman was filed on FebruaIy 24.2006 as Bonner County Case Number CV-
2006-0000365. Therefore, Backman's five-year prescriptive period cannot be detenn.inative 
because the adverse possession statute at Idaho Code Section 5-203 states, in part, "No action ... 
can be m.aintained ... unless ... [it was] seized ... within twenty years before the commencement 
of the action ... " Plaintiffs have found no subsequent Idaho case available to provide guidance. 
However, it is clear to plaintiffs that jf Conin.es could exercise a vested right in a five-year period 
they accrued prior to the statutory change, and could bring that claim after July 1,2006, such a 
claim would essentially eviscerate the Legislature's intent, which was to quadnlple the statutory 
time period for claims made after July 1, 2006. 
Conines brought their counterclaim in August of 2007, whic.h is over one year from the 
statutory change date of July 1,2006. In order to give effect to the legislative intent and uphold 
the law in effect as of August 8,2007, this Court should recognize the legisJati.ve intent~ and 
require that Conines must have been "seized or possessed of the property in question within 
twenty (20) yesrs before the commencement of the action," which would require them to prove 
the elements of prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence since August 8, 1987, 
twenty years from the filing of their counterclaim. PJaintifTs argue that on the evidence 
presented, Defendants' prescriptive easement cJ:um must faU. 
C. Plaintiffs Argue That Tbis Court's Application ofIdaho's Recording Statutes, I.e. § 55-
815, § 55-811, and § 55-813, was Clearly Erron.eous Under the Facts of This Case. 
As Plaintiffs noted in. their Post-Tria) Legal Argum.ents, Sanders lacked power to grant 
\ o..8b L.I.\. 
He.nry an. easement on June 6, 1988. (pI. Post-Tr.ial. Br., p. 23), because on June 3, 1-99&, Sanders 
('HI iJ f . . _' .. 
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conveyed the fLTC station parcel to the Worley Fire District ("WFD"), and thus did not own the 
real property upon. which Defendants claim an easement was granted from Sanders to Henry. 
(Id) The Sales Agreement was dated June 1, 1988, but was not signed until June 6, 1988; the 
Worley Fire District deed was signed on June 3, 1988. When the parties signed their Sales 
Agreement, the Sanders had no ownership in the Worley Fire District parcel. The Sanders-
Henry grant therefore fails for lack of consideration due to the prior sale to Worley Fire District 
which invalidates the Sanders-Henry grant in Instrument Number 1119009. (pls. Ex. 15.) 
As between the Sanders and tbe Worley Fire District, the signed but then five days later 
recorded warranty deed was "valid as between. [those] parties thereto and those who [had] notice 
thereof." (I.C. § 55-815.) Sanders had n.o legal power to convey the same property twice. 
Sanders certainly had notice of the co:r.1.Veyance to WFD. Therefore, the Sanders-Henry easement 
grant must fail due to Sanders' wrongful and knowing attempt to convey interests in that 
property twice. This Court's app1ication of the recording statutes appears to be convoluted. This 
Court acknowledged the substance of I.e. § 55-815, then stated that LC.§ 55-811 overrides I.C. 
§ 55-815, and concluded on page 11 of its Decision with the statem.ent "I.C. § 55-815 would not 
apply because that statute applies to 'unrecorded' inS1.TUments and these instruments were 
recorded.·· Plaintiffs argue, first, that 1.C. § 55-81.5 does apply in the instant case because 
Sanders was one of the "parties thereto" and had "notice" of his grant to the Worley Fire 
Department. Second, Sanders' transfer of the easement grant to Henry fails for Jack of 
consideration. - Sanders did not own. the property he was attempting to transfer. (PIs. Ex. 15.) It 
would be illogical to conclude tbat the Jater recording wouJd obliterate the substance of I.C. § 55-
815. Sander's action was at best a misrepresentation and could likely be construed as a 
fraudulent conveyance to be voided by this Court. 
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D. Plaintiffs Argue That Thi.s Court Clearly Erred in its Discussion of the Elements of a 
Prescriptive Easement on Page 4 of its Decision. 
This Court stated that "they used the disputed private drive under a claim. of rights. Their 
use was open and obvious. The pri.vate road had been. in existence since sometime during the 
period of 1983 to 1986 ... " Th.e mere existence of a road is irrelevant to the elements of 
prescriptive casement. As Plaintiffs stated on page 50 of their Post Trial Legal Arguments, "In 
order for a claimant to establish that he has acquired a private prescriptive easement by adverse 
use, he must submit reasonably clear and convincing proof of opel!, n.otorious, continuous, 
uninterrupted use, under a claim. of right, with the knowledge of the owner of the servient 
tenement, fOT the prescriptive period. (West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557 (1973).) Under Idaho 
Law, when the road was constructed has no bearing on whether a prescri,ptive easement has been 
obtained. Plaintiffs argue that this Court's reference to the 1983 to 1986 period was c1eady 
erroneous and that this Court should find that there was no prescriptive easem.ent as discussed 
herein and as discussed in detail on pages 50 - 59 of Plaintiffs' Post Trial Lega1 Arguments. 
E. Thi.s Court's Characterization of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 as "a serial grant of easement. first 
from Sanders to Henry, and second from Henry to Merwin" on Page 3 of its Decision 
was CJearly Erroneous. 
In. its Decision, this Court apparently cut and pasted Defendants' arguments from page 3 
of their Post Trial Memorandum, with the exception of referring to the easement as a. "serial" 
versus a "dual" grant of easement. As argued in the preceding paragraph above and on page 3 of 
Plaintiff.c;' Reply to Post-Trial Memorandum, there was never a valid. grant fTo.m. Sanders to 
Henry in Plaintiffs' Exhibit l5 because Sanders did not possess the land upon which he 
pu:rportcd to grant an easement. Similarly, the purported grant of easem.ent from Henry to 
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Merwin should be held i.nvalid. As Plaintiffs stated )n their Post-Trial Legal Arguments, Henry 
had neither title nor possession oftbe subject property when. he signed tbe Mutual Agreement for 
Easement for Ingress and Egress on June 7, 1988. Therefore, Henry did not have any legal 
power to grant an easement appurtenant to Merwin. (Pt Post-Trial Br., p. 26). 
F. Plaintiffs Argue That the Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement Controls Over Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15. 
Plaintiffs argue that this Court's conclusion, fouod on page 7 of its decision, that "[t]he 
Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement does not modify, supersede or extinguish the terms and 
conditions set fortb. in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15" was clearly erron.eous. This Court did not provide 
any explanation as to bow it reached thjs conclusion, and Plaintiffs argue that this statement 
contTadicts the plain language found in the Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement (PIs. Exs. 18, 
19.) As Plaintiffs mscussed on page 48 of their Post-Trial Legal Arguments, the Joint Use and 
Maintenance Agreement states in pertinent part that "[t]he parties hereto agree to use said 
roadway for nonna! ingress and egress ... " and that "[t]his agreement shall be binding on the 
beirs, successors, and assigns of the parties hereto." Cleady, the Joint Use and Maintenance 
Agreement appJ.ies to the Conines and clearly the Joint Use and Maintenan.ce Agreement did 
ther.efore "modify, supersede or extinguish the terms and conditions set forth in. Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15." 
G. This Courts' Failure to Address Trial Arguments and Evidence Related to the Tenn 
"community road~' as Found in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 was Clearly Erroneous. 
On page 4 of its Decision, this Court asserted that the nortberly easement extended from. 
Chandler Lane/Sanders Road across the Besl.sters' property to the Conines property. Thjs Court 
adopted Defendants' position that the northerly easement is simply found in Instrument No. 
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1119009 while ignoring the language in this In.strument that states "[ s laid easements are the 
continuation of the existing logging road running paranel to Rockford Bay Road on the South 
and the existing roadfrom the community road on the North." (Italics added.) Plaintiffs 
discussed jn detail the probable meaning of "community road" on pages 20 - 22 of their Post~ 
Tri.al Legal Arguments. As Plaintiff..co noted therein, it would only make sense that the mcanin.g 
of the words "community road (TOm the north" is the extension of the road from what is now 
Black Rock coming down from the northeast of the Conine property and through it heading west 
toward Belstler's. This accords with evidence from defendants' Exhibit 0, wherein. Merwin 
granted an easement to Sanders "on the northwest com.er of the property ov.med by [Merwin J •.. 
to provide Mr. Sanders with the authority to complete the present road and provide him access to 
his other property." Plaintiffs believe evidentiary ana1ysis of the easements at issue has been 
burden.ed with the limiting and mistaken assum.ption th.at such ana1ysis must begi1l at Rockford 
Bay Road and head up the hill. If this Court abandons that assumpti.on and adopts an olliective 
anaJysis, including analysis from the opposite direction, so its analysis flows east to west, ·a11 the 
evidence for interpreting the documents to find the correct easement paths lines up smoothly 
straight downhill from Black Rock to Rockford Bay Road. Therefore, Plaintiffs urge this Court 
to reexamine Plaintiffs ~ Exhibit 15 to carefully consider the meaning of "community road," 
because Plaintiffs believe that the specific verbiage found in Exhibit 15 whol1y alters the 
meaning of the words "northerlyeasement." 
H. Plaintiffs Argue that Defendants' Arguments Related to Idaho Code Section 55-313 are 
Imgfoper at this Stage of the Case and That This Argument ·Was Not PropedyAddressed, 
at or Before Trial. 
Plaintiffs disagree with this Court's statement on. page 2 of its Decision that "the parties 
'InA 
,., '-' ' 
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agreed that the court should adjudicate whether the Belstlers may move the easem.ent in 
accordance with 1. C. § 55-313 ... " Plaintiffs also argue that this Court has misconstrued events 
at trial and in the pleadings as evidenced by its discussion of I.e. § 55-313 on. page 14 of its 
Decision. Plaintiffs could only find reference to I.e. § 55-313 in Defendants' pretrial and post-
trial memoranda. Tn those documents, Defendants simply referred to the statute and concluded 
that it applied. Plaintiffs were not given opportunity to fuI1y address the legal implications of the 
statute, and, to the best ofP1aintiffs' recollection, the parties did not in fact "extensive)y litigate 
the relocati.on issue at trial" as was stated on page 14 of this COllrt's decision. The absence of 
any refe.ren.ce to I.C. § 55-313 in Plaintiffs' detailed Post-Tri.al Legal Argumeuts supports this 
contention, as well as the absence of applicable case law in any pleading or at trial. 
... J. Defendant.c; Cannot Claim an Express Easement Under Instrument Number 1119009 
Because it Was Not Delivered. 
Plaintiffs argue that this Court clearly erred in concluding on page 7 of its Decision that 
"[tJhere is no tenable claim that there was no delivery" of easement grant from Henry to Merwin .. 
In its explanation, this Court apparently cut and .pasted language from Defendants' Post Trial 
Memorandwn regarding the Supreme Court Case of Barmore v. Perrone, 179 P. 3d 303, 145· 
Idaho 340 (2008). As Plaintiffs asserted on page 6 of their RepJy to Defendanfs Post Trial 
Memorandum., to conclude that there was no delivery based on this rule statement alone would 
be clearly erroneous. Quoting from the same case, Plaintiffs a.rgued that in Idaho, "an argument 
that a deed lacked the intent necessary to be effective is identical to an argument that delivery 
never occurred." (Barmore v. Perrone, 2008-TD-R0219.005 at 3 (2008).) This results because 
"the real test of the delivery of a deed is this: Did the grantor by his acts or words, or both, intend 
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to divest himself of title? If so, the deed is deJjvered. ~'\ (Id.; citing Estate of Skvorak, 140 Idaho 
at 21 (2004).) Even though Plaintiffs do not dispute that Henry signed instrument number 
1119009, he believed tbat instrument number 1119009 was "some type offormality" and he 
lacked a clear understanding of why he signed it. (Henry Oepo. at p. 8, 11. 3-24). Without a clear 
uoderstandin.g of why he signed it, this Court should find that Henry lacks th.e requisite intent to 
have the easement grant operate in favor of Merwin, or Merwin's successors, the Canines. The 
Court should not 'overweight Defendants' counsel's five-page bullying that resulted in Henry's 
statement to the contrary. (Jd. at p. 14-15, 11. 24. 25, 1). The Conines do not enjoy an easement 
across the Belstlers' property as purportedly conveyed by instrument number II t 9009, because 
Henry did not deliver that instrument to Merwin, either physically or with intent for it to benefit 
ber. (PI. Post-Trial Br., p. 28). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' argue this Court erred in its interpretation of the law and the facts in its 
December 30, 2009 Mem.orandum Decision and order for. Judgment. Plaintiffs argue this Court 
should reconsider its entire Decision, focusing on the points discussed in this Brief. Plaintiffs 
urge this Court to reassess th.e facts and law it relied upon in that Decision, and to issue a 
different decision based on. said facts and Jaw in favor of findings that no easements exist, either 
expressly by grant or by prescription. 
Plaintiffs also request attorneys fees and costs be awarded to them. 
DATED this Z"J2 day of &tr:lt- 1 2010. 
~ 
ARTHURB.MACOMBER 
Attorney at Law 
1 Plaintiffi note that tbis quote from. Barmore also supports theiT contention in tbis Brief's Section C that Grantor 
Sanders fully intended to divest themselves of the Worley Fire Distria parcel, and that thus their alleged 
consideration in Plaintiffs' Exhibit J 5 faiJed. ?:n 
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COMES NOW, the Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs, KAREN SHELER CONINE and 
HOWARD CONINE, husband and wife, by and through their Attorney of Record, and hereby submit 
the following Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of 
Memorandum Decision. 
Plaintiffs are accurate in their introduction, that is on the 23rd of December,2009 the court 
issued its Memorandum Decision and corrected that Memorandum Decision on approximately the 
30th of December, 2009. The matter is awaiting the submission of the proposed final Judgment to 
be provided to the court upon receipt by counsel from a surveyor (Gale Dahlman) of the center line 
description of one of the easements as required by the Court's Memorandum Decision. It is 
anticipated that Judgment will be filed within the next thirty (30) days. In the interim, the Plaintiffs 
have filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Memorandum Decision. 
The conundrum faced by the court in this instance is that the trier effect (the court) was the 
Honorable James Michaud. The hearing Judge in this matter, Lansing Haynes, District Court Judge, 
did not have the opportunity to hear the trial in full, which trial lasted approximately four days. It 
appears that the Plaintiffs are requesting this court to overturn the findings of Judge Michaud, who 
wasthe trier of fact, took the evidence, observed the witnesses, and made his decision based upon the 
law, facts, evidence and his observations of the witnesses. 
The Plaintiffs first argue the issue of merger as described in Jolley vs. Idaho Securities, Inc., 
90 Idaho 373 , 414P2d 879 (1966). Plaintiffs have misconstrued that case. The court in Jolley 
(Supra) at page 884, noted that the exception to the general rule of merger is "There is an exception 
to the rule stated, which is that the contract of conveyance is not merged upon execution of a deed 
where under the contract the rights are conferred collaterally and independent of the deed; there being 
no presumption that the party in accepting the deed intends to give up the covenants of which the deed 
is not a performance or satisfaction". In this case there was a contract for conveyance, and the 
execution of the deed simultaneously, which deed was later recorded. The terms set forth in the 
contract, ( easements) which are in addition to the conveyance of the real property, survive in 
accordance with Jolley. In this case Judge Michaud found that the collateral stipulation regarding the 
easement was in addition to the deed, Exhibit 15 was of record, and put the world on notice. 
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AMENDMENT OF MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Plaintiffs then argue that the court erred in using the five year time period instead of the 
twenty year adverse possession time period. The court in its reasoning found that the rights vested 
prior to the legislature modifying the rights, and that those rights being vested could not otherwise 
be taken. This is an issue of first impression with the courts of the State of Idaho, there being no 
appellate court decision making that determination. Therefore the reasoned decision of Judge 
Michaud should stand. 
Next, the Plaintiffs argue that the application of the recording statutes was erroneous under 
the facts of this case noting that they do not believe Sanders had the ability to grant an easement 
across the Worley Fire District portion. While Sanders mayor may not have had such a right, he 
certainly had the right to grant an easement across the now Belstler property which was then the 
Henry property in terms of the agreements entered into between Sanders and Henry. It is important 
to note that Worley Fire District is not a party to this agreement, nor is there any evidence that they 
have objected to the easement as it crosses its property. 
Next, the Plaintiffs argue that the court erred regarding the discussion of the elements of 
prescriptive easement on page 4 of its decision. The Plaintiff argue that the mere existence of a road 
is irrelevant to the elements of prescriptive easement. However, Plaintiffs fail to note that as to the 
requirement of open, notorious, continuous and interrupted use what lies on the face of the earth and 
the time period in which it lies on the fact of the earth goes directly to the issue of open and notorious. 
The facts are undisputed that the road in question was in place within the prescriptive time limit, and 
was used openly. 
Next, the Plaintiffs argue that Judge Michaud's characterization of "Exhibit 15" was a serial 
grant of easement. That is a conclusion of law based upon the status of the law and the facts 
construed by Judge Michaud. It appears, again, that this is a collateral attack on the trier of fact in 
terms of interpretation ofthe documents ("Exhibit 15" which was admitted without objection by both 
parties). 
Next, the Plaintiffs argue that the Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement controls over 
Plaintiffs "Exhibit 15". A close examination ofthe Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement, Plaintiffs' 
"Exhibit 18 and 19" clearly indicates it was simply an agreement for maintenance of a roadway, and 
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did not supercede any previously existing road, nor was there any surrender of any rights to the use 
of the road previously granted. Therefore Plaintiffs' argument that the Joint Use and Maintenance 
Agreement supercedes "Exhibit 15" must fail. 
The Plaintiffs then argue that Judge Michaud failed to address the trial arguments and 
evidence related to the term "community road". Quite clearly, the term "community road" was some 
what ambiguous, and subject to interpretation based upon the facts introduced at trail. Again we see 
the Plaintiffs' attempt to have this court over rule the trier of fact, who reviewed all of the evidence 
and heard the testimony over a course of four days. The same is without merit. 
The Plaintiffs then argue that the application of Idaho Code 55-313 is improper at this stage. 
The Plaintiffs, however, waived such argument because statements and argument were made, as well 
as ajudicial recognition taken ofIdaho Code 55-313 at the time oftrial. Defendants also pointed out 
that issue in their pretrial brief and post trial memoranda. There was no objection at the time of trial 
for the court to examine that code section, which provides guidance to the court to prevent future legal 
disputes between the parties (judicial economy). Therefore the Plaintiffs' argument must fail. 
Finally the Plaintiffs argue that there was no delivery of the Grant of Easement from Henry 
to Merwin. However, as Plaintiffs point out in their own brief, citing the Estate ofSkvorak, 140 Idaho 
at 21, page 204 (apparently ofthe Pacific Reporter) that the real test of delivery of a deed is this: "Did 
the grantor by his acts or words or both intend to divest himself of title? If so, the deed is delivered." 
Judge Michaud, taking all ofthe facts and evidence into consideration, determined that it was Sanders 
intention to divest himself of title, both as to Henry and as to Merwin for the purpose of conveying 
easements. The facts are uncontroverted to that effect. 
Therefore Defendants respectfully request that the court reject the Motion for Reconsideration 
and the Amendment of Memorandum Decision. //~ \_.~ 
DATED this ~ day of March, 201 0/ L<~ ~ "", _" (,~~-
CHARLES M. DODSz 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
I hereby certify that on the {6 1-' day of 
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AMENDMENT OF MEMORANDUM DECISION 
/1tAu~b ,2010, a true and correct copy 
oftl1efOfegoing was: 
transmitted, via facsimile: 
to: 
ARTHUR B. MACOMBER 
A TT0gNEY AT LAW 
vr~=9933 ._-=-
CHARLES M. DODS01f=3 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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Arthur B. Macomber, Attorney at Law 
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Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 664-4700 
Facsimile (208) 664-9933 
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Case No: CV 2007-2523 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND 
AMENDMENT OF 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Date: 
Time: 
Venue: 
March 16,2010 
3:30 P.M. 
Kootenai County 
Courthouse 
The Honorable Judge Haynes 
-------------------------) 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs and Counter Defendants, CHRlS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, by and through their attorney of record, Arthur B. Macomber, and provide their 
Reply to Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of 
Memorandum Decision filed late with this Court on March 10,2010. 
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum Decision,., -1 IF~ 
1 I,. ! I 
ARGUMENT 
In reply to defendants' opposition, there should be no concern by this Court that the trier 
of fact was the Honorable James Michaud, now retired. It is not necessary for the current Judge 
Haynes to hear the trial in full, because this trial is primarily concerned with judicial analysis of 
documents and interpretation of those documents under law. The oral evidence presented at trial 
and the Judge's analysis of witnesses while testifying is almost completely irrelevant to the 
outcome of this case. If this Court simply reads the law, the exhibit documents, and the pleadings 
submitted by counsel, plaintiffs believe a proper and different decision would be rendered in 
plaintiffs' favor. 
As far as defendants' and the Court's previous arguments related to merger and the Jolley 
case, 90 Idaho 373 (1966), there were no collateral rights conferred in the purported easement 
that is plaintiffs Exhibit 15. There is probably nothing more non-collateral in real property law 
than an easement that runs with the land and is appurtenant to title. A collateral matter would be, 
as in Jolley, the provision of an abstract of title, or, as in Sainsbury Constr. Co. v. Quinn, 137 
Idaho 269,273 (2002) (rev. denied), an agreement to construct a residence. 
Strangely, in their argument regarding merger in the deed, defendants state on page 2, at 
paragraph 4 of their Brief in Opposition that the Sanders-Henry contract for conveyance and the 
execution of the Henry deed were done simultaneously, but that it is of no consequence that 
plaintiffs Exhibit 15 was executed later. Further, and confusedly, on page 3, at paragraph 2 of 
defendants' Brief in Opposition, defendants claim Sanders "had the right to grant an easement 
across the now Belstler property," even though plaintiffs Exhibit 15 has no such easement. The 
only purported Sanders' grant in Exhibit 15 is across Worley Fire District property Sanders' no 
longer owned! Judge Haynes can read these facts himself. The fact that Worley Fire District is 
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not a party to the case or may have never objected to anyone crossing its property is irrelevant to 
whether Sanders had power to convey an easement over property he no longer owned. It is black 
letter Idaho law that Sanders could not convey an easement to Henry across property that 
Sanders did not own, and thus Sanders' consideration to Henry for the purported Henry to 
Merwin grant in plaintiffs Exhibit 15 must fail. Defendants fail at articulating an argument 
around this conclusion given Idaho law and the documents in this case. 
As to the purported "delivery" of plaintiffs' exhibit 15 to Merwin, Judge Haynes can read 
the Deposition of Mr. Henry, exhibit 26, related to his lack of knowledge of what he was signing, 
and then his acceptance after five deposition pages of coaxing and pressure. Henry, Sanders, and 
Merwin did not testify at trial, and Judge Michaud erred in this judgment regarding delivery, 
something Judge Haynes is perfectly capable of determining from documents in evidence when 
reconsidering the Memorandum Decision. 
As far as the five-year time period for adverse possession defendants argued and Judge 
Michaud concluded to be previously vested and applicable here, as opposed to the use of the 
twenty-year adverse possession time period as passed by the Legislature in 2006, it should be 
clear to this Court that the current Idaho Code section 5-203 requires defendants for their 
counterclaim be "seized or possessed of the property in question within 20 years before the 
commencement of the action," and since their counterclaim did not commence until mid-2007 the 
twenty-year time period should apply. There is no law or reason behind defendants' claim that an 
issue of first impression incorrectly decided should stand, if the black letter of the statutory law 
calls for a different conclusion. This conclusion would unnecessarily encourage appeal. 
Further, defendants err when they claim that the mere existence of the road is relevant to 
elements of prescriptive easement, because, as they argue, that fact "goes directly to the issue of 
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open and notorious." In fact, those elements of open and notorious are related to the use of the 
property by claimant/defendants, and not open and notorious existence of the road itself. Because 
defendants failed to show open and notorious use for the twenty-year period, prescriptive 
easements should not have been found by Judge Michaud. This finding was clear error. 
Defendants claim plaintiffs make a "collateral attack on the trier of fact in terms of 
interpretation of the documents." This is absurd. Plaintiffs request reconsideration of the decision 
given the facts and documentation in the case, and this should not be mischaracterized as a 
collateral attack on Judge Michaud. 
Plaintiffs pray Judge Haynes undertakes "a close examination" of the Joint Use and 
Maintenance Agreement at plaintiffs exhibits 18 and 19, because plaintiffs believe it is clear that 
said Agreement supersedes any purported grants made in plaintiffs Exhibit 15. There is no 
evidence before the Court that the parties to the Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement did not 
execute the provision at issue in that document in order to clear up confusion caused by 
plaintiffs' Exhibit 15. 
Plaintiffs believe Judge Michaud ignored the clear documentary evidence at plaintiffs' 
exhibit 32 related to the term "community road." In fact, Judge Michaud did not consider in his 
Memorandum Decision at page 6 plaintiffs' exhibit 32 at all, and it does not appear in that 
decision, even though it should be determinative as to the definition of "community road" for its 
meaning in plaintiffs' exhibit 15, which is a document created by Sanders or his agent at 
Sanders' direction. It is clear that Sanders' designated road direction referenced in plaintiffs' 
exhibit 15 is east-to-west, not west-to-east up Chandler Lane from Rockford Bay Road. 
Finally, Judge Michaud's decision to enjoin plaintiffs' potential future use ofldaho Code 
section 55-313 was not argued at trial. Was it mentioned in defendants' briefs? Yes. Were the 
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cases available under Idaho law related to servient estate movement of easements considered or 
argued? No. For example, while there is no case law under Idaho Code section 55-313, there was 
no discussion of case law under Idaho Code section 42-1207, which addresses servient estate 
relocation of irrigation ditches, such as Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Association v. Pulley, 
125 Idaho 237 (1993). Nor was the case of Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39 (1951) discussed, 
which includes discussion of how to arrive at whether "injury" has occurred due to a servient 
estate's acts to relocate. Nor was the significance argued of the fact that Idaho Code section 42-
1207 requires consent of the dominant estate, whereas Idaho Code section 55-313 does not. No 
Court should enjoin based on facts and law not fully briefed and argued, and this Court should 
remove the injunction from the Memorandum Decision in this case. 
-+k A.J~ I. 
DATEDthis (z day of '~L ,2010. 
ARTHUR B. MACOMBER 
Attorney at Law 
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HOWARD CONINE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
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HOWARD CONINE, husband and wife, 
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v. 
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JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court trial concluding all September 24,2009, the 
Honorable James R. Michaud presiding. Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants Belstler's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Amendment of Memorandum Decision came on regulady for hearing 
before the Court on March 16,2010 at 3:30 p.m., the Honorable Lansing L. Haynes, District 
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Judge presiding. Arthur B. Macomber appeared for PlaintiffS/Counter Defendants. Charles M. 
Dodson appeared for Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs. This Court entered its Memorandum 
Decision and Order Re: Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider on April 21, 2010. 
Based upon the Court record and Memorandum Decision. the Court does hereby, 
ORDER~ ADJUDGE, AND DECREE that, 
1. Plaintiffs Belstler are the owners of that certain rea] property described as follows: 
All that portion of Government Lot 1, Section 17, Township 48 North, Range 4 
West, Boise Meridian, described as follows: Beginning at the Northeast corner 
of said Government Lot 1 ~ thence North 89°36' West, along the North line of 
said Government Lot 1, 330.2 feet; thence South 0~4' West, to a point on the 
North line of Rockford Bay Road; thence Easterly along said North line of 
Rockford Bay Road to a point which bears South 00:24' West, from the Point of 
Beginning; thence North O~4' East, to the Point of Beginning. 
2. Defendants Conine are the owners of that certain real property described as 
follows: 
That portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quartet' of Section 17, 
Township 48 North, Range 4 W.RM., Kootenai County, State of Idaho, 
described as follows: Beginning at the Northwest corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter; thence continuing along the North side of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Qualter, a distance of 51 0 feet; thence South 
on a line parallel with the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter to th.e Northerly boundary of Terrace Addition to Rockford Bay Summer 
Homes; thence in a Westerly direction along the Northerly boundary line of said 
Terrace Addition to the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter of Section 17; thence North along said West line to the Northwest corner 
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter to the point of beginning; 
EXCEPT therefrom as a right of way> the existing County Road, also reserving, 
if required, a 15 foot easement South of the County Road, for an entrance to Lots 
3 and 4 in Terrace Addition; 
3. No express easements exist across BeIstler's real property benefitting Conine's 
real property; 
4. No prescriptive easements exist across PlaintiffBelstler's property in the area 
depicted on the Survey recorded on November 25,2005 as Instrument No. 1997493000 in 
Kootenai County, State of Idaho, as "Dirt Road elL" or "Road Easement" abut ling Belstler's 
soutllem border as identified at trial in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23. 
5. Defendants Conine's claim for a southerly easement by prescription is dismissed. 
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6. Title is ordered quieted for Plaintiffs Belstler in the area comprising both 
southerlY easements on the Survey recorded on November 25,2005 as Instrument No. 
1997493000 in Kootenai County, State ofIdaho, 
P. ? 
7, Defendants Conine have established a prescriptive easement upon Belstler's real 
property in an area surveyed as shown in Exhibit "A" to this Judgment, which centerline is 
depicted on the Survey recorded on November 25,2005 as Instrument No. 1997493000 in 
Kootenai County, State of Idaho within the area identified as "Private Access Road" on 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23. 
8. The quiet title claims of Plaintiffs Belstler are dismissed with respect to the 
"Private Access Road" northerly easement depicted on the Survey recorded on November 25, 
2005 as Instrument No. 1997493000 in Kootenai County, State of Idaho, but granted as to the 
most northem easement above said "Private Access Road," which most northern easement's 
centerline shows distances referenced as C12, L3, CII. and CIO. 
9. The nature, length, width and location of said prescriptive easement over the 
private drive benefitting Defendants Conine's propeliy is as described and depicted on the 
survey attached hereto as Exhibit "A," 
10, Plaintiffs Belstler are denied any right to change the location of the Canines 
prescriptive easement to the locations referred to on "Worksheet of Road Grades dated August 
12,2008" evidenced at trial as Exhibit "T," a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
11. The use of Conine's prescriptive easement is for year-round residential use only. 
12. Defendants Conine are awarded their costs incurred in the defense ofthis action, 
but are denied an award of attorneys' fees. Plaintiff'S BeIstler shall pay their own fees and costs, 
IT IS SO ORDERED and JUDGMENT is entered accordingly_ 
DATED this .3 
JUDGMENT 
day of J "-lVV- , 2010. 
Lansing . aynes 
District Judge 
3 
J un. L. L V I V ~ : lJ I AM IVI er Law nLC No.0031 P. 6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I on the ~ day of :;r\L~ ,20ID, a true copy of the foregoing 
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Law Office of Arthur B. Macomber ~1 
408 E. Shennan Avenue, Ste 215 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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Charles M. Dodson 
Attorney at Law 
1424 Shennan Ave., Suite 300 
Coeur d! Alene, 1D 83814 
Telephone: 208-664-1577 
FAX: 208-666-9211 
Attorney for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband aud wife, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
DEFENDANTS. 
KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife. 
COUNTER PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
COUNTER DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NUMBER: CV·07·2523 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Jul: 7. 2010 3: 19PM ~ er Law PLLC No.0118 P. 3/8 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court) trial concluding on September 24, 2009, the Honorable 
James R. Michaud presiding. Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants Belstler's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Amendment of Memorandum Decision came on regularly for hearing before 
the Court on March 16,2010 at 3:30 p.m.) the Honorable Lansing L. Haynes, Djstrict Judge 
presiding. Arthur B. Macomber appeared for Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants. Charles M. Dodson 
appeared for Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs. This Court entered its Memorandum Decision and 
.., Order Re: Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider on April 21, 2010. 
Based upon the COUlt record and Memorandum Decision, the Court does hereby, 
ORDER, ADJUDGE, AND DECREE that, 
1. Plaintiffs Belstler are the owners of that certain real propelty described as foHows: 
All that portion of Government Lot 1, Section 17, Township 48 North, Range 4 
West) Boise Meridian, described as follows: Beginning at the Northeast comer of 
said Goverrunent Lot 1; thence North 89OJ6' West, along the North Hne of said 
Government Lot L 330.2 feet; thence South 0°24' West, to a point on the N0l1h 
line of Rockford Bay Road; thence Easterly along said NOlth line of Rockford Bay 
Road to a point which bears South 0'24' West, from the Point of Beginning; 
thence N0l1h 0°24' East, to the Point of Beginning. 
2. Defendants Conine are the owners of that certain real property described as follows: 
That portion of the Northwest Quarter of the NOltheast Quarter of Section 17, 
Township 48 North, Range 4 W.B.M .• Kootenai County, State of Idaho, described 
as follows: Beginning at the Northwest cornel' of the Northwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter; thence continuing along the North side of the NOlthwest 
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Quarter of the Northeast Quarter, a distance of 510 feet; thence South on a line 
parallel with the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the NOltheast Quarter to 
the Northerly boundary of Terrace Addition to Rockford Bay Summer Homes; 
thence in a Westerly direction along the Northedy boundary line of said Terrace 
Addition to the West line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quatter of 
Section 17; thence North along said West line to the Northwest comer of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Qualtel' to the point of beginning; 
EXCEPT therefrom as a right of way, the existing County Road, also reserving, if 
required, a 15 foot easement South of the County Road, for an entrance to Lots 3 
and 4 in Terrace Addition; 
3. No express easements exist across Belstler's real propelty benefitting Conine's real 
propelty; 
4. No prescriptive easements exist across Plaintiff Belstlel" s property in the area 
depicted on the Survey recorded on Novembelo 25, 2005 as Instrument No. 1997493000 in 
Kootenai County, State of Idaho, as "Dirt Road CIL" 01' "Road Easement" abutting Belstler's 
southern border as identified at trial in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23. 
50 Defendants Conine's claim for a southerly easement by prescription is dismissed. 
6. Title is ordered quieted for Plaintiffs Belstlel' in the area comprising both southerly 
easements 011 the Survey recorded on November 25, 2005 as Instrument No. 1997493000 in 
Kootenai County, State of Idaho. 
7. Defendants Conine have established a prescriptive easement upon Beistler' s real 
property in an area surveyed as shown in Exhibit "A" to this Judgment, which centerline is 
. depicted on the Survey recorded on November 25,2005 as Instrument No. 1997493000 in 
Kootenai County, State ofIdaho within the area identified as "Private Access Road" 011 Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 23. 
8. The quiet title claims of Plaintiffs Belstler are dismissed with respect to the "Private 
Access Road" northerly easement depicted on the Survey recorded on Novembeto 25 J 2005 as 
Instrument No. 1997493000 jn Kootenai County, State ofIdaho, but granted as to the most 
northern easement above said "Private Access Road," which most northern easement's centerline 
shows distances referenced as C12, L3, CII, and CIO. 
r"\?1 l .) I 
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9. The nature, length, width and location of said prescriptive easement over the private 
drive benefitting Defendants Conine's property is as described and depicted on the survey 
attached hereto as Exhibit <lA." 
lO. Plaintiffs BeJstler are denied any right to change the location of the Conine's 
prescriptive easement to the locations refelTed to on "Worksheet of Road Grades dated August 12, 
2008" evidenced at trial as Exhibit "T," a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
11. The use of Conine's prescriptive easement is for year-round residential use only. 
12. Defendants Conine are awarded their costs in the amount of TWO THOUSAND 
FIVE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN DOLLARS AND FORTY SEVEN CENTS ($2,597.47), but 
are denied an award of attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs Belstler shall pay their own fees and costs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED and JUDGMENT is entered accordingly, Nunc Pro TUNC to 
June 3rd, 2010. 
DATED this - 13 day of 3" vb.( 
I hereby certify that on the K day of 
<- )' . 'j::?v~ // - ,2010, a true and correct copy 
ofilie foreing was transmitted, via facsimile: 
to: 
ARTHUR B. MACOMBER #- S-& ) 
FACSIMILE 664·9933 
,2010. 
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Arthur B. Macomber, Attorney at Law 
408 E. Shennan Avenue, Suite 215 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 664-4700 
Facsimile (208) 664-9933 
Email address:art@macomberlaw.com 
State Bar #7370 
Attorney for Appellants 
STATE Of IDA'HtJ ,~ 
COllNTY OF KOOTENAd 55 
FfL~r,: -::. 103J 
... u '.', I 0Jr')I"'::' 
J,V'--' 
2010 JUL 16 PH 2: 58 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA ) Supreme Court Docket # 
----
BELSTLER, husband and wife, ) 
) Case No: CV-2007-2523 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) 
) 
v. ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and ) 
HOWARD CONINE, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
) 
) 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and ) 
HOWARD CONINE, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Counter PlaintiffslRespondents, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA ) 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Counter Defendants/Appellants. ) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, KAREN SHELER (CONINE) AND 
HOWARD CONINE; AND THOSE PARTIES' ATTORNEY, CHARLES M. 
DODSON, 1424 SHERMAN AVE., SUITE 300, COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, 
83814; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 1 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named plaintiffs-appellants, CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER hereby appeal against the above named defendants-respondents CONINE to the 
Idaho State Supreme Court from the Amended Final Judgment (nunc pro tunc) entered in the 
above-entitled action on the 4th day of June 2010, Honorable Judge Lansing L. Haynes 
presiding. 
2. That the parties hereby timely appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to 
Appellate Rule 14(a), and the judgment described in paragraph one above is an appealable order 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule l1(a)(1). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellants intend to 
assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellants 
from asserting other issues on appeal: 
(a) Whether the trial court erred in determining that the statutory period for 
plaintiffs to quiet their title against a prescriptive easement was five years, 
instead of the 20 years required by Idaho Code section 5-203 in effect when 
plaintiffs filed their quiet title action. 
(b) Whether the trial court erred in determining the statutory period for 
defendants to establish a prescriptive easement was five years, instead of the 
20 years required by Idaho Code section 5-203 in effect when defendants filed 
their counterclaim for prescriptive easement. 
(c) Whether the trial court erred in deciding not to quiet title in favor of plaintiffs 
Belstler when it decided defendant's Conine had a prescriptive easement right 
to use Belstler's private driveway. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
(d) Whether the trial court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction when it 
barred plaintiff Belstlers' future exercise of their statutory right pursuant to 
Idaho Code section 55-313 to relocate any Conine easement to locations 
referred to in paragraph 10 of and Exhibit B to the Amended Judgment. 
(e) Whether the court erred in not deciding Belstler's were the prevailing party 
and that they are not entitled to their fees and costs from defendants, and in 
deciding Conine's were due their costs from Belstlers. 
4. No Order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record or transcript. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) Appellants request the preparation of the following reporters' transcript's 
in hard copy [ ], electronic format [ ] , or both [XX]: The entire reporter's Standard Transcript 
as defined in LA.R. 25(c), for which the Trial Reporter was Joann Schaller, and supplemented 
by the following: Transcript of Hearing of Motion for Reconsideration held March 16, 2010 at 
3:30PM before Judge Haynes with Reporter Laurie Johnson transcribing. 
6. Appellants request the following documents be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under LA.R. 28: 
(a) 4/30/2008 Affidavit of Chris and Dana Belstler, 
(b) 6/23/2008 Affidavit of Karen Sheler (Conine) in Opposition to pet's motion 
for summary judgment, 
(c) 9116/2009 Plaintiffs Trial Brief Reconveyance of Easement Ineffective 
Pursuant To Idaho Law, 
(d) 10/29/2009 Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Legal Arguments, 
(e) 10/30/2009 Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs' Post Trial Memorandum, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 3 
(f) 11123/2009 Defendants Conines Response to Plaintiffs Post Trial Brief, 
(g) 11/23/2009 Plaintiffs reply to Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs Post-Trial 
Memorandum, 
(h) 3/02/2010 BriefIn Support Of Motion For Reconsideration And Amendment 
Of Memorandum Decision, 
(i) 3/10/2010 Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration 
and Amendment of Memorandum Decision, 
G) 3/1212010 Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Motion for 
Reconsideration & Amendment of Memoradum Decision. 
7. Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: Three (3) USDA Farm Service 
Agency Aerial Photos, as listed on Notice of Filing Plaintiffs List of Exhibits dated 09/08/2009. 
Appellants request that these photos not be copied, due to the cost, but that the originals be 
transported to the Supreme Court on the appropriate schedule. 
8. Plaintiffs' attorney signing below certifies: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and address: Joanne Schaller, P.O. Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 83816-9000; 
Name and address: Laurie Johnson, P.O. Box 9000, Coeur d' Alene, Idaho, 83816-9000. 
(b) [XX] That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c) [XX] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 4 
(d) [XX] That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this 16th day of July 2010. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 5 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney for Appellants 
? /1 r 0"'1' '. I 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was 
served this 16 day of July 2010, upon the following people in the manner indicated: 
Charles M Dodson 
Attorney at Law 
1424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: 208-664-1577 
Clerk of the District Court 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
Joanne Schaller 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
Laurie Johnson 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 6 
[XX] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile: 208-666-9211 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[XX] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile: 208-
[XX] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile: 208-
[XX] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile: 208-
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney for Appellants 
"t. ,J 
CHARLES M. DODSON 
Attorney at Law 
1424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 300 
Coeur d' Alene ID 83814 
(208) 664-1577 
Facsimile (208) 666-9211 
ISB #2134 
STI\"!'E OF IDAHO >~S 
cown Y OF KOOTENAI1 " 
FILED: 6 49~ ~ 
2010 MIG -6 AM 10: 46 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT/CROSS APPELLANTS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NUMBER 37893-2010 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS/CROSS 
RESPONDENTS, 
VS. 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/CROSS 
APPELLANTS, 
KAREN SHELER CONINE and HOWARD 
CONINE, husband and wife, 
COUNTER PLAINTIFFS/RESPONDENTS/ 
CROSS APPELLANTS, 
VS. 
I-NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL 
CASE NUMBER: CV-07-2523 
NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL 
? ," I .. ) 1 ;, 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
COUNTER DEFENDANTS/ APPELLANTS/ 
CROSS RESPONDENTS. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS/CROSS RESPONDENTS, CHRIS 
BELSTLER and DANA BELSTLER, husband and wife, AND THEIR ATTORNEY ARTHUR B. 
MACOMBER,408 SHERMAN AVENUE, SUITE 215, COEUR D'ALENE IDAHO 83814; AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
Notice is hereby given, in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 15 and Rule 18 of the 
Cross Appeal of Defendants/Respondents/Cross Appellants, KAREN SHELER CONINE and 
HOWARD CONINE, and as follows: 
A. The title of the action for proceeding is as set for in the heading hereof. 
B. The title of the court which heard the trial is as hereinabove set forth, and the name of the 
presiding Judge at the trial was the HONORABLE JAMES MICHAUD, and the name of the Judge 
hearing the Motion for Reconsideration is the HONORABLE LANSING HAYNES. 
C. The Case Number is as set forth hereinabove, including the docket assigned by the 
Supreme Court. 
D. That the name of the parties Cross Appealing are KAREN SHELER CONINE and 
HOWARD CONINE, husband and wife, represented by CHARLES M. DODSON, ATTORNEY AT 
LA W, and the adverse parties are, CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA BELSTLER, husband and wife, 
represented by ARTHUR B. MACOMBER, ATTORNEY AT LAW. That the name, telephone 
number and e-mail address of counsel for the Cross Appellants, is: 
CHARLES M. DODSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
DODSON AND RAE ON LAW OFFICES 
1424 SHERMAN AVENUE, SUITE 300, 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
TELEPHONE 208-664-1577 
FACSIMILE 208-666-9211 
STATE BAR NUMBER2134 
E-MAIL ADDRESScmdodsonlaw@gmail.com; 
2-NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL ?4··.~ 
and that name, telephone number and e-mail address for counsel for the Cross Respondents is: 
ARTHUR B. MACOMBER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MACOMBER LA W, PLLC 
408 SHERMAN AVENUE, SUITE 215 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
TELEPHONE 208-664-4700 
FACSIMILE 208-664-9933 
STATE BAR NUMBER 7370 
E-MAIL ADDRESSart@macomberlaw.com 
E. The designation ofthe Judgment appealed from is the Judgment and Amended Judgment 
entered by the trial court in the above entitled matter as said original Judgment was entered June 3, 
2010, and the Amended Judgment (to include costs) was entered on the 13th of July, 2010. 
F. Statement of issues. The preliminary statement of issues on appeal are: 
1. That the original trial Judge was correct on his analysis, pronouncement and Opinion; and, 
2. the Judge hearing the Reconsideration (not the Judge participating in the trial) erred in excluding 
the findings and order of the Trial Judge that an express easement existed, both as to the "Northern 
Easement and Southern Easement"; and, 
3.That based upon the decision of the Original Trial Judge Defendants/Respondents/Cross Appellants 
should have been awarded fees in addition to costs. 
G. This matter is brought as an appeal as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 4 and Rule 14(a) 
as the same applies through Rules 15 and 18 Idaho Appellate Rules. 
H. The transcript. The transcript has been designated by the Appellant. 
I.. Record. The designation of the record documents has been identified by the Appellant, 
and prior to the approval of the transcript examination, will be made to determine whether or not it 
should be augmented. 
J. Exhibit. Cross Appellant requests Defendants Exhibits 0, P, T, U, V, and W, and 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 14, 15, and 16 admitted at trial be part of the record in addition to those requested 
by the Appellant. 
K. Certification. 
3-NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL 
1. The undersigned hereby certifies that service of the Notice of Cross Appeal and any 
requests for additional transcript (there being none) have not been made upon the Reporter(s); 
2. That the estimated Reporter's fees for the requested transcript, if any, have previously been 
paid by the Appellant, and that the Cross Appellant did not request such transcript; 
3. That the estimated fees for any additional documents and the Clerk's Record (copies of 
Exhibits) have not been paid but will be paid upon presentation of an estimated cost; 
4. That the Appellant Filing Fee is paid concurrent with the filing of this Notice. 
5. I hereby certify that a copy of this Notice of Cross Appeal and any requests for additional 
transcript (none) has been served upon each Reporter of whom an additional transcript has been 
requested (none), and that service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 1AR. 
DATED this /';' i' day of August, 201~ //' /) ~N-= ~ 
ATTORNEY FOR CROSS APPELLANT 6-
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of 
August, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to: 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney at Law 
Macomber Law, PLLC 
408 Sherman Avenue, Suite 215 
Coeur d'Alene 1D 83814 
and personally delivered to: 
Clerk of the District Court 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
Coeur d'Alene 1D 83814 
Joanne Schaller 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
Coeur d'Alene 1D 83814 
4-NOT1CE OF CROSS APPEAL 
Laurie Johnson 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
Coeur d' Alene ID 83814 
~ ~--~--------
( '-'Z-- ::--(~~~'"--."':\ 
CHARLES M. DOri£N 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
5-NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL 
IN THE 01 COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICI OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA 
BELSTLER, husband and wife 
Petitioner/Plaintiff 
vs 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and 
HOWARD CONINE, husband and wife 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
37893-2010 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
L Daniel 1. English, Clerk of District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, in and 
for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the above entitled cause 
was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and 
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellants and Respondents were notified that the Clerk's Record 
and Reporter's Transcript were complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies 
were mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on the _-'--~ __ .!.L-__ ' 2010. 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript will be duly lodged with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai, Idaho 
this day of ___ --...;\=-"'......,..'--__ ' 2010. 
DANIEL 1. ENGLISH 
Clerk of District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
CHRIS BELSTLER and DANA ) 
BELSTLER~ husband and wife ) 
) 
) 
Petitioner/Plaintiff ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs ) 
) 
KAREN SHELER (CONINE) and ) 
HOWARD CONINE, husband and wife ) 
) 
Respondents/Defendants ) 
CERTIFICATE OF 
EXHIBITS 
CASE # CV-07-2523 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
37893-2010 
L DANIEL 1. ENGLISH, Clerk OrDistrict COLlli of the First ludicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and tor [hc County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the attached list of 
exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being forward to the Supreme Court 
of Appeals. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the following documents will be submitted as exhibits to the 
Record: 
I. Defendant's Exhibit No. A (admitted 9/21/09) Mutual Agreement. 
7 Defendant's Exhibit No. B-C (admitted 9/21/09) 10int Use Agreement. 
3. Defendant's Exhibit No. D (admitted 9/21/09) Wan'anty Deed. 
4. Defendant's Exhibit No.1 (admitted 9/21109) Building Permit Application. 
5. Defendant's Exhibit No.1 (admitted 9/21109) Sale Agreement. 
6. Defendant's Exhibit No. K (admitted 9/21109) Statutory Warranty Deed. 
7. Defendant's Exhibit No. M (admitted 9/21109) Wan'anty Deed. 
8. Defendant's Exhibit No. N (admitted 9/21109) Warranty Deed. 
9. Defendant's Exhibit No. 0 (admitted 9/21109) Document - Verbal Agreement. 
10. Defendant's Exhibit No. P (admitted 9/21109) Document. 
j I. Defendant's Exhibit No. Q (admitted 9/21109) Map. 
12. Defendant's Exhibit No. R (admitted 9/21109) Warranty Deed. 
J 3. Defendant's Exhibit No. S (admitted 9/21109) Warranty Deed. 
14. Defendant's Exhibit No. T (admitted 9/21109) Map. 
IS. Defendant's Exhibit No. U (admitted 9/21109) Title Report. 
16. Defendant's Exhibit No. V (admitted 9/21/09) Ernest Money Agreement. 
17. Defendant's Exhibit No. W (admitted 9/21109) Disclosure Document. 
18. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. I (admitted 9/21109) Map 1987. 
19. Plaintiffs Exhibit No.2 (admitted 9/21109) Map. 
20. Plaintiff's Exhibit No.3 (admitted 9/21109) Map. 
21. Plaintiff's Exhibit No.4 (admitted 9/21109) Report. 
22. Plaintiffs Exhibit No.5 (admitted 9/21109) Deed 6-3-1947. 
23. Plaintiff's Exhibit No.6 (admitted 9/21109) Deed. 
24. Plaintiff's Exhibit No.7 (admitted 9/21109) Deed. 
25. Plaintiffs Exhibit No 8 (admitted 9/21109) Map. 
26. Plaintiff's Exhibit No.9 (admitted 9/21109) Warranty Deed. 
27. Plainti ff s Exhibit No. I 0 (admitted 9/21/09) Paperwork. 
28. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. II (admitted 9/21109) Easement. 
29. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 12 (admitted 9/21109) Map. 
30. PlaintifTs Exhibit No. 13 (admitted 9/21109) Warranty Deed. 
31. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14 (admitted 9/21109) Sales Agreement 
32. Plaintitf's Exhibit No. 15 (admitted 9/21109) Agreement. 
33. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 16 (admitted 9/21109) Warranty Deed. 
34. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 17 (admitted 9/21109) Warranty Deed. 
35. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 18 (admitted 9/21109) Agreement. 
36. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 19 (admitted 9/21109) Agreement. 
37. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 20 (admitted 9/21109) Warranty Deed. 
38. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 21 (admitted 9/21109) Warranty Deed. 
39. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 22 (admitted 9/21109) Warranty Deed. 
40. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 23 (admitted 9/21109) Map. 
41. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 24 (admitted 9/21109) Depo Of Karen Conine 
42. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 25 (admitted 9/21109) Depo Of Henry G. 
43. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 26 (admitted 9/21109) Depo Of Henry K. 
44. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 27 (admitted 9/21109) Depo Solomons. 
45. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 28 (admitted 9/21109) Depo Evans. 
46. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 29 (admitted 9/21109) Building Permit. 
47. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 30 (admitted 9/21109) App For Pem1it. 
48. PlaintitTs Exhibit No. 31 (admitted 9/21109) E-mail. 
49. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 32 (admitted 9/21109) Newspaper Article. 
50. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 33 (admitted 9/21/09) Permit 
51. PlaintitTs ExhIbit No. I-A (admitted 9/21109) Map. 
52. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3-A (admitted 9/21109) Map. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court 
At Kootenai County, Idaho this day 2010. 
DANIEL 1. ENGLISH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
